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Gertrude Stein's last words were cast in the wry and questioning style 
of Postmodernism. "What is the answer?" she asked, and receiving 
only an empty silence, pressed further: "What is the question?" But 
this book takes as its title not the last words of Stein, which throw us 
off balance, but those of the great Modern writer Henry James. "At 
last," he is quoted as saying, "the real distinguished thing." The 
sober tone, the sense of final achievement and discovery, the poise of 
authoritative endings, the judiciousness and breadth of perspective— 
these are the qualities that interest me. 
In recent years, my research and teaching has been concerned with 
the distinctions between Modernism and Postmodernism in American 
literature and the problems of aging and the elderly in our century's 
industrial culture. The latter takes many people by surprise. I am often 
asked how I became interested in doing research on old age with the 
materials and methods of the humanities. There are, of course, many 
answers to this question, all of which have personal dimensions and 
some of which are no doubt reflected in this book, although I must 
confess that I realize this only in retrospect. For the conception of this 
book evolved over a long period of time. I did not in fact set out 
consciously to write a book on aging and poetry, although this is just 
what has emerged. 
The process began simply enough. Some seven years ago, while 
reading the poetry of Wallace Stevens, I found myself drawn to his last 
poems, preferring them to the early poems of Harmonium and sub­
sequent volumes at a time when his last poems had received compara­
tively little critical attention and the early poems were canonized. I 
decided to study them in the context of the entire body of Stevens' 
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work to discover if I could account for a development over time. I also 
was concerned to understand the place of these poems—an old man's 
poems—in our cultural history. Did they, I wondered, offer our culture 
a model for the satisfactions which I felt? And were Stevens' achieve­
ments paralleled elsewhere? I turned to William Carlos Williams, 
whose major last work was published about the same time. Paterson V 
is critical to the comprehension of Williams' development as a poet; it 
extends his most ambitious poem while at the same time departing 
significantly from it, testifying to a poetic and personal crisis which 
involved both Williams' loss of power in old age and issues of tradition 
and authority. Was the coincidence of The Rock and Paterson V, so 
similar in many respects, an accident? If not, what did this reveal not 
just about individual poetic development or about the needs of our 
culture at a particular point in time, but also about the development of 
American Modernism in poetry? As the questions proliferated, I turned 
to Pound, choosing to focus on what I consider his most beautiful, 
integrated, and wise Cantos—the Pisan Cantos—which came late in 
his life and which, like Williams' Paterson V, were written at a time of 
intense crisis. And lastly, I turned to Eliot and his Four Quartets, his 
last poem, which seemed to me to share many of the qualities of these 
other long meditative poems. What did it mean that Eliot's poem came 
first? Did it in any way provide a model for the others? Or for Eliot 
himself? 
The resulting book is not a systematic study of all the late poems of 
these poets. Rather I have chosen to concentrate in each case on one 
long poem, placing it in the context of earlier work. It is my hope 
that this book casts light on both an aging Modernism and the poetry of 
age (here I use the term "age" instead of "old age" for several 
reasons, one of which is simply that as I grew older in the course of this 
research, my notion of what is "old" changed, receding further into 
the future). 
I have rehearsed at some length the path I took in choosing the poets 
included here because I want to emphasize that I did not begin my 
work with questions about the "images" of poets in their old age. If I 
had, I might have begun with Yeats, whose late poems are splendid 
and basically different in tone, as Daniel Albright shows in his book on 
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Yeats's poetry in old age:1 like Dylan Thomas, Yeats rages against 
age, whereas, for the most part (this must be strictly qualified), these 
four American poets do not. And if I had, I might have written a book 
dominated by images of aging that would have sought, consciously, to 
champion the rights of the elderly as a dispossessed group, much as 
books have been written on behalf of women and their literature, 
blacks and their literature. I share that concern but it was not my initial 
purpose. As I have said, among other things, I was interested in under­
standing just what constitutes the style of the late poems of American 
Modernism, and thus this book invites further research along this line. 
To my mind, Eliot, Pound, Stevens, and Williams are our central 
Modern poets. But what about the late poems of Marianne Moore? Do 
they resemble the poems of these poets? And what of the poets who 
came after? Theodore Roethke's long meditative poems of the fifties?2 
Robert Duncan's poetry? Or Allen Ginsberg's recent poetry concerned 
with old age? I hope others will pursue these questions. 
Nor did I undertake my research with a clear hypothesis about aging 
and the life cycle in mind, although in the process of research and 
writing, this book has no doubt acquired a polemical character. Gener­
ally speaking, there is nothing wrong with adopting a position on 
matters involving cultural choices, values, and practices; indeed, there 
is everything right in doing so, and this all too rarely happens in 
academic research. But in this case—research in the relatively new 
field of aging (especially new in literary studies)—there is a particular 
pitfall to be avoided, if possible. 
The problem, or weakness, of research on aging and the elderly is 
that it tends to fall too easily into one of two overly simplified 
categories: either aging and old age are romanticized or they are pre­
sented as tragic twentieth-century injustices that can be alleviated, 
perhaps even rectified, through medical research and political and 
social reform. The literature of gerontology is characterized by bipolar­
ity: unfortunately it tends to be either flatly optimistic or pessimistic. If 
Simone de Beauvoir's The Coming of Age and Robert Butler's Why 
Survive: Being Old in America tend toward the latter, my book tends 
toward the former. It does so, however, with the understanding basic 
to the humanities that I am concerned with the unique—in this case, 
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with gifted writers—not a carefully selected cross-section of the popu­
lation. This book, in other words, does not deal directly with the 
relationship between social problems and the literary mind, although it 
does imply that there are subtle connections between the larger needs 
of a culture and the artistic imagination. The focus is not on our 
stereotyped images of aging, which can indeed be uncovered through 
the study of literary texts, informing us about our blunt, often unseen 
cultural prejudices: I would hope my approach is more delicate than 
that. 
If there is one discipline outside of literature that comes close to the 
approach of this book, it is developmental psychology, not social 
gerontology. One of the central conclusions of this book, for example, 
is that a new way of thinking (and thus being in the world), a new 
mode of cognition, may emerge in old age. Other areas of fruitful 
research in developmental psychology, not explored in this book, are 
suggested by its findings. I will cite just one example. David Levin-
son 's research on adult development3 reveals that a mentor—an older 
person who represents authority, a teacher, a sponsor, or a guide—is 
crucial to the years of early adulthood; the role of the mentor is to aid in 
the realization of one's dreams in life, which ultimately will require the 
rejection of the mentor. In the poems which I have studied closely— 
poems concerned with aging and old age instead of young 
adulthood—a wise figure also appears, but there is no implication that 
he must be discarded. Is this a developmental phenomenon? I would 
like to see research done on this question by developmental psycholo­
gists as well as scholars in the humanities. 
Finally I should add that this book goes against the grain of much 
contemporary literary criticism, which is preoccupied with beginnings, 
the continual invention of the self, and the denial of origins. Edward 
Said, in his book Beginnings, writes that "paradoxically, an interest in 
beginnings is often the corollary of not believing that any beginning 
can be located."4 This is not the case with endings. They can be 
located, tragically so, in a life, in a civilization. And they are too often 
denied. It may be characteristically American to see things in terms of 
beginnings, but I think it wise to shift our gaze to endings. Certainly 
it is sobering. For as Stevens wrote, so perfectly, in "Waving Adieu, 
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Adieu, Adieu," "In a world without heaven to follow, the stops/ 
Would be endings, more poignant than partings, profounder.. . .  " 
And if a history of American poetics could be written in terms of our 
changing sense of beginnings, as Joseph Riddel proposes,5 we must 
also begin to think of that history as having endings, and write that 
history as well. 
I am deeply indebted to Roy Harvey Pearce, whom I hold dear as a 
mentor, and to the late Michel Benamou, whom I loved. I am grateful 
to Edwin Fussell, Joseph Riddel, Avrum Stroll, Andrew Wright, and 
Donald Wesling for their advice and encouragement. I am also grateful 
to Richard Rose for his perceptive and meticulous work in editing this 
book. I would like to thank the University of California at San Diego 
and the Department of English and the Center for Twentieth Century 
Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, especially Dean 
William Halloran, for their generous support of my research. 
1. See Daniel Albright, The Myth against Myth: A Study of Yeats's Imagination in 
Old Age (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). His work shares many of the 
concerns of my own. 
2. Ralph J. Mills, Jr., has done work on the late poems of Roethke. See his essay in 
Cry of the Human: Essays in Contemporary American Poetry (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1975). 
3. David Le vinson et al., The Seasons of a Man's Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1978). 
4. Edward W. Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Basic Books, 
1975), p. 5. 
5. Joseph Riddel, The Inverted Bell: Modernism and the Counterpoetics of William 
Carlos Williams (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), p. 44. 
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"It must be believed," wrote Emerson in an essay entitled "Old 
Age,'' ' 'that there is a proportion between the designs of a man and the 
length of his life: there is a calendar of his years, so of his perfor-
mances."1 Emerson's theory is characteristically optimistic: he pro­
poses a model of the relationship between creation and the life cycle, 
which he finds fruitful for reasons of both personal and cultural health. 
In our age, we are for the most part skeptical, however. But what doubt 
we have about Emerson's theory of a just measure between perfor­
mance and age, we must limit to specific cases. Our minds move to 
examples to test the theory: Wordsworth (the received wisdom of 
literary history instructs us) lived much too long, Anne Sexton too 
tragically brief a time. In this book I am concerned with four of our 
greatest Modern American poets of the twentieth century. I focus on 
four meditative poems—T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets (1943), Ezra 
Pound's Pisan Cantos (1948), "To an Old Philosopher in Rome" 
from Wallace Stevens' The Rock (1954), and the fifth book of Pater­
son (1958) by William Carlos Williams—considering each in the gen­
eral context of the poet's poetry and prose, and in particular, his social 
thought. My purpose is not so much to test the theory as to point to our 
culture's need for the possibility it offers. For these poets, did aging 
and old age bring poetic fulfillment? Do these poets offer us insight 
into the experience of aging and its satisfactions? 
The appropriate place to begin is with T. S. Eliot, whose work, 
reviewed briefly, can provide us with the historical poetic context in 
which to place these late Modern American poems. In 1915 Eliot 
introduced the world to "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," and 
in that portrait of a middle-aged man whose life is one of endless 
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indecision, Eliot anticipated the uncertainty and debilitation engen­
dered by World War I. Prufrock was bored and exhausted, so worn out 
in fact that by 1920 he had aged to become Gerontion, a shrunken man 
living in a rented house with nothing but his own tired thoughts to keep 
him company. Thirty-two years old at the time of the publication of 
"Gerontion," Eliot describes him as a little old man whose physical 
decrepitude is matched by the sterility of his meditations, "a dull head 
among windy spaces" who, having lost his "sight, smell, hearing, 
taste, and touch," is capable only of "thoughts of a dry brain in a dry 
season. "2 Then, as if it were not enough to personify the times in these 
portraits of Prufrock and Gerontion, two years later Eliot created a new 
poetic model, "The Waste Land," which itself expressed the fragmen­
tation and sterility of the modern secular world, a culture that had no 
informing symbols, only a "heap of broken images." Together these 
three central poems—"Prufrock," "Gerontion," and "The Waste 
Land"—launched what has come to be known as the Age of Eliot. 
But if the Age of Eliot began in exhaustion, it ended in affirmation. 
Eliot, and with him, Pound, Stevens, and Williams, confronted the 
collapse of order, and in their late poems, sought to discover, or 
generate, a new order, a new ground of authority. It is thus nonsense to 
conclude, as does a critic of Wallace Stevens, that "American poets 
have not, in general, aged well, because they have been unable to live 
their agedness with any fulness of being."3 On the contrary, while 
most of the English Romantics, for example, burnt themselves out 
when they were young, these American poets reached into old age with 
intellectual vigor and poetic force. Pound was sixty-three when the 
Pisan Cantos were published, and both Stevens and Williams were 
seventy-five when their last books appeared. Eliot is an exception. His 
seventies were not poetically fertile; the Four Quartets was published 
when he was only in his fifties, but its voice and theme are definitely 
that of an older man. In these poems one impulse dominates individual 
variations: we do not find odes of dejection or the dusty thoughts of a 
Gerontion but poetic energy sustained by deep thought. These poets 
are our ancestors, men of exceptional intelligence and creativity who 
lived a long time, and as poets they must be lived with for a long time. 
And we owe it to ourselves to listen openly, for, as Eliot wrote, "you 
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don't really criticize any author to whom you have never surrendered 
yourself.' '4 
In the Four Quartets, Eliot proposes a poetic point of unity, reestab­
lishes the principle of authority on religious and literary grounds, and 
in so doing opens what we could call Late Modernism, that span of 
fifteen years dating from the publication of the Four Quartets in 1943 
to the appearance of Pater son V in 1958. During these years American 
Modern poetry returns to the tradition of Romanticism (had it ever 
really left it?). Edwin Arlington Robinson's pronouncement of the 
death of great American poetry was much too premature: before the 
nineteenth century had even come to an end, he lamented that "the 
master songs are ended," because Whitman's poetry was "too power­
fully pure,/too lovingly triumphant, and too large"5 for a new age. But 
in the late work of Eliot, Pound, Stevens, and Williams, we have 
master songs of the twentieth century, and they are superb achieve­
ments, large, certainly, if not triumphantly expansive. 
But the books are bound together by more than an affirmative vi-
sion.6 Again it could be said that Eliot takes the lead and provides a 
model. The Four Quartets differs from "The Waste Land" not only in 
its final effort at resolution, but also in its personalism, meditative 
mode, and more pronounced lyric clarity. And in general, these 
characteristics also appear in the late work of the other poets. We no 
longer encounter the careful impersonality of the poet that was the 
hallmark of much early American Modernism. Nor do we find the 
irony that imposes distance. Instead there is a new closeness, a more 
open dialogue between the poet and himself and between the poet and 
the reader. The Modern poet is no longer invisible. He shows us 
himself. The Four Quartets, the Pisan Cantos, The Rock, Paterson 
V—all represent the culmination of long poetic careers (although 
Pound did continue to write for many years), and all strive for tran­
scendence of historical time, seeing history, as Eliot does in "Little 
Gidding," as "a pattern/Of timeless moments."7 In these poems the 
confusion of the urban collage of "The Waste Land" is resolved, if 
only tentatively, in the central image of the sanctuary, partly religious, 
partly ironic, partly paradoxical, of a small enclosed space. 
These poems are marked by a solitude of the self. The first four 
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books of Williams' ambitious epic are dominated by the landscape of 
an industrial New Jersey city, with its polluted rivers and jammed 
elevators. The last book, written after the stroke that compelled him to 
abandon his medical practice, is pervaded by the religious quiet of the 
Cloisters in New York. Age forced a kind of disengagement8 upon 
Williams that was totally new for him, and the remedy he sought was 
equally unparalleled in his past life—the acceptance of the European 
tradition, the shelter of the museum. For Pound, the humiliating, sti­
fling U.S. prison camp in Pisa, Italy, where he was incarcerated in his 
sixties, yielded, paradoxically, a kind of grace. In Stevens' "To an 
Old Philosopher in Rome," the broad expanse of the West contracts to 
the silence of a small convent room. And in the last of Eliot's Quartets, 
"the light fai ls/ . .  . in a secluded chapel" in Little Gidding. 
The quality of this silence is not empty and hollow, as is the Post­
modern silence of Krapp's sputtering last tape in Samuel Beckett's 
play. It is orphic and sacramental, the source of language, the kind of 
silence that lets in symbolism, as the raucous neoromantic Norman O. 
Brown has put it.9 Or as Eliot wrote in his moving essay on Goethe, 
"The wisdom of a human being resides as much in silence as in 
speech."10 With the lessening of mobility imposed by age, space in 
these poems shrinks and disengagement from the social sphere takes 
place. But through the imagination, memory, and the meditative 
mode, this solitude brings new insights. 
Each poet moved in his own way toward a kind of closure to his life 
in poetry. The poems are of course very different from one another. 
But as a group, they are characterized by (1) the central image of "the 
still point"; (2) a method of reflection, a new meditative mode, that 
denies the longheld Cartesian view of the act of the mind as conscious, 
voluntary, Promethean, and dominating, and stresses instead an easy 
penetration of mind and world, an ecology of mind; (3) a new hero, the 
wise old man, in a society that worships youth; and (4) a dedication to 
tradition and the creative act as a stay against chaos, and the life 
review. Thus, considered together, these four late works reveal a new 
development in lyric poetry that marks the last phase of American 
Modernism. 
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I. THE STILL POINT 
In these late poems the past and tradition are not rejected but are 
recreated, and from what Eliot had called the wasteland emerges a new 
image that is potent and integrative, or at least signals the desire for 
such a symbol, a belief in its possibility. In "Burnt Norton," it is the 
"still point": 
At the still point of the turning world. Neither 
flesh nor fleshless; 
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, 
there the dance is, 
But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call 
it fixity, 
Where past and future are gathered. Neither 
movement from nor towards, 
Neither ascent nor decline. Except for the point, 
the still point, 
There would be no dance, and there is only the 
dance. 
The desire is for wholeness, for a reconciliation of opposites ("Neither 
flesh nor fleshless; / Neither from nor towards"), for a state of being 
that is balanced at the source of change but not touched by it, for a 
moment of pure present-ness that can counteract the tyranny of biolog­
ical and historical time without degenerating into stagnation ("do not 
call it fixity"). 
That point of stillness is the origin of meaningful creation, indi­
vidual and cultural ("Except for the point, the still point, /There 
would be no dance"). It is a point of unity and deep peace, the point of 
eternal return, which is described as: 
The inner freedom from the practical desire, 
The release from action and suffering, release from the inner 
And the outer compulsion, yet surrounded 
By a grace of sense, a white light still and moving, 
Erhebung without motion, concentration 
Without elimination, both a new world 
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And the old made explicit, understood 
In the completion of its partial ecstasy, 
The resolution of its partial horror. 
"Burnt Norton" 
The still point is an image of a state of "grace," "still and moving." 
Released from the demands of the world and inner pressures, one 
stands outside of time and gains the perspective of wisdom (' 'both a 
new world / And the old made explicit"). Thus it represents the ulti­
mate goal of a person's life: enhanced spirituality, increased con­
sciousness, and the inner peace that comes from an acceptance of the 
"partial ecstasy" and "partial horror" of one's life and culture. The 
hope, as Eliot puts it in the concluding lines of "Little Gidding," the 
last of the Four Quartets, is that 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
One's life is a journey whose end has the power to illuminate one's 
beginnings. One's end is a threshold where ideally "past and future are 
gathered." 
Eliot's still point is an ideal, a model of wholeness that was offered, 
we might say, to Pound, Stevens, and Williams. The still point: its 
equilibrium represents the simplest and most complete structure a sys­
tem can assume under given conditions. It is a term that has entered the 
vocabulary of the educated and can be sighted in such different fields 
as ballet and the study of Zen.11 It calls up the English Romantics who 
were also preoccupied with the notion of the reconciliation of oppo­
sites. It is analogous to the "point supreme" of which Breton speaks.12 
And it is described by Octavio Paz as the center of the Poem: 
It is not impossible that, after this first and deceptive contact, the 
reader may reach the center of the poem. Let us imagine that encounter. 
In the flux and reflux of our passions and occupations (always divided, 
always I and my double and the double of my other self), there is a 
moment when everything comes to terms. The opposites do not disap­
pear, but are fused for an instant. It is a little like suspended animation: 
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time has no importance. The Upanishads teach that this reconciliation is 
ananda or bliss with the One. Of course, few are capable of reaching 
this state. But all of us, at some time, even for a fraction of a second, 
have glimpsed something similar. One does not have to be a mystic in 
order to know this truth.13 
But above all, the still point refers to a means of articulating the 
relationship of the self to the world. For these four poets it is both 
different and the same. For Ezra Pound in the Pisan Cantos the still 
point is (among other things) the intersection of history and myth, the 
city "in the mind indestructible. "14 It may surprise us that a man who 
devoted so much of his energy to preserving objects and fragments of 
objects—a few lines of Sappho and the stone mermaids of Santa Maria 
Dei Miracoli—should understand the still point as a state of mind 
rather than the reconciliation of opposites embedded in artifact. 
The reverse is true of William Carlos Williams. For him, in the fifth 
book of Pater son, the still point is to be found in the triumph of art 
over time and mortality. It is the museum made real, and here the still 
point refers not so much to a union of the self with the world as a 
strategy for escaping the world: 
It is the imagination 
which cannot be fathomed. 
It is through this hole 
15 we escape . . 
In the work of Wallace Stevens, on the other hand, the still point is not 
embodied, given body. It is neither sought in the medieval tapestries of 
the Cloisters, as it is in Williams, nor in a psychological/mystical state, 
as it is in Pound. For Stevens the still point is eternally elusive, a 
fiction ultimately abstract and metapoetic, the form to which concrete 
texts aspire. It is, as he puts it, the primitive like an orb, "the essential 
poem" that is found "at the centre of things." As he writes, wistfully, 
in "The Ultimate Poem Is Abstract": 
It would be enough 
If we were ever, just once, at the middle, fixed 
In This Beautiful World Of Ours and not as now, 
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Helplessly at the edge, enough to be 
Completely, because at the middle, if only in sense, 
And in that enormous sense, merely enjoy.16 
And for Eliot, who wished always to see the world through the filter of 
consciousness, who always was concerned with historical context, 
with growth, change, and decay, the still point is identified with 
knowledge and the redemption knowledge can bring, but is ultimately 
unattainable. 
II. A NEW MEDITATIVE MODE 
Late Modernism witnessed developments not only in poetry but also 
in the fields of anthropology and psychology which reveal an interest in 
wholeness and integration. As the intellectual historian Merle Curti 
observes, "In the later 1940s and throughout the 1950s the age-old 
quest for absolutes was pursued with fresh zest," and the answer 
given, he says, was essentially a religious or humanist one.17 Thus on 
the one hand, Erich Neumann and Erik Erikson (the former a Jungian 
and the latter a neo-Freudian) proposed theories of psychological de­
velopment and maturation that offer models for what Jung has called 
"centroversion," the achievement of psychic wholeness in the last 
phase of life. And on the other hand, the anthropologists Gregory 
Bateson and Victor Turner looked at the West from both within and 
without and concluded that we must adopt an ecological theory of 
mind, a systemic view of social change. What this suggests is that the 
common concerns of these psychologists and social scientists over the 
last thirty years have been anticipated, or paralleled, by the poets. 
For Gregory Bateson, a work of art is fundamentally a quest for 
grace.18 Although he writes about "primitive" visual art, we can apply 
his observations to the self-conscious poetry of the twentieth-century 
West as well. Certainly the connotations of the word "grace"— 
religious favor, prayer, compassion, good fortune, the unerring beauty 
of poise, the Greek goddesses, moral virtue—capture some of the 
concerns and qualities of these late poems of Eliot, Pound, Stevens, 
and Williams. But for Bateson grace is ultimately something more 
abstract. It is essentially a problem of integrating the diverse parts of 
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the mind, and this integration exists on not just an individual level but a 
cultural level as well. Every culture, he concludes, has a characteristic 
species of grace toward which it is striving, and this can be read in its 
art. The terms that he uses to describe this integration are essentially 
Jungian: art delivers ' 'a message about the interface between conscious 
and unconscious. "19 Rather than holding to the Freudian notion of art 
as symptom, Bateson believes that art speaks a hidden truth; it does 
not hide a truth. 
Taken together, these American poems share a conclusive distrust of 
the conscious, muscular, Promethean act of the mind. They signal a 
return to tradition, to metaphor, and to a reliance on the creative 
readiness that can yield the epiphanic moment. In this way the history 
of American Modernism fulfills Bateson's notion of the more specific 
role art has to play today if we are to extricate ourselves from the 
nightmare of our technological civilization. For art, he believes, calls 
attention to an ecological view of life which compensates for our 
too-purposive Western view of life. This is the wisdom that art can 
impart. "Wisdom," he writes, "I take to be the knowledge of the 
larger interactive system—that system which if disturbed, is likely to 
generate exponential curves of change."20 Humility is a part of this 
wisdom, the knowledge that man is only part of a larger system and 
that the part can never ultimately control the whole. This is the humil­
ity that the American Moderns call for, either explicitly or implicitly. 
Perhaps more importantly, this humility is also dramatized by the 
mode of these meditative poems. It is possible, Bateson believes, that 
the cure for the excesses of conscious purpose lies first with the indi­
vidual rather than with the wholesale reform of institutions. In art, 
dreams, and religion the whole person is involved and "must necessar­
ily relax that arrogance [of the conscious mind] in favor of a creative 
experience in which his conscious mind plays only a small part." He 
concludes that "in creative art man must experience himself—his total 
self—as a cybernetic model. "21 At its best, in other words, the medita­
tive mode of these late poems operates on a new principle of selecting 
"information." It provides us with a model of correct thought, just as 
the nineteenth-century Romantic landscape poem did in its time. The 
meditative mode is thus a way of uniting the self and the world through 
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the agency of the mind, but we must not make the mistake of under­
standing mind as being limited to only conscious mind. 
Here the model of mind described by Bateson converges with that of 
the psychologist Erik Erikson. The wisdom of the meditative mode 
parallels the strength of what Erikson calls the eighth and final stage of 
psychosocial development of the life cycle. The decisive choice in this 
stage of old age, Erikson hypothesizes, is between the attitudes of 
integrity and despair: 
Wisdom, then is detached concern with life itself, in the face of death 
itself. It maintains and conveys the integrity of experience.... If vigor 
of mind combines with the gift of responsible renunciation, some old 
people can envisage human problems in their entirety (which is what 
' 'integrity'' means) and can represent to the coming generation a living 
example of the "closure" of a style of life. Only such integrity can 
balance the despair of the knowledge that a limited life is coming to a 
conscious conclusion.22 
Strength thus inheres in being able to continue with dignity, to be, 
while facing the reality of not being. 
Erikson's phrase "detached concern" provides us with a key to 
understanding the process of achieving this state of mind, this state of 
grace: the meditative mode requires not so much an act of the mind as 
a state of receptivity to experience. In this final stage of life, unity is 
not discovered by the arduous, formulaic Jesuitical meditation Loyola 
recommended: composition, discourse, and colloquy.23 The kind of 
thinking involved is not category-making and abstraction. The goal is 
to discover rather than to impose or to reason. 
How is the meditative mode described by the poets? It occurs, Eliot 
wrote, "at rare moments of inattention and detachment, drowsing in 
sunlight."24 The illumination of the "unexpected moment" appears 
when one is not consciously, purposively, looking for it. The medita­
tive mode of these poems of old age is Heideggerian. It is characterized 
by a quiet openness to the primal realities of human experience which 
allows them simply to be, to disclose themselves before the gaze of the 
whole mind. Here we might speculate, as scholars in other disciplines 
are doing, to what extent this kind of "thinking" characterizes, either 
totally or partially, a last stage of life—senectitude. With the contrac­
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tion of space, the imposition of physical immobility, and the condition 
of solitude, perhaps a new mode of cognition develops that is satisfy­
ing and non-Promethean.25 
El. THE WISE OLD MAN AS HERO 
In these poems a new image of nobility and authority appears: the 
figure of the wise old man as hero. This is significant because so much 
has been said about the adolescent hero in our literature and the frenetic 
cult of youth in America. But it is a corrective we needed and still 
need. The tradition of the new, still rampant, requires its opposite, the 
wisdom of the tradition of the old made new. If we can read the shape 
of history from literature, then in the forties and fifties we desired a 
new form of heroism, or at least, a new sense of tradition and con­
tinuity to counter a throw-away culture. For the abundance of America 
can no longer be thought of in terms of increasing consumer indexes. 
The people of a once-expanding land of plenty must reconceive space 
in interior terms. It is clearly no longer appropriate, nor correct, to 
apostrophize the United States, as Whitman did, as the greatest poem. 
But the compensation could be this: in these four Moderns we see 
that the American Adam has grown up, and more importantly, he has 
grown old with grace and dignity. Whereas "Gerontion" is a "dull 
head among windy spaces," in these poems the supreme humanist 
symbol is transformed from the primitive orb of the poem (a fiction) 
into the wise old man (a reality) in search of what will suffice. Eliot 
had written prophetically in "East Coker" that "Old men ought to be 
explorers." And, in fact, in these late poems it is often the very 
presence of a teacher, an embodiment of tradition and continuity, that 
is sought. Stevens' Santayana and Eliot's composite figure of his liter­
ary ancestors (the ghost), Pound's Confucius and Williams' Toulouse-
Lautrec, to whom he dedicates Paterson V—all represent not only 
tradition but are also doppelgangers, secret selves. 
For at its best a literary symbol, in addition to its historical context, 
has a personal dimension that acts to transform the self. Thus we 
understand how important these master figures are for the poets and, in 
turn, how important for us are these aging poets: they have given us 
images of balance achieved only after a long life of reflection and 
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creative work. As Theodore Roszak writes in Where the Wasteland 
Ends, "A true symbol must be lived into, that is how its meaning is 
found."26 Our culture must absorb these poems into the body politic 
and thereby take the words to heart. 
We can also look at this from a slightly different point of view. 
"Achieving the impossible," Robert Nisbet writes, "is what metaphor 
is all about. From it springs religions, prophecies, and dogmas."27 If 
the image of the still point, which unites these poems of maturity and 
old age, is indeed the root metaphor of American Modern poetry (and 
the wasteland is not), and if a root metaphor expresses what cannot yet 
be expressed as conscious thought, poetry is indeed prophecy or at 
least the voicing of need, of desire.28 In what sense, then, are these 
poets our prophets? What is their legacy? 
As Erikson has said, "A civilization can be measured by the mean­
ing which it gives to the full cycle of life, for such meaning, or the lack 
of it, cannot fail to reach into the beginnings of the next generation, 
and thus into the chances of others to meet ultimate questions with 
some clarity and strength."29 In the West, the aged are devalued in 
direct proportion to their loss of power, which is measured in economic 
terms. This view of the aged signals disaster for our civilization, for 
human dignity is denied, continuity broken, the cohesion of commu­
nity destroyed. Simone de Beauvoir makes the same point. In La 
Vieillesse, which her American publisher issued under the misleading 
and euphemistic title The Coming of Age, she writes, in words that 
recall those of Erikson, "the meaning or lack of meaning that old age 
takes on in any given society puts that whole society to the test, since it 
is this that reveals the meaning or lack of meaning of the entirety of life 
leading to that old age."30 She urges us to concentrate our efforts on 
the most oppressed of our elderly. But we must look also at those who 
provide models of the fullest possibility. This would involve us in the 
relationship between creativity and old age, an area that up until now 
has been largely ignored.31 
The figure of the heroic wise old man we must not overly idealize 
however. Serenity is not undisturbed; balance is not easily won or 
preserved. In the Pisan Cantos, for example, Pound is cranky as well 
as benevolently wise. Eliot's voice is wise, but his vision of old age is 
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basically grim. Williams exhorts Paterson (himself) to "keep your 
pecker up / whatever the detail!" (V,iii). 
And the tone of The Rock, although ever well-measured, is alter­
nately one of a balanced tranquility, delight, and a weary sadness; in 
taking stock of his life and his work, Stevens acknowledges a sense of 
failure as well as newfound pleasures and ways of being. On the 
whole, then, for these four poets, the condition of integrity, to use 
Erikson's term, achieved in, or imagined for, old age is no simple state 
of being. Above all, perhaps, it is characterized by humility (and this 
returns us to the meditative mode) that contradicts the Western way of 
thinking about mankind in the world—imperialism over nature and 
other peoples. Old age brings an end to domination. Man stripped of 
such physical, perhaps overbearing, strength is what Stevens imagines 
in "Lebensweisheitspielerei," which I quote here in full: 
Weaker and weaker, the sunlight falls 
In the afternoon. The proud and the strong 
Have departed. 
Those that are left are the unaccomplished, 
The finally human, 
Natives of a dwindled sphere. 
Their indigence is an indigence 
That is an indigence of the light, 
A stellar pallor that hangs on the threads. 
Little by little, the poverty 
Of autumnal space becomes 
A look, a few words spoken. 
Each person completely touches us 
With what he is and as he is, 
In the stale grandeur of annihilation. 
It is "the finally human" which "touches us," a deepening of the 
human spirit made possible in and by old age. 
IV. TRADITION, CREATION, AND THE LIFE REVIEW 
Of the four poets Pound was submitted to the most severe physical, 
psychological, and social pressure in his old age, both in the Italian 
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prison camp and later in Washington at St. Elizabeth's. He had to start 
again, to find not only what could "suffice," in Wallace Stevens' cool 
term, but what he could live on. After all he was branded a traitor 
(understandably since he had spoken in favor of the enemy), his be­
trayal a result of believing in the wrong values at the wrong time in the 
wrong place. His solution would be a return to the past, not a projec­
tion into the future. 
What he could live on was, in part, the memory of both people and 
places, art works and historical events and monuments. Robert Butler 
has suggested that the predominance of the shades of memory in the 
elderly is not necessarily a sign of senility or psychological imbalance, 
but may very well be a functional mechanism by which man comes to 
terms with his past life.32 Certainly this is the case for Pound. He 
asserts "Senesco sed amo" (LXXX), which is both a personal revela­
tion and a declaration as to how to live. He literally plots the curve of 
his own past, just as Eliot provides us in the Four Quartets with a 
model for that plot: 
. .  . the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
But we must remark that Pound's "past" extends beyond his own life 
to the troubadours of the twelfth century, the literature of Greece and 
Rome, and African myth. 
Perhaps just as significant (and this is a kind of lesson in the politics 
of the elderly), one of the primary catalysts in transforming his life in 
prison into magical moments of paradise, is his acknowledging 
brotherhood with other prisoners—criminals—of the camp. Paradoxi­
cally the forced space and forced time provided him, although against 
his will, the freedom for a life review. Thus in the Pisan Cantos Pound 
moves beyond the elite sphere of history, literature, and myth and into 
the world of outcast men. He magnificently unites the two, learning 
much, remaking himself, and creating one of his finest poems. 
The work of the anthropologist Victor Turner can help us under­
stand, I think, both how Pound was "made new" and how the elderly 
today form a key sector along the frontier of cultural adaptation.33 In 
Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors,34 Turner discusses our fundamental 
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need for what he calls "communitas," a condition of social unity 
(community) characterized by undifferentiated social status (what Mar­
tin Buber has termed the "I-Thou" relationship of the self to the other) 
and a time that is not socio-historical time but sacred time. Above all, 
communitas is not merely metaphorical; it is a relationship between 
concrete individuals (the pilgrimage is an excellent example of com­
munitas). 
To communitas Turner opposes ' 'structure,'' by which he means the 
hierarchal, stratified, bureaucratic structure we encounter in the institu­
tions of the family, the orthodox church, the corporation, and so on. 
The dialectic of the two poles of communitas and structure, Turner 
argues, is a useful conceptual tool for understanding the process of 
social change, that includes the revitalization of institutions, the re­
placement of one institution by another, and so on. It is communitas 
that is the condition "for the production of root metaphors, conceptual 
archetypes, paradigms, models" and that thus provides the impetus for 
significant social change.35 Of the four poets, it is only Pound who 
succeeds in clearly dramatizing this need for community and suggest­
ing what power the condition of communitas has. In the prison camp of 
Pisa, he and the other prisoners are divested of all status, as are the 
elderly in our society, and from their mutual bondage, a close social 
bond is formed. 
If an image of this social bond among marginals was not possible for 
Eliot, or Stevens, or Williams, certainly for all of them (although here 
we might question Stevens), the gift of history and tradition is a partial 
answer to the anguish of old age and death. In these poems, the past is 
recovered and placed in the present, itself renewed, a renewing force. 
The thrust is a conservative one. To conserve and preserve one's 
origins, one's heritage, to expand one's cultural past so as to create 
new possibilities for the present and the future—that is the goal. The 
question is a political as well as a literary one, and of the four, Stevens 
is the only one who does not offer a solution, however small it might 
be, to the dehumanization and fragmentation of the Western industrial 
world. 
In his essay on "Art and Time," the depth psychologist Erich 
Neumann uses the word "transcendent" to describe the quality that is 
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found in the work of great artists in old age. In a creative solitude, such 
artists move beyond the limitation of their age, in both senses of the 
word. Neumann cites the self-portraits of the aged Rembrandt, the late 
paintings of Titian, the late plays of Shakespeare, and the late quartets 
of Beethoven. In these works, he says, w e find "a strange figuration, a 
breakthrough into the realm of essences."3  6 I quote Neumann at 
some length: 
In these works of man a numinous world is manifested in which the 
polarity of outward and inward—nature and art—seems to be resolved. 
Their secret alchemy achieves a synthesis of the numinosum at the heart 
of nature and psyche. 
These aged masters seem to have attained the image and likeness of a 
primal creative force, prior to the world and outside the world, which, 
though split from the very beginning into the polarity of nature and 
psyche, is in essence one divided whole. 
This art no longer relates either consciously or unconsciously to any 
historical time; the solitary monologue of these "extreme" works is 
spoken, as it were, into the void. And one cannot quite tell whether it is 
a monologue or a dialogue between man and the ultimate. 
But in the rare instances when the phenomenon of transcendence 
occurs, the transpersonal seems, even though it has passed through the 
medium of the human, to have achieved its own objectivity—to speak, 
one might say, with itself. It is no longer oriented toward the world or 
man, the ego or the collective, security or insecurity; instead, the crea­
tive act which mysteriously creates form and life in nature as in the 
human psyche seems to have perceived itself and to shine forth with its 
own incandescence. The creative impulse seems to have liberated itself. 
United on the plane of artistic-creation, the self which man experiences 
within him and the world-creative self which is manifested outwardly 
achieve the transparency of symbolic reality.37 
Although I am not sure in what way historical realities are ever tran­
scended in a work of art, I do understand, and accept, what Neumann 
points to. The poems of Stevens, Eliot, Pound, and Williams do pos­
sess an orphic quality, a timeless dimension, which links them with 
what can only be called the age-old wisdom of humanity. 
For Neumann, man is not a one-dimensional political or economic 
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animal. Rather Neumann calls for a "mystical anthropology"; he is 
concerned with homo mysticus, with mysticism not limited to the 
experience of God but understood as a fundamental, broadly based 
category of human experience. Following Jung's model of individua­
tion (the striving of the individual toward psychic wholeness), 
Neumann argues that different forms of mysticism accompany the 
three major stages of psychological development: we find source mys­
ticism in the uroboros stage where the unconscious is dominant, hero 
mysticism in the second phase where the ego is dominant, and mature 
mysticism in the final stage where the self emerges: opposites are 
reconciled, and harmony is achieved between the conscious and un­
conscious aspects of the mind. 
More specifically, the final stage of Old Age Neumann identifies 
with the mysticism of the Egyptian god Osiris and The Tibetan Book of 
the Dead. In this stage the self becomes transparent, he says; the world 
becomes transparent, and the mystical experience is a conscious one. 
The possibility of the symbolic life is revealed, and life in the world 
becomes possible, even in the face of death. Thus Neumann explores 
the archetype of the Wise Old Man through its manifestations in texts 
drawn from both literature and the visual arts, which are themselves 
the creations of men in old age. Literature, he finds, reveals the 
achievement of wisdom in our time and records the potentialities of 
human experience. 
Jung's description of the archetype of the Wise Old Man not only 
accords with Neumann's findings (this is not surprising) but also corre­
sponds to Erikson's notion of the final stage of a person's development 
in old age: 
In the encounter with life and the world there are experiences that are 
capable of moving us to long and thorough reflection, from which, in 
time, insights and convictions grow up—a process depicted by the 
alchemists as the philosophical tree. The unfolding of these experiences 
is regulated, as it were, by two archetypes: the anima, who expresses 
life, and the "Wise Old Man," who personifies meaning.... This aptly 
describes the character of that spirit or thinking which you do not, like 
an intellectual operation, perform yourself, as the "little god of this 
world," but which happens to you as though it came from another, and 
greater, perhaps the great spirit of the world... .38 
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The involuntary character of the archetype fits the description that the 
poets give of the meditative mode and the symbols that emerge from 
this state of being. 
Perhaps the long life of the imagination compensates for the losses 
of the social world. Perhaps some form of mystical experience is 
possible. If so, it does not result from an "intellectual operation" that 
one performs like a "god ." It simply happens, and happens as the 
result of a long life of writing, a long life of working with images. All 
of this is metaphor for the creative process. Neumann describes it this 
way: 
It is characteristic of the creative process that in it the ego cannot cling 
to its position of consciousness, but must expose itself to encounter with 
the nonego. In so doing, the ego renounces conscious reality in which 
the world is experienced as contradiction, and an encounter occurs 
between ego and nonego in which the contradictions of the world, ego, 
and self are suspended. This encounter, wherever it may occur, we 
designate as mystical.39 
This is the still point, with the reconciliation of opposites being de­
scribed in psychoanalytical terms. The mature phase of old age can be 
understood as a new synthesis between the conscious ego and the 
nonego, an integration of the personality with the self, not the ego, at 
the center. 
What these depth psychologists describe as an archetypal process, 
what Erikson and Neumann have to say about the final stage in man's 
development, is clearly pertinent to the study of the late poems of these 
American poets. This will be offensive to many who find these notions 
soft, romantic, and mushy-minded. I agree we must be careful. And 
this brings me to the theme with which I opened this chapter— 
Emerson's theory of a just proportion between age and creation. For 
the truth value of the constructions of developmental psychology is not 
at stake here. Nor would I argue that these poems are expressions of 
universal values and thus transcend their culture. Although theories of 
the evolution of personal consciousness play a backstage part in read­
ing the late poems of these Modern poets, it is not the case that the 
theory predicts the poems or that the poems verify the theory. Nor is 
this the sheltered circularity of an argument that can only reproduce 
itself, a flat tautology. 
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One does not, in other words, have to apply psychological analysis 
to poetry. Nor should one. When a paradigm pervades an age, it offers 
models of thinking that are explicit in scientific thought but remain 
implicit in poetic practice. For the imagination does not argue, as 
James Hillman has said, it imagines.40 And thus what we read in the 
poets and psychologists is an expression of the collective imagination 
of the Modern American Age. Both reflect the needs and beliefs of a 
cultural period. The work of the poets corroborates the findings of 
these developmental psychologists. And in turn, the work of the latter 
illuminates the visions of the Modern poets. They each give assent to 
the other. And they do so precisely because they hold the same all-
pervading assumptions about the possibility of holistic integrations of 
individual lives for the survival of men and mankind. Thus, the two 
modes of inquiry—that of the poet and that of the psychologist— 
reinforce each other and in so doing help us understand the spirit and 
values of an age. Basically, both the humanistic psychology of Erikson 
and Neumann, Jung and Schachtel,41 and the poems of these four poets 
propose a model of growth that applies to personal and cultural de­
velopment (there are exceptions, of course, as we will see). It is this 
assumption that gives body to their theories and generates their poems, 
a romantic belief that embodies the hope of the Modern age, a belief 
that must both be taken seriously and questioned. 
In general, then, these are the common grounds that invite compari­
son of the Four Quartets, the Pisan Cantos, The Rock, and Paterson 
V. But to the literary mind, differences are more important than 
similarities, and each of these books offers a unique solution (if I may 
use that word) to a particular problem. Thus each book, and each poet, 
demands its own approach. Although in the four essays that follow 
comparison is the chief rationale for bringing these poems together and 
remains the central method for judging them (I assume that the readers 
are familiar with these poems and thus make comparisons among the 
poets and their poems within the chapters), the convergence of 
models—both among the models themselves and with the poems— 
cannot, should not, blind us to the individualities of each. This was the 
criterion to which I eventually submitted my work. In spite of like­
nesses, would the differences survive critical attention? I hope so, for 
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significant information is difference that makes a difference, and these 
books present four converging but separate visions of aging, old age, 
and an aging Modernism. 
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T. S. ELIOT AND THE FOUR QUARTETS 
The Still Point, Aging, and the Social Bond 
After the kingfisher's wing 
Has answered light to light, and is silent, the light is still 
At the still point of the turning world.—"Burnt Norton" 
Eliot would certainly have objected to the often-voiced view that in the 
still point of the Four Quartets, he had created a symbol, as though he 
had fashioned a planet and hurled it into the heavens. As we well 
know, Eliot wanted not to create but to discover. He was no system-
builder in the manner of Yeats and Blake. "Man is man," he wrote in 
his 1928 essay entitled "Second Thoughts about Humanism," "be­
cause he can recognize supernatural realities, not because he can invent 
them. "* Moreover, if we understand, as we should, that a symbol has 
an experiential dimension, that it is a magical object that works a 
transformation of the self, then we should not confer upon the still 
point the status of a symbol for Eliot. As Roszak explains: "True 
symbols transcend intellectual deciphering, calling forth another level 
of consciousness which eludes words. They are, as it were, doors 
leading into dark chambers of reality, like the entrance ways of the old 
mystery cults. We must take our whole life in with us and be prepared 
to be totally transformed."2 In Pound's Pisan Cantos we find this 
experiential dimension on all levels; in the Four Quartets we do not. In 
the still point Eliot has neither created a symbol for himself nor has he 
discovered a true magical object. But the irony is that he has invented a 
term which has life, which spoke to his generation and continues to 
speak to ours. The irony is that Stevens' notes never built a supreme 
fiction, but Eliot's still point functions as one. 
The still point, then, is not a symbol but more like a definition. As 
Eliot wrote in his confident and clear-minded 1916 Harvard doctoral 
dissertation, which was published under the title Knowledge and 
Experience in the Philosophy ofF. H. Bradley. "That at which we aim 
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is the real as such; and the real as such is not an object. When we 
define an experience, we substitute the definition for the experience, 
and then experience the definition; though the original experience may 
have been itself a definition: but the experiencing is quite another thing 
from the defining."3 
The still point is a hybrid, let us call it a construction, part image and 
part concept,4 the locus perhaps of the two in a modern world where 
geometry is skewed and parallel planes intersect. It is a fitting, in fact a 
brilliant, solution for a poet who owed much, perhaps against his will, 
to the symbolist aesthetic, and who believed, against the main current 
of twentieth-century Western thought, in the Christian world view. 
I. VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS AND LITERARY EXPERIENCE 
Consequently I rejoice, having to construct something 
Upon which to rejoice 
"Ash Wednesday"5 
To begin, we must distinguish between the still point and a still 
point, or more accurately, "the unattended moment." First, the still 
point is a model, an ideal construct, a point that does not and cannot 
exist within the normal human domain but instead represents a goal 
which man strives to both comprehend and attain. The still point, in 
other words, has a clear Christian referent. Unlike Blake, Eliot did not 
have to create philosophy as well as poetry. He believed in a traditional 
and coherent system of belief, or at least he believed it was necessary 
to believe. As he says somewhat pragmatically in his essay on Dante, 
the advantage to the poet (and to the reader) of having such a system at 
his disposal is that "it stands apart, for understanding and assent even 
without belief, from the single individual who propounds it. "6 The still 
point belongs to such an encircling system of distinctly defined corre­
spondences. It refers to both a state of mind, which is perfect Christian 
peace, and to the principle of Incarnation. It is miraculous and does not 
admit either skepticism or doubt: 
The hint half guessed, the gift half understood, is Incarnation. 
Here the impossible union 
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Of spheres of existence is actual, 
Here the past and future 
Are conquered, and reconciled.... 
"The Dry Salvages" 
As such, the still point is posited by Eliot as poet but not experienced 
by Eliot as a character in the Four Quartets. 
For Eliot, man's common, conscious state of mind is suffering and 
torment, and even to apprehend the Incarnation, to lay hold of its 
meaning as both event and principle, is a possibility only for saints: 
But to apprehend 
The point of intersection of the timeless 
With time, is an occupation for the saint— 
No occupation either, but something given 
And taken, in a lifetime's death in love, 
Ardour and selflessness and self-surrender. . .  . 
"The Dry Salvages" 
The degree of reality of an object for a particular person, Eliot 
believed, varies in direct proportion with "the experiences which clus­
ter around it: an object is real, we may say in proportion to its relations 
outside of its objectivity."7 Eliot thus understands knowledge to be a 
relation between knower and known. And although he is speaking here 
in terms of the realm of concrete objects, we can apply his observations 
to the realm of concepts as well. Just as Eliot would never deny that the 
"unreal" object qua object exists, we would not deny the existence of 
the still point as concept. Likewise, we would say that its intensity, its 
reality, depends upon the experiences of its thinker in conjunction with 
it. But the experience of a concept or a definition must not be confused 
with the experience of a sunset, a sculpture, or a meeting with an old 
friend. The former exists primarily in the realm of the abstract, the 
latter in the realm of the concrete (which is, of course, mediated by 
mind). 
The still point does refer to the Christian system of belief, and few 
would deny that,8 but it does not belong exclusively to this system. 
Mallarme, as Hugh Kenner has pointed out,9 stands within the Four 
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Quartets just as Dante stands behind them, or above them. We see this 
in the celebrated still point passage in section II of "Burnt Norton," 
which I quote in the Introduction, and also in the following passage 
from section V: 
Words move, music moves 
Only in time; but that which is only living 
Can only die. Words, after speech, reach 
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern, 
Can words or music reach 
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still 
Moves perpetually in its stillness. 
Nor the stillness of the violin, while the note lasts, 
Not that only, but the co-existence, 
Or say that the end precedes the beginning 
And that the end and the beginning were always there 
Before the beginning and after the end. 
At work here is the symbolist aesthetic, understood primarily not as a 
doctrine of correspondences but as a theory of linguistic construction 
whose elements refer to nothing but themselves and the system that 
they create. It is the pattern of the words that reaches into the stillness, 
not man. 
Mallarme, we remember, believed, as he said in his 1894 lecture 
"Music and Literature," that "Literature does exist and, I may add, 
exists alone and ail-exclusively."10 Mallarme believed that all litera­
ture aspires toward the condition of music, which alone possesses 
purity of structure and form. We read in the Four Quartets—and 
Mallarme would surely have agreed—that 
Words strain, 
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden 
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, 
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, 
Will not stay still. 
"Burnt Norton" 
Mallarme's method was to still the voice of the poet and allow the 
words themselves, as he put it, to take the initiative. His method was to 
pass from the concrete to the pure "Idea," to conceive of an object in 
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its absence, in its silence, to divorce it from "the direct and the palpa-
ble,"11 to allude and suggest, to, as Charles Mauron has phrased it, 
evaporate reality into a musically fluid dream.12 In his famous essay 
"Crisis in Poetry," Mallarme describes the ineffable, the mystery, 
which is released by poetry: 
When I say: "a flower!" then from that forgetfulness to which my 
voice consigns all floral form, something different from the usual 
calyces arises, something all music, essence, and softness: the flower 
which is absent from all bouquets.... 
Out of a number of words, poetry fashions a single new word which 
is total in itself and foreign to the language—a kind of incantation. Thus 
the desired isolation of language is effected; and chance (which might 
have governed these elements, despite their artful and alternating re­
newal through meaning and sound) is thereby instantly and thoroughly 
abolished.13 
In the still point passages from "Burnt Norton" we see a similar 
strategy at work. Although Eliot is not concerned to evoke an object, 
he is concerned to invoke a concept. He does so by beginning with 
abstraction, the name, "the still point." Then he evokes its quality 
through incantation and imagery, and finally he allows the concrete 
image to dissolve, leaving only the pattern and the Word. Eliot 
achieves what Mallarme desired: "a single new word which is total in 
itself and foreign to the language—a kind of incantation." And in this 
sense the still point has no referent, it is the thing itself. 
The still point thus reconciles opposites in two different ways— 
through the word itself, the system of language and art, and through 
the Christian religion, a system of articulated correspondences. The 
still point, in other words, has more than one vanishing point. It 
disappears into the poem, it disappears beyond the poem. Like an 
Escher engraving where the perspective of the picture plane is skewed 
and stairs lead in irreconcilable directions, the still point wavers be­
tween image and concept, taking on different meanings at different 
points in the poem. It is a supreme balancing act, an occupation only 
for great poets.14 
If the still point, in either of these two cases, is not a symbol which 
is "lived into," what is possible in Eliot's world? In "The Dry Sal­
vages" we read that 
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For most of us, there is only the unattended 
Moment, the moment in and out of time, 
The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight, 
The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightning 
Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply 
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music 
While the music lasts. 
Many of these moments ' 'in and out of time' ' are recorded in the Four 
Quartets. Above all, we should not understand them as miniature 
versions or miniature visions of the still point. The two orders are 
similar but not the same. What separates them surgically is this: the 
still point is not to be experienced in the commonsense notion of the 
term (either it is to be strived for, but never reached, or it is to be 
suggested by, embodied in, art), while the unattended moments exist, 
or can exist, in an experiential dimension. 
In his essay on Pascal, Eliot speaks of illumination, observing that 
"what can only be called mystical experience happens to many men 
who do not become mystics," noting that "you may call it communion 
with the Divine, or you may call it a temporary crystallization of the 
mind. "1  5 It is the latter formulation that most clearly conveys the status 
of unattended moments: they fall basically into the realm of cognition 
rather than that of divine communion. And here we are reminded of F. 
H. Bradley's epistemology, to which Eliot owed so much. 
Bradley, we remember, denied that there is any actual dichotomy 
between the observer and the observed, desire and the desired. In his 
dissertation on Bradley, Eliot explains Bradley's notion of "immediate 
experience." "In feeling the subject and object are one,"1  6 and 
immediate experience, we have seen, is a timeless unity which is not as 
such present either anywhere or to anyone. It is only in the world of 
objects that we have time and space and selves. But the failure of any 
experience to be merely immediate, by its lack of harmony and cohe­
sion, we find ourselves as conscious souls in a world of objects.17 
Immediate experience is thus characterized by wholeness, by the union 
of the self with the other. But Eliot does not by any means discount the 
role that (self-) consciousness plays. In fact, he argues that conscious­
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ness is the necessary agent in the second step that we take in arriving at 
knowledge. As he explains, "We perceive an object, we will say 
[immediate experience], and then perceive it in a special relation to our 
body [the body defined as both physical and mental self, the conscious 
self being a construction]. "18 Bradley put it this way, and Eliot quotes 
him: "There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one, with 
which knowledge begins."19 
Knowledge begins. Immediate experience, or feeling, is wider than 
consciousness, for the conscious subject necessarily falls partly outside 
the whole of any feeling. As Eliot concludes: "We must therefore 
expect to find consciousness to be both something immediately given 
and something which would not be in the immediate experience unless 
it also extended beyond it. Consciousness is not an entity, but an 
aspect, and an inconsistent aspect of reality."20 And since knowledge 
is a function of consciousness, it also lies both inside and outside of 
immediate experience. Moreover, since consciousness is an aspect of 
reality that Eliot believes does develop, we are free to assume that 
knowledge too can grow and develop. In referring to the development 
of consciousness, Eliot makes an interesting observation about the 
growth of the arts and the aesthetic self: ' 'It is perhaps epistemology 
(although I offer this only as a suggestion, and to make clearer the sort 
of thing that I mean) that has given us the fine arts; for what was at first 
expression and behaviour may have developed under the complications 
of self-consciousness, as we become aware of ourselves as reacting 
aesthetically to the object."21 All of this has special relevance to the 
unattended moment. 
Wallace Stevens knew, as he wrote in the title poem of The Rock, 
that "It is an illusion that we were ever alive." Eliot too believes in the 
essential discontinuity of experience. On the one hand, he suggests that 
knowledge is cumulative; on the other hand, in "East Coker," he 
questions its value, since every appraisal of the past yields a different 
pattern: 
There is, it seems to us, 
At best, only a limited value 
In the knowledge derived from experience. 
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The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, 
For the pattern is new in every moment 
And every moment is a new and shocking 
Valuation of all we have been. 
For "consciousness and its object," as he puts it, "are both only 
evanescent aspects in reality."22 
This evanescence of immediate experience, this essential discon­
tinuity, is just what we encounter in the Four Quartets. As a group, the 
unattended moments are distinguished by a marvelous eclectic mysti­
cism, or we could say, a mystical eclecticism. Together they pinpoint 
several peaks in Western literary history: the metaphysical poets, the 
Hesiodic tradition, naturalism, and English landscape romanticism. 
In the rose-garden of "Burnt Norton," for example, Eliot gives us 
the imaginary recollected, not through emotion or tranquility, but 
through intellection. The way into the garden, into fantasy, is through 
ratiocination: 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future, 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable. 
What might have been is an abstraction 
Remaining a perpetual possibility 
Only in a world of speculation. 
What might have been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is always present. 
Footfalls echo in the memory 
Down the passage which we did not take 
Towards the door we never opened 
Into the rose-garden. My words echo 
Thus, in your mind. 
We think of the English metaphysical poets, for Eliot's praise of their 
ability to associate thought and feeling is renowned. But here we find a 
peculiar version. Here thought does not so much blend with feeling, as 
logic yields to feeling, reverie, image, immediate experience. And in 
the rose-garden passage we see that for this imaginary, displaced ex­
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perience to be complete, in order to invent history and the impossible 
future, immediate experience must self-consciously be made con­
scious. It must be remembered: 
Time past and time future 
Allow but a little consciousness. 
To be conscious is not to be in time 
But only in time can the moment in the rose-garden, 
The moment in the arbour where the rain beat, 
The moment in the draughty church at smokefall 
Be remembered; involved with past and future. 
Only through time time is conquered. 
Here "consciousness" must be understood as "immediate experi­
ence," as an intense sense of reality, as continuous, as out of time and 
history, unanalyzable into parts. 
But this experience dissolves: 
So we moved, and they, in a formal pattern, 
Along the empty alley, into the box circle, 
To look down into the drained pool. 
Dry the pool, dry concrete, brown edged, 
And the pool was filled with water out of sunlight, 
And the lotos rose, quietly, quietly, 
The surface glittered out of heart of light, 
And they were behind us, reflected in the pool. 
Then a cloud passed, and the pool was empty. 
To preserve immediate experience, the self-conscious subject must 
construct it as an experience, must react aesthetically to the experience 
as one would to an object. 
The method is presented abstractly, as we would expect from Eliot, 
but the image is a thing of magic. In this passage we see Eliot's genius 
more clearly, in fact, if we compare his capturing of imaginary experi­
ence with Williams' deliberate construction of an imaginary object, the 
unicorn at the center of a virgin-and-whore scenario in the fifth book of 
Pater son. Williams tries to trap the unicorn in the concrete of tapestry, 
keeping the icon separate from him. By contrast Eliot's rose-garden is 
psychological, unstable, flickering, like the flux of Wallace Stevens' 
world. 
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In "Burnt Norton" we are presented with the reality of the imagi­
nary which was never actual. In "East Coker" we encounter an histor­
ical vision of mythical cast. The sixteenth century surfaces in the 
twentieth, although how or why we cannot guess. The prerequisite for 
this privilege, however, and it is twice-repeated, is a peculiar one for 
Eliot: one must not disturb the past, one must not modify it, one must 
not come too close: 
In that open field 
If you do not come too close, if you do not come too close, 
On a Summer midnight, you can hear the music 
Of the weak pipe and the little drum 
And see them dancing around the bonfire 
The association of man and woman 
In daunsinge, signifying matrimonie— 
A dignified and commodious sacrament. 
This moment is not so much a part of the historical record (and thus, 
given Eliot's understanding of how the present and past modify one 
another in endless reverberation, subject to change) as it is outside of 
history, existing as a Utopian hesiodic moment, which can be eternally 
recovered by the literary imagination but cannot be entered. The time 
traveler is not free to join the dance. He can only observe. An invisible 
wall separates the literary anthropologist from this agricultural com­
munity. And this invisible wall, we might guess, is consciousness of 
the second degree. 
But the Brueghel-like dance, a timeless round from the annals of 
primitivism, vanishes, to be replaced in "The Dry Salvages" by a new 
system of belief. Here we meet turn-of-the-century naturalism, the 
eternal gods of the sea and river calling up a timeless zone: 
The tolling bell 
Measures time not our time, rung by the unhurried 
Ground swell, a time 
Older than the time of chronometers, older 
Than time counted by anxious worried women 
Lying awake, calculating the future, 
Trying to unweave, unwind, unravel 
And piece together the past and the future, 
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Between midnight and dawn, when the past is all deception, 
The future futureless, before the morning watch 
When time stops and time is never ending; 
And the ground swell, that is and was from the beginning, 
Clangs 
The bell. 
And later in this Quartet, in the last section of "The Dry Salvages," 
Eliot casts a glance at nineteenth-century English landscape romanti­
cism, at the unexpected moment of "immediate experience" sparked 
by "a shaft of sunlight / The wild thyme unseen, or the winter light­
ning." 
All of these moments, from the rose-garden to the wild thyme, 
provide, are, "crystallizations of the mind," moments of cognition, of 
wholeness. And so too is the moment of religious pilgrimage in "Little 
Gidding": 
Here, the intersection of the timeless moment 
Is England and nowhere. Never and always. 
Such moments populate the Four Quartets. They constitute a kind 
of catalogue of possible mystical experience. The Four Quartets do 
not form, in other words, a unified system that is suspended from a 
Christian or Buddhist point of view in the way that a Calder mobile 
hangs from a wire string. Rather, Eliot's genius is that he offers us so 
many different notions and nuances of language and holds them to­
gether suspended, as particles are, in solution. 
But his medium is a particular one: it is literary. Eliot believes that 
the purpose of criticism is to establish a tradition, to forge continuity 
with the literary past, and it is in this way that the unattended moments 
function in the poem. They convince us that the poem is not solely a 
Christian poem with Eliot sloughing his way on to reconciliation of fire 
and roses as doggedly as Bunyan's famous pilgrim made his progress 
toward heaven. And they succeed as magic in great part because of 
their insubstantiality, their amazing incorporeity, their lack of hardy 
autobiographical roots. They exist—we do not deny that—but how, we 
need to ask, and for whom? For as Hegel said, there is nothing behind 
the curtain other than that which is in front of it. 
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The elusiveness of Eliot's voice is well known. Hugh Kenner has 
brilliantly discussed this aspect of Eliot's work in his aptly titled book 
The Invisible Poet. Kenner shows that in his earlier poems Eliot deals 
in verbal effects, not ideas, and as a result images and phrases are often 
unanalyzable, nonsensical.23 In some of the earlier poems, including 
"Ash Wednesday," the reader tries to part the words from each other, 
only to find nothing there. The tissue of words closes in upon itself. 
The signifier displaces the signified. Words do not describe but curi­
ously evoke, and often in the manner of, surprisingly enough (for her 
egotism is as obtrusive as Eliot's is not), Gertrude Stein. In the Four 
Quartets Kenner concludes, and I think rightly so, that we find poetry 
which is for the first time "selflessly transparent."24 It is a final 
triumph of style where the Eliot of many masks disappears in favor of a 
disembodied voice of unquestionable authority. 
We cannot help but contrast this voice, almost sphinxlike, with that 
of Pound's in the Pisan Cantos. Pound is alternately irascible and 
exhausted ("Oh let an old man rest"), irreverent ("Athene cd/ have 
done with more sex appeal"), irate as well as wise. Pound shows 
us himself. 
On the other hand, as William Moynihan has put it, "the speaker of 
the poem is a fictive Eliot... old, dry, philosophic, religious, and 
most important, a poet."25 Many have said that the Quartets are the 
most personal of Eliot's poems, yet the speaker is curiously absent. We 
find, with Kenner, that "the first person pronoun prompts no curios-
ity."26 We find that these moments "in and out of time" exist apart 
from him. The " I , " we feel, is not T. S. Eliot. The " I ,  " in fact, is 
often not " I , " but "we " and "you." One pronoun glides into 
another, effortlessly, and we follow, but we do not know whom we are 
following. Moreover we follow the voice into a dimension that is 
hypothetical, neither ideal or real. 
Consider the "Little Gidding" sequence. The last poem of the Four 
Quartets opens in a spring that is not an actual spring but instead a 
vagary of winter (we think of Stevens' last poem in The Rock, where 
spring is spring). The first stanza closes with a call (a lament?) for the 
ideal: 
Where is the summer, the unimaginable 
Zero summer? 
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The time is out of joint. This is not peace but "pentecostal fire / In the 
dark time of the year." Furthermore, the next two passages begin in 
the conditional: 
If you came this way, 
Taking the route you would be likely to take 
From the place you would be likely to come from, 
If you came this way in may time, you would find the hedges 
White again, in May, with voluptuary sweetness. 
And, 
If you came this way, 
Taking any route, starting from anywhere, 
At any time or at any season, 
It would always be the same: you would have to put off 
Sense and notion. 
And finally, throughout the entire first section of ' 'Little Gidding," the 
first person pronoun not only prompts no curiosity, it is literally miss­
ing. 
As with the other timeless moments, Eliot is not here. He is absent, 
just as the thrush in the rose-garden, as David Ward has pointed out, is 
"any thrush or no thrush; an ideal thrush, a thrush of memory or 
imagination; not even a thrush at all, but a way of expressing a move­
ment of the soul.' '27 The particular has disappeared (did it ever exist?). 
The dialect of the tribe is purified. 
And the Four Quartets as a whole possess this quality of the ephem­
eral. Although the names of each of the Quartets are place names, it is 
hard to associate each poem with a name (who can remember or 
rehearse what "happens" in each poem?). And it is even more difficult 
to remember what particular place is associated with what name. Again 
the signifier is detached from the signified and referent, lifted away by 
unknown hands from the concrete world. The words are talismans, not 
markers or signposts. The unattended moments do not have a locus in 
time and space, they do not have coordinates, nor are they meant to. 
This is part of their definition. For immediate experience is "a timeless 
unity."28 
This is the magic of such moments: this also divests them of actual­
ity. As readers, like the women in Murder in the Cathedral, we both 
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know and do not know. We are both satisfied and unsatisfied. Just as 
the "we" of "Burnt Norton" must return to the rose-garden, we must 
return to the poem to find it again. The unattended moments exist as 
perpetual possibilities. Taken together they do not form a track which 
we feel Eliot himself followed. In Euclidean geometry two points 
make a line. In the Four Quartets these moments, hypothetical, do not 
make a Poundian periplum. And the Chapel Perilous lies either inside 
the poem, where Eliot is not, or outside the poem, where Eliot cannot 
reach. 
II. CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SOCIAL BOND 
The World is trying the experiment of attempting to form a civilized but 
non-Christian mentality. The experiment will fail; but we must be very 
patient in awaiting its collapse; meanwhile redeeming the time; so that 
the Faith may be preserved alive through the dark ages before us; to 
renew and rebuild civilization, and save the world from suicide.— 
"Thoughts after Lambeth," 193129 
Oh, I suppose the only thing to be done about W. civilization is to think 
as clearly as one can.—Letter to Bonamy Dobree, November 12, 192730 
Unlike The Rock of Wallace Stevens, and within that book of poems 
the Roman convent that offers Santayana sanctuary, the world of the 
Four Quartets is not limited to the private meditative world of the 
individual. The nightmare world of urban industrialization and war 
intrude. We see London, its miles of subway tunnels and streets lit­
tered with garbage and buildings razed by bombs. This is as much a 
part of the Four Quartets as the hyacinth garden is of "The Waste 
Land, " perhaps more. The unattended moments, in fact, could be said 
to evaporate while the "drifting wreckage" remains constant: 
Men and bits of paper, whirled by the cold wind 
That blows before and after time, 
Wind in and out of unwholesome lungs 
Time before and time after. 
"Burnt Norton" 
The question we must pose is: What is the relationship between the 
model for personal wholeness (whether or not it is either achievable or 
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achieved) and the social vision of the poem? For we see that there is a 
disparity between what is possible for the individual and what is possi­
ble for an entire society. 
The still point is rich in meaning for the individual in metaphysical 
and cognitive dimensions, but not in the social sphere. In the Four 
Quartets we find no corresponding model for a Utopian society. The 
field of folk in "East Coker" is the only possibility, but if we compare 
it with Pound's Wagadu and Williams' Tenochtitlan, we can see that it 
does not at all function in the same way. Like the laughing children in 
the leaves of the apple-tree in the Four Quartets, the dancers are a 
literary vision, not an anthropological or historical text. 
Whereas both Pound and Williams believed in the social systems of 
Africa and the Aztec as having literal relevance for their time, Eliot is 
primarily interested in the zestful dancers as a simple metaphor for 
social harmony. He was much more cautious, more judicious, prudent, 
and tentative than either of them. He possessed a much stronger reality 
principle than either of them. He wrote in terms of "Notes toward a 
Definition of" rather than an assertive "Guide to." If Pound's and 
Williams' strength is that they both believed in a direct link between 
poetry and social change, Eliot's strength is that he did not. Poetry for 
him could not legitimately deal with social ideals. As he wrote in After 
Strange Gods, "I should say that in one's prose reflexions one may be 
legitimately occupied with ideals, whereas in the writing of verse one 
can deal only with actuality."31 
In prose, ideals perhaps, but not Utopias. Eliot's temperament was 
ever purgatorial, not Utopian. As he warned in The Idea of a Christian 
Society, the "prospect involves, at least, discipline, inconvenience and 
discomfort: but here as hereafter, the alternative to hell is purga-
tory."32 From Eliot's extensive prose writing, especially the work that 
flanks and penetrates the time of composition of the Four Quartets 
{After Strange Gods was published in 1934, The Idea of a Christian 
Society in 1940, and Notes toward a Definition of Culture in 1948), we 
are familiar with his views as to why contemporary society was in such 
a desperate state of disintegration and what was necessary to hold 
society together. 
For him, industrialism, the pursuit of private profit, and the all­
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pervading philosophy of materialism were the prime causes, and for 
him religion the strongest—in fact, the only—meaningful and effective 
social bond. In both of these areas of discussion Eliot is lucid, almost 
eloquent. He is less clear on the issue of what a better society would 
be, could be, like.33 Unlike Pound or Williams he could not visualize 
it, he could not image it, in prose. All we are granted, essentially, are a 
few parameters: that on the local level he favored the small community 
with a strong tie to place and a stable hierarchical social structure 
bound together by Christianity, and that on the global level he accepted 
cultural pluralism, or as he aptly termed it, "an ecology of nations. "34 
Although Eliot wished to revive Christianity, and for this we would 
surely call him romantic, in his own terms it is not he, but people like 
Pound, who are the romantics. For Eliot separates things carefully, 
into categories; Pound does not. Eliot's 1919 review of Wyndham 
Lewis' novel Tarr is telling in this regard. What he says of the main 
character we can imagine him saying of Pound: 
His literature and his politics and his country life are one and the same 
thing. They are not in separate compartments, they are one career. 
Together they make up his real world: literature, politics, riding to 
hounds. In the real world these things have nothing to do with each 
other.35 
A doctrine of segregation, poetics in one genre, politics in another. 
Thus, the Four Quartets is lopsided, dislocated. Eliot could not 
build a poem on a model analogous to that of the Elizabethan world 
view where individual harmony is implicit in social harmony and both 
are implicit in cosmic harmony. Pound could, for he put one foot 
outside of his tradition and chose Confucius as a guide. Pound was at 
heart a bricoleur. But this Eliot could not be. To learn another tradi­
tion, to go to the center of it, "would require forgetting how to think 
and feel as an American or a European," Eliot fastidiously believed, 
and this was, of course, unthinkable.36 Thus, the parts of the Four 
Quartets are discontinuous, each is not implicit in the other.37 Har­
mony on the individual level cannot find its counterpart in society. 
"Hints and guesses" of a religious bond are all there are, and they are 
not enough to hold together the individual and society (or, to rephrase 
and thus reconstruct the problem in a better way, the organism and its 
organization).38 
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All that can be reasonably hoped for, in the world of the Four 
Quartets, is that the individual preserve the faith. And, almost ironi­
cally, this requires one to all but sever ties with others, to detach 
oneself. The artist, the man of religion, is thus, to use Victor Turner's 
phrase, a liminal man who exists outside of the ongoing social struc­
ture which, in Eliot's case, is industrial and technological society. But 
whereas for Pound this arena is communal and sexual and literary and 
natural, for Eliot the possibilities are much more limited. 
If Eliot cannot offer us a vision of a Utopian society in the Four 
Quartets, he does give us a model for individual growth and develop­
ment. The ultimate goal is enhanced spirituality and peace. What is 
possible is increased consciousness. The method is three-fold: reli­
gious discipline ("the rest / Is prayer, observance, discipline, 
thought and action," we read in "The Dry Salvages"), the "hints and 
guesses" of the unattended moments, and research. 
Research: this is what we would expect from a poet who is one of 
our greatest, and one of our most scrupulous, literary critics. This is in 
great part what Eliot means by exploration. The way back to the 
garden, to the beginning of the poem, to the source of creativity, which 
is desire and thus movement, is both hard work and its opposite, 
"inattention and detachment." In such a rose-garden moment, Eliot 
wrote in his essay on John Marston, is found the "kind of pattern 
which we perceive in our own lives only at rare moments of inattention 
and detachment, drowsing in sunlight."39 
Here Eliot and the Stevens of The Rock agree on method, if not on 
the pattern or what is perceived. We must look and not look, hear and 
not hear: 
At the source of the longest river 
The voice of the hidden waterfall 
And the children in the apple-tree 
Not known, because not looked for 
But heard, half-heard, in the stillness 
Between two waves of the sea. 
And thus at the end of "Little Gidding" we are returned to the rose-
garden of "Burnt Norton," but it is a hypothetical return, a return 
predicted for the future: 
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And all shall be well and 
All manner of thing shall be well 
When the tongues of flame are in-folded 
Into the crowned knot of fire 
And the fire and the rose are one. 
It is a promise of peace, of reconciliation of beauty and suffering in the 
eternally projected future. One does not attain that, but one can possess 
consciousness. And the Four Quartets posit that growth. 
The high value that Eliot placed on the development of conscious­
ness as a measure of growth is seen not only in this poem but in many 
other places as well. Throughout his prose the terms "conscious" and 
"unconscious" appear and reappear like fetishes. A passage such as 
the following, from "The Function of Criticism," is not unusual: 
A common inheritance and a common cause unite artists consciously or 
unconsciously: it must be admitted that the union is mostly unconscious. 
Between the true artists of any time there is, I believe, an unconscious 
community. And, as our instincts of tidiness imperatively command us 
not to leave to the haphazard of unconsciousness what we can attempt to 
do consciously, we are forced to conclude that what happens uncon­
sciously we could bring about, and form into a purpose, if we made a 
conscious attempt.40 
Just what meanings Eliot assigns to these terms throughout his work 
need to be untangled further, but here I can suggest a few of the areas 
which might be explored. 
Biological evolution: Eliot has written, for example, that he accepts 
"the development of consciousness in biological evolution as a de­
velopment of knowledge."41 
The creative process: we are all aware of Eliot's description in 
"Tradition and the Individual Talent" of the poet's mind as catalyst, 
but we are perhaps less familiar with a variation on this theme that 
appears in Eliot's introduction to a 1929 collection of poems by Pound: 
The poet's progress is dual. There is the gradual accumulation of 
experience like a tantalus jar: it may be only once in five or ten years 
that experience accumulates to form a new whole and finds its appropri­
ate expression. But if a poet were content to attempt nothing less than 
always his best, if he insisted on waiting for these unpredictable crystal­
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lizations, he would not be ready for them when they came. The de­
velopment of experience is largely unconscious, subterranean, so that 
we cannot gauge its progress except once in every five or ten years; but 
in the meantime the poet must be working; he must be experimenting 
and trying his technique so that it will be ready, like a well-oiled 
fire-engine, when the moment comes to strain it to its utmost.42 
Just as in the Four Quartets the growth of consciousness requires 
discipline, research, and creative readiness for the unexpected mo­
ment, the creative process for Eliot makes the same demands. The 
' 'unpredictable crystallizations'' of mind that are necessary for crea­
tion of form are indistinguishable from the unattended moments of the 
Quartets. The creative process and the intuitive cognitive process in­
tertwine. The model for each is the same: the transformation of what is 
unconscious (but not necessarily the Freudian or Jungian unconscious) 
into consciousness. What is unformed is granted form. Consciousness 
is knowledge of form, and knowledge of form confers history: 
A people without history 
Is not redeemed from time, for history is a pattern 
Of timeless moments. 
"Little Gidding" 
Significantly, however, the act of writing uncovers a message which 
the poet sends first to himself. In meditative poetry, Eliot says, the 
poet ' 'does not know what he has to say until he has said it; and in the 
effort to say it he is not concerned with making people understand 
anything. "43 For Eliot, the unconscious, the subterranean, is thus iden­
tified as a source, a breeder, of knowledge. It is also associated with 
the vitality of the primitive in the area of language. 
Language: the auditory imagination, we remember, is defined as 
"the feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating far below the con­
scious levels of thought and feeling, invigorating every word; sinking 
to the most primitive and forgotten, returning to the origin and bringing 
something back, seeking the beginning and the end."44 The metaphor 
is that of the journey, and the very words recall the search in the Four 
Quartets'. "In my beginning is my end." But poetry has a social 
function, and of this Eliot was always mindful. 
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The poet: according to Eliot, the poet is "more conscious" than 
"his people," other people.45 The poet has a more refined sensibility 
and a clearer apprehension of feeling, and it is through our experience 
of form, the aesthetic experience, that he keeps alive our collective 
ability to feel. 
Eliot, however, has a specific notion, a highly Eliotic notion, of the 
kind of knowledge that the word "consciousness" connotes. For him 
F. H. Bradley is one of the men who possesses such knowledge, which 
Eliot calls wisdom: "Of wisdom Bradley had a large share; wisdom 
consists largely of skepticism and uncynical disillusion; and of these 
Bradley had a large share. And skepticism and disillusion are a useful 
equipment for religious understanding and of that Bradley had a large 
share too."46 The coolness and composure, the utilitarian and almost 
technological vocabulary ("useful equipment") that Eliot uses to de­
scribe the skeptical modern mind is striking, although not surprising. 
In the Four Quartets he speaks of "agony" but the tone is often 
professorial—abstract, parenthetical, and logical: 
Now, we come to discover that the moments of agony 
(Whether, or not, due to misunderstanding, 
Having hoped for the wrong things or dreaded the wrong things, 
Is not in question) are likewise permanent 
With such permanence as time has. 
"The Dry Salvages" 
The wise mind, his own mind, cannot be free of skepticism and 
doubt. This is the burden of much of The Elder Statesman and Eliot's 
important essay on Pascal. In the latter we encounter slightly different 
terminology, but we must not let this mislead us, for Eliot makes 
essentially the same point. Skepticism of Montaigne's brand he con­
demns, and the radical doubt of Pascal he praises and would take as his 
model. 
Pascal, he asserts, is the religious writer most relevant to us: "I can 
think of no Christian writer, not even Newman, more to be com­
mended than Pascal to those who doubt, but who have the mind to 
conceive, and the sensibility to feel, the disorder, the futility, the 
meaninglessness, the mystery of life and suffering, and who can only 
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find peace through a satisfaction of the whole being."47 The accep­
tance of Christianity by the individual is not so much accomplished by 
a Kierkegaardian leap of faith as by a conscious and conscientious, 
disciplined act of the mind. Thinking the problem through properly, 
Eliot explains, leads one into faith. Thus, the intelligent believer of 
today, the conscious believer of today, he affirms, must successfully 
join doubt and skepticism with faith (but, it is not Santayana's animal 
faith). It is this marriage of opposites that is one of the most important 
in the Four Quartets. And it is one that is not figured in the still point, 
for the still point, we remember, does not admit of skepticism or 
doubt. It lies beyond man's ken, although it exists as an ideal to guide 
him. 
The still point can not be reached, although man must pretend that it 
could be. Likewise, Eliot recognized that global Christendom was 
unfeasible, but believed that we must act as if it were. This raises the 
question of his model for cultural development. Do we find that the 
process of cultural growth and development is analogous to that of 
individual development and the creative process? The answer is basi­
cally yes, although it is a yes that must be firmly qualified.48 
Comparison of Eliot's views with the "Prolegomena to the History 
of Primitivism" by Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas, first pub­
lished in 1935,49 suggests how complex Eliot's notion of historical 
development is. The classifications offered by Lovejoy and Boas are 
rigorously schematic and logical, dividing primitivism first into 
chronological primitivism and cultural primitivism, then into finitist 
and infinitist theories, theories of undulation, decline, and ascent, and 
so on. The point to be made, however, is that Lovejoy and Boas use 
the words "savage" and "primitive" interchangeably, largely dismiss 
cultural primitivism as escapism, and at no time mention conscious­
ness as a measure of cultural development. Eliot, as we see in Notes 
toward a Definition of Culture, does not begin by accepting these 
axioms and thus cannot draw such sharply defined conclusions about 
primitivism. His tone, in fact, if we compare it with that of the 
passionate cultural historian of the seventies, William Irwin 
Thompson, who in great part shares Eliot's analysis of Western de­
velopment, is neutral and calm.50 
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On the one hand Eliot recognizes that primitive communities are 
characterized by social cohesion, a shared culture, and lack of speciali­
zation. He understands that as civilization grows more complex, class 
consciousness appears, and religion, science, art, and politics split and 
coagulate into separate institutions, which must deliberately, con­
sciously battle each other for power. He does not lament this loss of 
unity but does comprehend that it is a genuine loss: "the one thing that 
time is ever sure to bring about is the loss: gain or compensation is 
almost always conceivable but never certain."51 But, on the other 
hand, increased consciousness and skepticism accompany increased 
complexity of civilization as compensation. And finally, although in 
his view cultural specialization is not necessarily equivalent to cultural 
disintegration, he does observe that in the West specialization has 
begun to degenerate into irreparable fragmentation. 
Eliot, in other words, does not hold a rigid theory of either general 
progress from the primitive to the "civilized" or, conversely, general 
decline from organic community to fragmented polity. As he says, 
"We do not assume that there is, over a long period, progress even in 
art, or that 'primitive' art is, as art, necessarily inferior to the more 
sophisticated."52 In this respect he was ahead of his time. 
The problem, however, is this. For Eliot the relation between reli­
gion and culture in an ideal state is one in which "people are uncon­
scious both of their culture and their religion."53 As he writes in his 
essay on ''Religion and Literature,'' ''What I want is a literature which 
should be unconsciously, rather than deliberately and defiantly Chris-
tian."54 
But later in that essay he involves us in a contradiction: "It is not 
enough to understand what we ought to be, unless we know what we 
are and we do not understand what we are, unless we know what we 
ought to be. The two forms of self-consciousness, knowing what we 
are and what we ought to be, must go together. "55 This more or less 
mirrors the distinction between tradition and orthodoxy that Eliot 
makes in After Strange Gods: tradition is basically unconscious and 
does not possess the means to criticize itself, while orthodoxy is basi­
cally conscious. Tradition can not be deliberately put on, like a rain­
coat to protect oneself from the elements. But orthodoxy can—and 
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Eliot adopted it in the form of Anglicanism. However, orthodoxy is not 
strong enough to hold a specialized society together. In other words, 
what is unconscious can be brought into consciousness, but the process 
cannot be reversed. And while the former may be repeated in each 
individual, the latter is impossible, I believe, for a civilization: once a 
fundamental tradition has hardened into orthodoxy, it is impossible for 
it to dissolve into its former state of invisible tradition. 
And this brings us to the key point of this discussion. Whereas for 
the individual, 
. .  . the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time, 
such an accomplishment is impossible for a civilization. Collective 
consciousness cannot give us back a tradition that has been lost. The 
split between organism and organization, the individual and his 
specialized technological society at large, cannot be healed by a return 
to Christianity. A civilization cannot go home again. In the Four 
Quartets Eliot, whatever his dreams, does not lie to us. In "The Waste 
Land" ancient wisdom couldn't lift the curse, nor can it here. As Eliot 
says in Notes toward a Definition of Culture, ' 'Understanding involves 
an area more extensive than that of which one can be conscious; one 
cannot be outside and inside at the same time."56 Yeats wrote in his 
last letter that "man can embody truth but he cannot know it." Eliot 
would have agreed, but he also would have accepted the reverse propo­
sition that "man can know truth but cannot embody it." 
III. THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 
And what the dead had no speech for, when living, 
They can tell you, being dead: the communication 
Of the dead is tongued with fire beyond the language of the living 
Here, the intersection of the timeless moment 
Is England and nowhere. Never and always. 
"Little Gidding" 
If, as Eliot believed, the act of writing releases a message hitherto 
unknown to the poet himself, if the poet ' 'cannot identify this embryo 
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until it has been transformed into an arrangement of the right words in 
the right order,"57 we must ask what this message is in the Four 
Quartets. And to answer this question it is appropriate to ask where it 
is that Eliot qua Eliot appears in the poem. This in turn involves us in a 
definition of the meditative poem. 
For most critics of Eliot, the poetry of meditation is understood as 
the language of abstraction.58 But Eliot himself has a different notion of 
what meditative poetry is. For him it is poetry that we generally label 
"lyric" poetry, poetry of the first person.59 This accords, in part, with 
Louis Martz' helpful notion of the meditative poem as drama wherein 
the poet seeks himself in himself, or as we might put it, projects a part 
of himself, an image of himself, in order to know himself.60 We have 
already seen that in the Four Quartets Eliot as a character playing 
himself is not distinctly or directly identified with the unattended 
moments beginning with the "Burnt Norton" rose-garden and stretch­
ing to the churchyard in "Little Gidding." These moments exist in a 
timeless and in great part a spaceless dimension without him. 
But there is one passage in the Four Quartets, a passage which has 
been called "one of his finest pieces of writing,"61 where Eliot does 
appear: the "Little Gidding" dramatization of his meeting with "a 
familiar compound ghost." This scene, extraordinary for Eliot, com­
bines the immediacy of anecdote with the truth of dream. Old Possum, 
the Eliot who all his literary life has championed the art of the imper­
sonal, here lays aside that dictum. We remember his famous words of 
years earlier in "Tradition and the Individual Talent": "the more 
perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man 
who suffers and the mind which creates."62 What is so moving in the 
ghost sequence is that the mind which creates is no less perfect, but the 
man who suffers is closer to us and more human. 
If, as Helen Gardner has pointed out, "The Hollow Men" is in part 
a work that presents the crisis we call middle age,63 then the Four 
Quartets deals directly with the crisis of old age. The message which 
Eliot sends himself, and us, is a message from the dead. Eliot assumes 
a "double part." He is both himself and the other. We see Eliot as a 
character bringing what is unconscious, what is beyond and below, 
into consciousness, into the present: 
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So I assumed a double part, and cried 
And heard another's voice cry: 'What! are you here?' 
Although we were not, I was still the same, 
Knowing myself yet being someone other— 
And he a face still forming; yet the words sufficed 
To compel the recognition they preceded. 
Kenner has observed that the mechanism of the Eliot plot is ' 'the 
entry of Lazarus, the man who has crossed a frontier and come back: 
Harry with his Furies invading Wish wood, Sweeney the uninvited 
guest at the ragtime jollification, the Magi returning to a kingdom in 
which they are no longer at home, where an alien people clutch their 
gods. '?64 But here there is a significant variation: Lazarus is greeted by 
a man of his own kind, he is not alone. The past is greeted by the 
present. The dream is that the literary tradition is continuous, not 
discontinuous, that it exists for a moment in space rather than time. 
And it is a moment of grace for them both. The "familiar compound 
ghost," like Stevens' Santayana and Pound's Confucius, represents 
the cultural tradition that Eliot has both learned from and become a part 
of. This scene condenses the truth that, as Octavio Paz puts it, "the 
poem is not literary form but a meeting place between poetry and 
man."65 The figure is a master, a teacher, a wise old man. 
The message he delivers is one that neither Pound nor Stevens could 
have received and only Eliot could have conceived. It is first and 
foremost purgatorial, the vision of old age is a bleak and bitter one: 
'Let me disclose the gifts reserved for age 
To set a crown upon your lifetime's effort. 
First, the cold friction of expiring sense 
Without enchantment, offering no promise 
But bitter tastelessness of shadow fruit 
As body and soul begin to fall asunder. 
Second, the conscious impotence of rage 
At human folly, and the laceration 
Of laughter at what ceases to amuse. 
And last, the rending pain of re-enactment 
Of all that you have done, and been; the shame 
Of motives late revealed, and the awareness 
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Of things ill done and done to others' harm 
Which once you took for exercise of virtue. 
Then fools' approval stings, and honour stains.' 
This could be Shakespeare's Jacques speaking. Until, unless, 
'From wrong to wrong the exasperated spirit 
Proceeds, unless restored by that refining fire 
Where you must move in measure, like a dancer.' 
Skepticism and faith, the two together, wisdom: this is one form of 
knowledge the ghost possesses and this is the knowledge Eliot presum­
ably was in need of. But if the Eliot of skepticism and despair yields to 
the Eliot of skepticism and faith, this is no surprise to us. It is a formal 
solution to a poetic problem which Eliot had come to terms with in his 
life some time before. This I will come back to later. 
This moment differs significantly from those preceding it in the 
Four Quartets. It opens to include the contemporary wasteland while 
others do not. It was the war, we remember, that prompted Eliot to 
write poetry again, to write "East Coker" and to continue with "The 
Dry Salvages" and "Little Gidding." Appropriately then, this scene 
takes place in London in the predawn hour after an air raid, and 
together the two men form "a dead patrol," a watch over the city. 
They are its guardians. It is a ritual action which they perform. And as 
we know, the one who participates in a ceremony is like an actor who 
plays a part: everything is and yet everything is not. It is a supreme 
achievement, for in all of the Four Quartets this is the single section 
where Eliot is able to unite the two worlds of cultural disintegration 
and individual illumination. 
Not surprisingly, the context is an aesthetic one. Moreover, it is not 
a weightless union of abstractions ("In my end is my beginning") but 
a concrete, tangible reconciliation of opposites achieved within the 
frame of a dramatic situation. This scene has specific historical coordi­
nates of space and time, and yet "this intersection" is "nowhere" and 
has "no before and after." 
This is what the vision is. We must also realize what it is not. Eliot's 
poetry is not a poetry of ecstasy. This section in "Little Gidding" does 
not dramatize a vision of Incarnation or of mystical contact with God. 
Eliot knew what his limitations were in a secular society, and he knew 
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what his possibilities were. And accordingly, he presents us with a 
poet, not a prophet, who delivers a vaguely Christian message. This is, 
of course, exactly the role Eliot set for himself. Eliot could not write a 
Bhagavad-Gita, where Krishna manifests himself. Eliot is not a New 
Dante and could not send himself a Beatrice. Nor is he Pound; he could 
not en-vision the eyes of a goddess in this London landscape. But in 
the Four Quartets Eliot does move far beyond the empty allegory of 
"Choruses from 'The Rock.' " Whereas in "Choruses," the Rock is 
handed wooden lines to speak before an undefined audience, in the 
Four Quartets we find a situation which is both dramatic and imagina­
tive. 
But the satisfaction we feel in this passage is not only a literary one. 
The message of the "familiar compound ghost" may have Christian 
overtones for those who would hear them, but the whole of this brief 
drama has an important sociological meaning. Contemporary urban 
society, as reflected in its subway faces, 
. .  . the strained time-ridden faces 
Distracted from distraction by distraction 
Filled with fancies and empty of meaning 
Tumid apathy with no concentration 
"Burnt Norton" 
is impacted, a dull mass. The individual, as we know Eliot believed, is 
in great part "empty of meaning" because the forces of industrialism 
and secularism have uprooted him from his traditional, personal 
associations—family, church, guild, village—in which he had clearly 
defined status, a coherent set of moral beliefs, and fellowship. And 
nothing has filled this vacuum. The subway rider is a displaced person 
among other displaced persons. As the Chorus asked in "Choruses 
from The Rock' ": 
When the Stranger says: "What is the meaning of this city? 
Do you huddle close together because you love each other?" 
What will you answer? "We all dwell together 
To make money from each other"? or "This is a community"? 
There is a basic human need for community, observes Robert Nisbet 
in The Quest for Community, and it is a need which is all the more 
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pressing in our century. "The problem," Nisbet argues, "lies in the 
realm of the small, primary, personal relationships of society—the 
relationships that mediate directly between man and his larger world 
of economic, moral, political and religious values."66 Our traditional 
small social groups, which had functional significance and also pro­
vided moral cohesion, have atrophied, he points out, and no new 
associations have taken their place. Our need for them is a fundamental 
one, he urges, and with this Eliot would agree. In "Choruses from 
'The Rock' " the notion of community that Eliot offers is exclusively a 
Christian one. In The Elder Statesman he explores the remaking of 
community on the level of the nuclear family and friends. But in the 
Four Quartets he stresses the importance of another kind of associa­
tion. As a poet, he recognizes and dramatizes his need to belong to a 
literary community that possesses a strong tradition and plays a vital 
role in the present. In the ghost passage we do not see Eliot detached 
"from self and from things and from persons," and we are glad of it: 
I said: 'The wonder that I feel is easy, 
Yet ease is cause of wonder. Therefore speak: 
I may not comprehend, may not remember.' 
He might have written: "The ease that I feel is cause of wonder." 
The "familiar compound ghost" contains many poets particularly 
important to Eliot—Dante and Dante's Arnaut and Yeats and Pound 
and Shelley and Mallarme and Milton. Together, and including Eliot, 
they form a guild in which master passes on craft and wisdom to 
apprentice. Given Eliot's belief in "the indestructible barriers between 
one human being and another," as Kenner has put it,67 this is as close 
as he ever allowed himself in poetry to break down that barrier. Here 
we cannot help but contrast Eliot's pale abstraction of these poets with 
Pound's almost literal calling out of their names, one by one, in the 
Pisan Cantos. But the relationship of poets is not purely literary. It is 
also, for Eliot, psychological, moral, and religious. And finally, it is 
social: for their common concern was, and is, language and speech and 
urging "the mind to aftersight and foresight" ("Little Gidding"). As 
this passage makes clear, it is in great part concrete association (how­
ever hallucinatory) with the living tradition which gives strength and 
makes the ongoing fight possible. The ghost is itself the "embryo" 
T. S. Eliot and the Four Quartets 55 
that comes into life "near the ending of interminable night." Con­
sciousness brings resolve: 
Old men ought to be explorers. 
Here and there does not matter 
We must be still and still moving 
Into another intensity 
For a further union, a deeper communion 
Through the dark cold and the empty desolation 
"East Coker" 
And next year's words await another voice. 
"Little Gidding" 
In contemporary society, Nisbet argues, one of the roles of small social 
associations is to act as a check against the totalitarian tendency of a 
mass society. And for Eliot this is the role of the literary community. 
Thirteen years after Eliot finished the Four Quartets he gave an 
address at Hamburg University on "Goethe as the Sage. "68 His tone in 
that essay is personal and almost affectionate, and his voice is wise. In 
the Four Quartets he had written: ' 'The only wisdom we can hope to 
acquire / Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless." The virtue 
of humility is a great part of the Hamburg lecture, and its words help us 
understand the wisdom of the Four Quartets. It is possible, Eliot 
argues, to distinguish between the philosophy of a poet and his wis­
dom. Whether or not we can accept the beliefs of Dante or Shakespeare 
or Goethe, we can accept, he maintains, their wisdom: 
It is precisely for the sake of learning wisdom that we must take the 
trouble to frequent these men; it is because they are wise men that we 
should try, if we find one of them, uncongenial, to overcome our 
aversion or indifference. Of revealed religions, and of philosophical 
systems, we must believe that one is right and the others wrong. But 
wisdom is Xoyog £i)v6g, the same for all men everywhere. . .. That the 
wisdom and the poetry are inseparable, in poets of the highest rank, is 
something I have only come to perceive in becoming a little wiser 
myself.69 
It is this inseparability of wisdom and poetry that we find in the Four 
Quartets. 
The distinctive nature of the "wisdom" of Eliot's last major poem 
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must be pursued just a bit further, however. Eliot provided his genera­
tion with a model of wholeness in "the still point" (for them the 
phrase expressed the ineffable, although for us it may have, unfortu­
nately, become a cliche). Pound, Stevens, and Williams each define 
for themselves a still point which is invested with the specific gravity 
of a long life, the particularity of a certain poetic problem, and per­
sonal urgency. But for Eliot, as I have argued earlier in this chapter, 
the still point remains a linguistic construction. It is only in the ghost 
passage of "Little Gidding" that Eliot is able to unite the private world 
of mystical illumination with the social world of violence. And this is 
especially important for us because his doppelgdnger speaks of the 
impending violence of old age, presenting him with a vision which is 
terrifying and offering veiled counsel which is indeed wise, but, I 
believe, not heeded. 
Earlier I said that the Four Quartets deals directly with the crisis of 
old age. They do, but they do more than that, and this twist of time in 
Eliot's imagination is also distressing. It is crucial for us in the twen­
tieth century to project ourselves imaginatively into our own future, 
our old age, for as individuals we tend to repress old age psychologi­
cally just as industrial culture has devalued the elderly as a nonproduc­
tive group and pushed them out of sight. But the surfacing of old age, 
in Eliot's sense, in middle age is a chilling prospect, and this is just 
what we encounter in the Four Quartets. Eliot imposes a dark vision of 
old age on his middle years. He is, we would say, old before his time, 
and here we mean old in the pejorative sense. For Eliot was only 
forty-seven when "Burnt Norton" appeared in his Collected Poems 
and only fifty-five when he published the entire set of poems together 
as the Four Quartets. Thus we might more accurately conclude that 
the Four Quartets deals with the crisis of middle age as viewed 
through the distorting lens of a repulsive old age. 
The Four Quartets confirms that Eliot has a strong sense of the life 
cycle and the sequence of generations, but it is one that is bizarrely 
truncated: the stress is on physical decay, never growth. In "Burnt 
Norton," for example, he turns a lifetime of decrepitude to advantage: 
Yet the enchainment of past and future 
Woven in the weakness of the changing body, 
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Protects mankind from heaven and damnation 
Which flesh cannot endure. 
A few lines earlier in the poem the still point is described as the point 
"where past and future are gathered," but while the locus of these 
different points of time is lovely in abstraction (they are ' 'gathered 
together), it is purgatorial in the concrete, "the changing body" where 
they are enchained. 
F. R. Leavis has called this attitude of Eliot's a sin against the 
principle of life.70 And indeed it is a funereal way of understanding that 
"In my beginning is my end." These words open the second Quartet, 
which refers us to Eliot's ancestry by its title: Eliot's family came to 
America from the village of East Coker, located in Southeast Somer­
setshire. But the poetic point that Eliot makes is general, not specific 
to his own psychological and social history, not directed at the influ­
ences of his family's origins on his development. Instead he submerges 
all autobigraphy in the continually crumbling arc of time. We would 
agree, I think, that to a large extent his perspective is "wise": what a 
generation creates must necessarily die, and within a given life time 
one devotes oneself, appropriately, to different tasks at different times 
(this is perhaps less understood by the young than the old): 
Houses live and die: there is a time for building 
And a time for living and for generation 
And a time for the wind to break the loosened pane 
And to shake the wainscot where the field-mouse trots 
And to shake the tattered arras woven with a silent motto. 
We cannot help but notice, however, that Eliot places the weight of 
time on destruction, decay, and death. 
The time for building, living, and generation in Erikson's concep­
tion of the life span (generativity means caring for one's children, 
nurturing the next generation, turning one's attention to those younger 
than oneself) contracts to a line and one-half and receives no figurative 
attention, whereas the entire last three lines of the opening stanza of 
"East Coker" turn to decay which is rendered imagistically, not 
merely stated. These images are familiar and contribute to a perhaps 
comforting tone of domestic melancholy and rural elegy, but earlier in 
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the section there appears an image of decay that is disturbing in its 
surreal mixture of organic matter—the earth which has always been 
and will always be a compost of "flesh, fur and faeces." Surely this is 
not wise but disquieting instead, an unhealthy vision of the dissolution 
of life while it is still intact and distinct, specifically recognizable in its 
various forms (the earth "is already flesh, fur and faeces, / Bone of 
man and beast, cornstalk and leaf"). For Eliot, this is the middle way, 
which will persist to the end, into old age: the two are part of a 
continuum of decay. 
I have dwelt on this at some length because although Eliot certainly 
possesses an acute sense of history, his sense of time in terms of his 
own life is severely impoverished. In the Four Quartets a sense of the 
future is not palpable, only an indefinite stretch of the middle way, 
which is a kind of death in life. When Eliot writes, "In my beginning 
is my end," I fear that the end has absorbed everything. We learn in 
"The Dry Salvages" that his life is one of endless ends, a kind of 
Sartrean hell from which there is no exit: 
There is no end, but addition: the trailing 
Consequence of further days and hours, 
While emotion takes to itself the emotionless 
Years of living among the breakage 
Of what was believed in as the most reliable— 
And therefore the fittest for renunciation. 
Although only middle-aged—and this is still a time of building—Eliot 
portrays himself as paralyzed, particularly in terms of poetry and the 
future. At the same time, he dismisses the tranquility of the wise old 
man for himself—and for others. "Autumnal serenity," we read in the 
second section of "East Coker," is in fact lethargy, dullness of mind, 
a reliance on old insights and useless knowledge. 
Eliot is ' 'wise'' to recognize his limitations in poetry (the limitations 
of language). And I do not at all find his admissions of inadequacy to 
be duplicitous, an exaggerated humility masking pride, as others 
have.71 When Eliot writes of his attempts and failures over a period of 
twenty long years to use words in a supremely accurate way adequate 
to his time, I believe him and admire the unflinching accuracy of his 
perception and the significance he attributes to work in language: 
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each venture 
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate 
With shabby equipment, always deteriorating 
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling, 
Undisciplined squads of emotion. And what there is to conquer 
By strength and submission, has already been discovered 
Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope 
To emulate—but there is no competition. . .  . 
I am in awe of his courage, the fierce demands he makes upon himself, 
but I wish for more, an energy of action. Given the vast span of 
history, Eliot may be "wise" to devalue his own anguish, to present it 
clinically, as he does in "The Dry Salvages," effacing his own tor­
ment and asserting that time is no healer; but does this "wisdom" not 
have an inordinate cost? 
Although we commonly observe that things must be placed in 
perspective in order to be seen with clarity, the olympian summit of 
Eliot's point of view so diminishes his self that he disappears before his 
time. As we will see later in Wallace Stevens' "To an Old Philosopher 
in Rome," such a perspective is appropriate, fitting, for a man of 
Santayana's age who has done his work. And so is the mode of his 
being, which is the meditative mode: detachment. 
But is not Eliot's detachment from his own life premature and thus 
unwise? We read in the third section of "Little Gidding" that 
' 'detachment / From self and from things and from persons" is a 
method for liberating oneself from an impossible future and an equally 
impossible past. Detachment, like memory, appears to be a way of 
tranquilizing the present, protecting oneself from it: 
This is the use of memory: 
For liberation—not less of love but expanding 
Of love beyond desire, and so liberation 
From the future as well as the past. 
Is not memory overvalued in his middle age? Eliot does not write of 
memory as a pleasure. Rather, it serves a "use"; his attitude toward it 
is pragmatic. Memory is a strategy for annulling desire, the impulse 
toward things, and persons, and the enhancement of the self. Why this 
fear of desire? Why this emphasis on a stillness, which, for a middle­
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aged poet of great talent, does not so much resemble the balance of 
Stevens' Santayana, for example, as it does a stasis, perhaps stagna­
tion? Clearly nothing seemed possible—either his life in poetry or his 
marriage. That anguish he believed could only be relieved and that 
tormented self vanish by submitting it to a higher meaning—"that 
refining fire" to which the ghost refers and which presumably will 
order one's life, providing a disciplined pattern in which "you must 
move in measure, like a dancer" (the italics are mine). 
See, now they vanish, 
The faces and places, with the self which, as it could, loved them, 
To become renewed, transfigured, in another pattern. 
Although it is ungracious of us to ask more of Eliot than he was 
capable of giving, on the other hand, I think he did not follow his own 
best advice, the advice of the ghost he sent himself. As we have seen, 
the ghost's last words do counsel him to submit himself to the disci­
pline of Christianity. And the final section of "Little Gidding" re­
hearses that theme. It is common to conclude therefore that the end of 
the Four Quartets represents the successful completion of a spiritual 
journey in which "the fire and the rose are one ." But here I agree with 
F. R. Leavis who complains that the Four Quartets ends on a note of 
declaration rather than poetic persuasion.72 
However this is not my major point. For the ghost had more to say. 
His speech is divided into three parts: the last three lines, which invoke 
the Christian tradition and come as an abrupt coda to both the first part, 
which is concerned with the relationship of the poet to his work, and 
the second part, which, as we have already seen, is concerned with the 
psychic and physical horrors of old age. It is the first section that is 
most relevant to us here. Speaking with authority, the ghost declares 
that " 'Last season's fruit is eaten.' " This is not an unfamiliar theme 
to us—Eliot has acknowledged this throughout the poem. But the ghost 
elaborates: 
'For last year's words belong to last year's language 
And next year's words await another voice. 
But, as the passage now presents no hindrance 
To the spirit unappeased, and peregrine 
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Between two worlds become much like each other, 
So I find words I never thought to speak. 
Our attention is focused on the present, the potential for a living 
tradition. The ghost, like Eliot, is wretched, his "spirit unappeased," 
but he represents the possibility of presence, of utterance, of speech 
whose words do and will reach into the silence. 
This is, for me, the wisdom which the ghost imparts. Not the Chris­
tian religion, for Eliot had embraced that years earlier, both in his 
poetry and his actions, but rather the possibility of poetry for Eliot 
himself. It is as if Eliot is prompting himself to speak, in poetry, to 
continue his work, despite its problematics, to act. "So I find words I 
never thought to speak," says the ghost, himself astonished that the 
words for this time, that place could be found. 
D. W. Harding, commenting on "Little Gidding," declares that the 
last section of the Quartets ' 'suggests a serene and revitalized return 
from meditation to one's part in active living."73 Action for Eliot: 
would that not have meant a life in poetry? As we learned from his 
essay on "Tradition and the Individual Talent," which he had written 
years earlier, he believed in the power of the poetic community to 
affect its culture in a meaningful way. And in the ghost sequence of 
"Little Gidding," he is finally able to dramatize that power poetically. 
But he does not follow his own advice. After the Four Quartets he 
leaves his life in poetry, unable to find a voice in the present, and the 
plays that follow do not fulfill the measure of his talent. 
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EZRA POUND AND THE PISAN CANTOS 
The Teachings of Confucius 
The Teachings of Ezra Pound 
Sincerity, this precision of terms is heaven's process. 
What comes from the process in human ethics. The sincere man finds 
the axis without forcing himself to do so. He arrives at it without 
thinking and goes along naturally in the midst of the process [T s 'ung 
yung chung tao], he is a wise man. He who is sincere seizes goodness, 
gripping it firmly from all sides. —The Unwobbling Pivot1 
The sincere man and the wise man, Pound learned from Confucius, 
finds his personal point of balance (his "still point," the "axis," the 
"unwobbling pivot") by means other than Western logic, reason, and 
the incessant abstraction of the mind. In the U.S.A. Detention Train­
ing Center north of Pisa in 1945, Pound discovered that "Le Paradis 
n'est pas artificiel." It is not unusual that this lesson and this discovery 
should come together, for they were, in fact, the two sides of the same 
coin, the two faces of the same open page. Pound, sixty years old and 
locked up in a hellhole of a wire cage, had only notebooks to keep him 
alive, and in these notebooks he worked on both translations of Con­
fucius {The Great Digest and The Unwobbling Pivot) and the Pisan 
Cantos (the record of the making of a wise old man). The two literally 
interpenetrate and work together. But Confucius, although dominant, is 
not the only figure behind the Pisan Cantos. Pound commentators 
have been eager to appoint various heroines, Venus, for example,2 or 
Persephone.3 This hero(ine) hunting can only be misleading, for the 
important point is that in the Pisan Cantos there is, on the contrary, no 
one personage (either historical or mythical) and/or no one particular 
path which Pound takes to "le paradis." 
Pound was in severe need of grace under pressure, and he looked for 
it and found it in as many places and in as many dimensions as possi­
ble: the natural landscape, personal memory, the third world, traditions 
of all kinds, the Utopian imagination, the prisoners around him. In this 
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way he is so unlike Williams, who in Paterson V proposed essentially 
only one way to counter old age and death: that of the museum, the 
modern tomb of dead civilizations. 
Williams, in his reliance on slice-of-life imagism, on pictorial im­
agism, on "re-painting" the flowers in the Cloisters Tapestries, on a 
kind of sweet domesticity, failed. He failed in great part because the 
"art" he chose was unrelated and set apart from the culture in which 
he lived (the lower-class industrial city of Paterson), and he could not, 
as Pound could with his own choices of art of the past, make it new; he 
could not successfully reintegrate the traditions of the past into the 
culture of the present. In the end the Cloisters Tapestries of Williams 
remain merely beautiful, not immediately meaningful or useful. 
Pound, we remember, believed that "the setting of the museum above 
the temple is a perversion,"4 and Pound is right. Williams lacked, at 
that crucial time in his life and his poetry, a sense of the divine, the 
religious, the sacramental. This is one of the reasons why his creaky 
symbolism of whore-virgin-and-unicorn did not work any better than 
his re weaving of the Tapestries. Williams, one concludes, tried to set 
the stage for experiencing in Paterson V what we Could (not so gener­
ously) call a moment of reassurance, a moment possessing none of the 
religious qualities of Pound's conception of the "magic moment." But 
Williams only succeeded in talking around it, and perhaps in talking 
himself, but not us, into it. 
Why could Pound achieve in the Pisan Cantos what Williams could 
not in Paterson V? In great part Pound's achievement was possible 
because of the "method" of the Cantos, their extreme openness of 
form. This is not as simplistic or as obvious as it might sound. 
Paradise, Pound says, is "spezzato," broken: 
it exists only in fragments unexpected excellent sausage, 
the smell of mint, for example, 
Ladro the night cat. 
By this he means that an eternal, continuous paradise is impossible, 
never again possible (was it really ever possible?). He also means that 
it can exist, does still exist, in "unexpected" moments, fragments 
which not only point to something else, something larger, something 
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beyond, but also are the " 'divine or permanent world.' "5 What is 
important here is the concept of the unexpected. Pound's notion paral­
lels that of Zen where a simple, unanticipated event (the falling of a 
petal, for example) can trigger, can invite atasal. One must be ready 
but one cannot be consciously looking. As Pound translated Con­
fucius, the siribere man "arrives at it without thinking and goes along 
naturally in the midst of the process."6 
This leads us to the chief difference between the openness of 
Pound's Pisan Cantos and that of Williams' Paterson. Although both 
are squarely in the American tradition of the open poem and although 
both find heirs in the Black Mountain poets and the Beats, Pound, 
however, had early on made a commitment about (and to) his poetry, a 
commitment crucial to the development of American poetry, which 
Williams never had. For Pound, the question of openness was not just 
a matter of the way the poem was allowed to look on the page. Nor was 
it only an acceptance of what had before been regarded as undesirable 
foreign matter—the mixing of prose and poetry, for example, or the 
injection of scraps from historical accounts into a lyric base. More 
importantly, for Pound the openness of the Cantos meant that the act of 
writing and his life were somehow one and the same. The two could 
not be neatly separated the way one could divide (and conquer) the Life 
and Works of T. S. Eliot or the Work and Writing of Wallace Stevens. 
The teachings of Confucius and the draft of the Pisan Cantos literally 
run through each other in the manuscript notebooks, and so do Pound's 
writing and his life. And just as life has no plot, neither do his Pisan 
Cantos. They are, even more so than the preceding Cantos, a kind of 
daybook, a journal, a form which, interestingly enough, became popu­
lar in American poetry in the sixties and seventies (think of Gary 
Snyder, of Paul Blackburn, of Allen Ginsberg). 
To say this is not to say that Pound did not have a vague, general 
notion of the direction he wished the Cantos to take. He certainly did, 
and critics are fond of quoting from his famous 1927 letter to his father 
in the hallowed name of an articulate structure: 
Have I ever given you outline of main scheme : : : or whatever it is? 
1. Rather like, or unlike subject and response and counter subject in 
fugue. 
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A. A. Live man goes down into world of Dead 
C. B. The ' 'repeat in history'' 
B. C. The "magic moment" or moment of metamorphosis, bust thru 
from quotidien into "divine or permanent world." Gods, etc.7 
The model is the Divine Comedy, we could say, or the model is the 
Odyssey. A model is not the same as a plot, however. A model permits 
flexibility, it is an undercurrent, a substructure, a scaffolding on which 
the substance is built. A plot, on the other hand, is by definition the 
focus of attention in the genres which it dominates—the novel, the 
drama—but not in poetry. A plot is a chain of events (a chain), it is 
planned in advance. But Pound's Cantos are not a novel or a five-act 
drama with a neat denouement. They are an unfolding of his life (Pound 
was among the first to invent this form; to my knowledge it is only 
Zukofsky in "A " who preceded him). Pound may have begun with the 
figure of Odysseus in the back of his mind, but he could not have 
anticipated the Second World War and the D.T.C. And that the model 
is latent, and best left so, is easily seen when we compare Pound's use 
of the homeomorph (to use Kenner's term)8 with Williams' cumber­
some and overweening use of metaphor in Paterson. Williams grafts 
the Giant onto the city of Paterson or the city onto the Giant, it little 
matters which. In the Cantos the journey of Odysseus resonates with 
the journey of Pound; the paradigm of the Divine Comedy works on a 
subliminal level (or would, if only commentators would not be so 
heavy-handed in digging it up). 
Pound had, in fact, once said that the Divine Comedy was not an 
epic but rather a lyric, "the tremendous lyric of the subjective 
Dante,"9 and the same is true of his own Cantos. In the Pisan Cantos 
especially, the act of writing upheld his life in a more immediate way 
than Mallarme would ever have understood: "As a lone ant from a 
broken ant-hill / from the wreckage of Europe, ego scriptor" 
[LXXVI]. Writing for Pound was more than ever before a way of 
talking to himself ("to write dialog because there is/no one to converse 
with" [LXXX]) and of saving himself. The Pisan Cantos are nothing 
less than a survival piece. 
Pound had long held the theory that you see nothing and find nothing 
if you start with a map, if you proceed into unknown territory with a 
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plan in hand as to what is important, if you use someone else's guide, 
someone else's categories and abstractions. Territory, he believed, 
must remain unknown until personally explored so that the unexpected 
is possible. If the unexpected is possible, then the future (change and 
growth) is also possible. "Periplum," the method of charting life by 
points of experience, is a watchword of all of the Cantos, not just the 
Pisan Cantos. 
But in the Pisan Cantos the word as mantra and the concept behind 
the word take on a more poignant meaning. Pound's dream for Italy 
had twisted into nightmare. He opens the sequence: 
The enormous tragedy of the dream in the 
peasant's bent shoulders 
Manes! Manes was tanned and stuffed, 
Thus Ben and la Clara a Milano 
That maggots shd/ eat the dead bullock 
DIGENES, Siyevec;, but the twice crucified 
where in history will you find it? 
[LXXIV] 
His Italy was gone. Pound himself had been stripped of his freedom, 
and his wife, and his books—all this by a country that he loved. He 
questioned his very future: 
we will see those old roads again, question, 
possibly 
but nothing appears much less likely 
[LXXIV] 
He had to start again, to find what he could live on. This is periplum 
with a vengeance. But in a way, this hell is just what made those 
fragments of Paradise possible. 
"Periplum": in the Pisan Cantos it connects with Pound's notion of 
mysticism as being based on "direct perception": 
The flavours of the peach and the apricot are not lost from generation 
to generation, neither are they transmitted by book-learning. The mys­
tic tradition, any mystic tradition, is of a similar nature, that is, it is 
dependent on direct perception, a 'knowledge' as permanent as the 
faculty for receiving it.10 
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As he wrote in Gaudier-Brzeska: A Memoir, "An image. .  . is real 
because we know it directly."11 Direct perception: what Pound ac­
cepted as a matter of course, Wallace Stevens debated his entire life. 
Was direct perception possible? Stevens fussed. At times he would 
answer no, arguing (reasonably, rationally, in the Lockean tradition) 
that the categories of the mind intervened (these categories could be 
logical, as in "Metaphors of a Magnifico," or metaphorical, as in 
"Someone Puts a Pineapple Together"). At times he would answer 
yes, yet add that plain-and-simple perception (the "painting" of carna­
tions in "The Poems of Our Climate"), the fruit of imagism, was not 
enough. 
In this Stevens and Pound agree. Pound had long ago articulated the 
canon of this brand of imagism, a "technical hygiene" as Hugh Ken­
ner has so aptly labeled it:12 
1. Direct treatment of the 'thing' whether subjective or objective. 
2. To use absolutely no word that does not contribute to the presenta­
tion. 
3. As regarding rhythm: to compose in the sequence of the musical 
phrase, not in sequence of a metronome.13 
Like Stevens, Pound rejected this doctrine as being insufficient 
(Williams, however, never really did). But whereas Pound was always 
sure of alternatives, steady in his beliefs in the "Symposium of the 
Whole," to use Robert Duncan's words, Stevens was not. Pound was 
interested in the emotional as well as the intellectual component; we 
recall his "second" definition of the image: "An 'Image' is that which 
presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of 
time."14 
But Stevens was uneasy with the emotional, the personal, as a 
means of validating the ' 'real." In one of his later poems, ' 'Bouquet of 
Roses in Sunlight," for example, perception of the real (the object) is 
based on feelings, and this basis Stevens hastens to undermine: 
Say that it is a crude effect, black reds, 
Pink yellows, orange whites, too much as they are 
To be anything else in the sunlight of the room, 
Too much as they are to be changed by metaphor. 
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Too actual, things that in being real 
Make any imaginings of them a lesser thing. 
And yet this effect is a consequence of the way 
We feel and, therefore, is not real, except 
In our sense of it, our sense of the fertilest red, 
Of yellow as first color and of white, 
In which the sense lies still, as a man lies, 
Enormous, in a completing of his truth. 
What "we fee l . .  . is not real"; such experience only reflects ourselves 
(we think of Mallarme gazing out of the window and seeing only his 
own image reflected); the room is one of solipsism. In his last poems 
Stevens is finally able to put aside the internal dialogue of the mind and 
accept without serious qualification "direct perception." The title of 
the last poem in the Collected Poems testifies to this: "Not Ideas about 
the Thing but the Thing Itself' (but it also testifies to his never having 
rejected Western dualism). 
But the question to ask is: How does Stevens' concept of "direct 
perception" differ from that of Pound? For the difference is vast. 
Stevens' aesthetic is, finally, an aesthetic of glimpses,15 of moments 
which give nourishment and an impulse to continue living. But for 
Stevens one moment does not connect with another, nor does the 
experience of a particular moment connect with something larger. For 
him the moment of perception is literally a fragment unto itself, not as 
for Pound a fragment which is a part of a whole. For Pound the "still 
point" is much more akin to the Wordsworthian notion of "seeing into 
the heart of things," although it is far more complex than that. Unlike 
Stevens, Pound believed in a possible unity of culture and nature, in a 
union of the historical and the mythical. He could write, for exam­
ple, in a relatively little known poem called "Religio, or, The Child's 
Guide to Knowledge": 
What is a god? 
A god is an eternal state of mind. 
What is a faun? 
A faun is an elemental creature. 
What is a nymph? 
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A nymph is an elemental creature. 
When is a god manifest? 
When the states of mind take form. 
When does a man become a god? 
When he enters one of these states of mind.16 
He could pose such questions directly, and he could answer them 
directly, without vacillation, something Stevens could never have 
done. He believed, without question, in the gods. He accepted, with­
out question, the mystical experience. 
In The Spirit of Romance he wrote, "I believe in a sort of permanent 
basis in humanity, that is to say, I believe that Greek myth arose when 
someone having passed through delightful psychic experience tried to 
communicate it to others and found it necessary to screen himself from 
persecution." The word "delightful" is weak; we would do better to 
use the word "ecstatic," which Pound himself uses elsewhere in the 
same essay to describe the emotion which great art calls forth. 
And what is "ecstasy"? "Ecstasy," he says, "is not a whirl of 
madness of the senses, but a glow arising from the exact nature of 
perception."17 In a Guide to Kulchur (kulchur and mysticism are 
linked together, the latter, in part, is a guide to the formation of the 
former), Pound distinguishes between two kinds of mysticism: 
Two mystic states can be dissociated: the ecstatic-beneficent-and-
benevolent, contemplation of the divine love, the divine splendour with 
goodwill toward others. 
And the bestial, namely the fanatical, the man on fire with God and 
anxious to stick his snotty nose into other men's business or reprove his 
neighbor for having a set of tropisms different from that of the fanatic's, 
or for having the courage to live more greatly and openly. 
The second set of mystic states is manifest in scarcity economists, in 
repressors etc. 
The first state is a dynamism. It has, time and again, driven men to 
great living, it has given them courage to go on for decades in the face 
of public stupidity. It is paradisical and a reward in itself seeking naught 
further... perhaps because a feeling of certitude inheres in the state of 
feeling itself. The glory of life exists without further proof for this 
mystic.18 
In the Pisan Cantos Pound experiences the form of mysticism where 
"the feeling of certitude inheres in the state of feeling itself." In the 
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Pisan Cantos mysticism, direct perception, periplum, the unexpected 
moment, paradise, the whole: all these are connected. 
Despite the fragmented appearance of these Cantos, the fragments 
cohere, they spin together. There is a paradox here, if we compare the 
Stevens poem with the Pound poem. The form of a Stevens poem is 
well-mannered. All the lines begin politely, properly capitalized, at the 
left side of the page. Poems are stanzaed and clearly sectioned like 
oranges. They are carefully crafted, or crated, well-wrought aesthetic 
urns, they do not spill out "life" in the way that Pound's Cantos or 
Robert Rauschenberg's combines do. No questionable typographic 
symbols (+ , $, @) or "foreign" foreign languages (Greek, Italian, 
Latin, to say nothing of Chinese) or disreputable abbreviations (wd/, 
sd/, s.o.b., and s.h., a.h., and c.s.) intrude. More to the point, the line 
of a Stevens poem has a clearer narrative direction than do the various 
Cantos (apart from the fact that the Pisan Cantos follow, in time, 
Pound's stay at the D.T.C.). Stevens built "To an Old Philosopher in 
Rome," for example, carefully, step by step, block by block; these 
parts cannot be interchanged, they logically lead to a climax, a kind of 
epiphany. In the Pisan Cantos, on the other hand, bits and pieces of 
the past, cultural landmarks, snatches of conversations, and memories 
are tossed together like a salad. But while a syntax of individual parts 
is missing, the syntax of the whole is not (and we can generalize, the 
opposite is often true with Stevens). To borrow vocabulary from sys­
tems theory, the Pisan Cantos are a whole, not a heap. "The excuse 
for parts of Ulysses,'' Pound once wrote to Joyce himself, ' 'is the 
WHOLE of Ulysses; 'serially' it is 'weak.' "19 The same can be said of 
the Pisan Cantos. It is a grabbag on the level of the individual page, a 
hodgepodge whose parts, however, form a personal vortex, which is, 
as Kenner puts it, "a circulation with a still center: a system of ener­
gies drawing in whatever comes near." For Pound, Kenner continues, 
the unwobbling pivot is a transcendental norm.20 
What is important in the Pisan Cantos is just this interpenetration of 
so many disparate elements. Pound could not sift his life for like 
images and themes, separating them into so many discrete poems, into 
clearly labeled bags of corn and oats and wheat. What literary critics 
do, he could not. To winnow the chaff from one theme (which critics 
do for the sake of analysis, if not always for the sake of the poem), 
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does more violence to Pound's Cantos than, say, to the poems of Eliot 
and Stevens. His Pisan Cantos are not the Chinese History Cantos or 
the Adams History Cantos or the Malatesta Cantos. They are his Gol­
den Notebook (to invoke the title of Doris Lessing's well-known 
novel) where he brings everything together. 
I. THE PICARESQUE SAINT 
Humanity? is to love men. 
Knowledge, is to know men.—Kung21 
Too much emphasis has been given to the view that the bits and 
pieces of the Pisan Cantos are fastened together by the Poundian act of 
reminiscence. Noel Stock says bluntly, "The unity of tone is of a man 
remembering."22 Hugh Kenner says, "What holds the events of the 
Pisan sequence together is that they are transacted explicitly within 
Pound's mind," and this mind is the "mirror of memory. "23 True, in 
comparison with the preceding Cantos, the tone of elegy and reminis­
cence is dominant in the Pisan sequence. But the pressure of the 
present, Pound's fellow prisoners in the D.T.C., the events in the 
camp—all these are crucial in shaping Pound's experience, and his 
poem. 
Although it is risky to suggest comparison between the novel and 
poetry (and particularly so after having argued that the narrative line in 
the Pisan Cantos is for all practical purposes nonexistent), still I think 
one parallel can be quite useful. And that is the similarity that exists 
between the figure of the picaresque saint which R. W. B. Lewis 
identifies as central to what he calls second generation fiction24 and the 
figure of Pound himself in the Pisan Cantos. Lewis proposes, and 
convincingly so, that while in general twentieth-century (Western) 
fiction has been concerned, perhaps obsessed, with death in all its 
forms and meanings (the death of the self, or civilization, of the po­
tency of myth, of God), the first generation of modern writers (Proust, 
Joyce, Mann) dealt with it by withdrawing into the realm of art, and 
the second generation (represented for Lewis by Camus, Silone, 
Moravia, Faulkner, Greene) found "grounds for living in life itself." 
"Where, in the first generation," Lewis writes, "the image of disin­
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tegration was redeemed by the absolute value of art, the sense of 
nothingness has been transcended, in the second generation, by an 
agonizing dedication to life. "25 Both of these solutions, we could say, 
were adopted by Pound (although not by Stevens), and Pound, for one, 
would certainly not have found any contradiction between them. 
Pound straddles, belongs to, two worlds. 
But the more important point is this. Lewis describes the picaresque 
saint as a figure who moves from a sense of loss to a potential gain (a 
form of conversion), who in great part finds his source of meaning in 
human companionship and compassion (the sharing of suffering), and 
who, perhaps most importantly, is both a saint and a sinner. "The 
picaresque saint," says Lewis, "tries to hold in balance... , by the 
very contradictions of his character, both the observed truths of con­
temporary experience and the vital aspiration to transcend them."26 
In the work of Ignazio Silone, Lewis points out, the emphasis shifts 
from politics to charity, and the same is in great part true in Pound's 
Pisan Cantos. The clearest example of the picaresque saint, Lewis 
argues, is found in Graham Greene's character of the unnamed Mexi­
can priest, the incompetent whiskey-priest who has fathered a child, 
who is the last practicing Catholic priest in the now totalitarian state, 
who is an outlaw, who is finally imprisoned with common and not-so-
common criminals. It is in prison, says Lewis, that conversion takes 
place, 
for it is by seeking God and by finding Him in the darkness and stench 
of prisons, among the sinners and the rats and the rascals, that the 
whiskey-priest arrives at the richest emotion second generation fiction 
has to offer: the feeling of companionship, and especially the compan­
ionship of the commonly guilty and wretched.27 
The parallel, rough as it is, between the priest in Greene's The Power 
and the Glory and Pound in the D.T.C. is instructive. But for Pound, it 
is no fiction, no parable. The emotion of the Pisan Cantos is not 
recollected in Wordsworthian tranquility. The act of writing is not 
practiced, as it is with Stevens, in a comfortable upstairs study, in a 
comfortable solitude, late in a quiet night. Pound feared for his life (his 
death) not at the hands of metaphor or nature, but from the government 
of men. 
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During the thirties in Italy, as we can judge from his letters, Pound 
became increasingly isolated. As he heard from fewer and fewer of his 
friends, as he worked for fewer magazines, his expression becomes 
gnarled, his tone shrill and more vituperative. During the war, as we 
all know, vituperation yielded something more poisonous. That 
poison, however, is all but missing in the Pisan Cantos. Pound had 
passed, as he puts it, "over Lethe." He had lost his bearings in the 
world, he was "noman," and had no name, he was in neither Italy nor 
the United States. He was detained, he was removed and set apart. The 
cage and the camp were for him d/QOVog, without time and indepen­
dent of time. They were also his Mt. Taishan, the mountain where the 
sage retires to breathe "the process." 
Here Pound, picaresque saint, discovers that the rabble, whom he 
had long held in Shakespearian contempt, was not of a piece: 
Criminals have no intellectual interests? 
"Hey, Snag, wot are the books ov th' bibl' " 
"name 'em, etc. 
"Latin? I studied latin." 
said the nigger murderer to his cage-mate 
(cdn 't be sure which of the two was speaking) 
"c'mon, small fry," sd/ the smaller black lad 
to the larger. 
"Just playin' " ante mortem no scortum 
(that's progress, me yr' " se/call it progress/). 
[LXXVI] 
"Dawley," "Tom," "Whiteside," and "Romano Ramona," and 
"Scott," "Salazar," and "Washington," and "Benin," especially 
"Benin"—these names are just as important to Pound as "William 
B.Y.," "Dr. Williams," and "dear H.J. (Mr. James, Henry)," or 
"Demeter" and "Cythera" or any of those which form any of the 
other countless categories of names. With these people Pound found 
companionship. From them he received charity, perhaps learned char­
ity. As he relates in the opening Canto: 
and Mr Edwards superb green and brown 
in ward No 4 a jacent benignity. 
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of the Baluba mask: "doan you tell no one 
I made you that table" 
methenamine eases the urine 
and the greatest is charity 
to be found among those who have not observed 
regulations. 
[LXXIV] 
And a few pages later he writes, "Filial, fraternal affection is the root 
of humaneness" (LXXIV). 
In the Pisan Cantos Pound also fulfills another dimension of the 
picaresque saint. He confesses, "J'ai eu pitie des autres/probablement 
pas assez, and at moments that suited my own convenience" 
(LXXVI). He admits, "There can be honesty of mind/without over­
whelming talent" (LXXX). He learns that no one "who has passed a 
month in the death cells/[can] believe in capital punishment" 
(LXXXIII). He vows that "nothing matters but the quality/of the affec­
tion" (LXXVI). He affirms, "Amo ergo sum" (LXXX), and in so 
doing rejects the dominant tradition of dualism, the unhealthy bias 
toward the "objective" and the "scientific," in Western thought since 
the Greeks and certainly since Descartes.28 
' 'Senesco sed amo'' (LXXX): This is both a personal revelation and a 
declaration as to how one should live. Pound chooses, in the words of 
Castaneda, a path with a heart.29 In these Cantos we see him honoring 
the dead in order to live by that rule. It is, in other words, not so much 
out of nostalgia as out of a desire to pay homage to what he has loved 
in his life that Pound composes his hymn to the dead. He recites the 
litany of restaurants and cafes (' 'Dieudonne,'' * 'La Rupe,'' and ' 'Dul­
lier") and the litany of artists of his generation ("Jepson" and "New­
bolt" and others: "Lordly men are to earth o'ergiven" [LXXIV]). 
As a result of this, which is first and foremost an act of love, Pound 
plots the curve of his own past. Periplum: I am getting old but I love. 
He establishes his own existence. He makes the Cantos his archives. 
He gives us (as he certainly could never resist doing, but here the spirit 
is not Poundian didactic imperative) a bibliography, an inventory of an 
important part of the twentieth-century past. The bibliography: like the 
journal, it too has become an important form in the seventies, provid­
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ing a thread to follow through the information explosion (think of Ihab 
Hassan and his paracriticism, of the Whole Earth Catalogue and its 
countless imitators, of Norman O. Brown's work). Pound was think­
ing, we can suppose, not only of pinpointing a specific landscape for 
himself (with accurate dates and names and places, this no Wallace 
Stevens landscape of the mind), but of the future "archeologist" and 
historian as well who would want just those objects as markers, as raw 
data. Here again the appropriate parallel in the visual (and plastic) arts 
is with Rauschenberg, whose work ("combines") of the fifties not 
only represents a whole (a state of mind, perhaps) but includes, in fact, 
the object—objects—thus transforming "life" into "art" only by 
shifting these objects from one context to another (a new text), by 
leaving them otherwise to stand primary, as fact. In the Pisan Cantos 
fragments of memory are, like Rauschenberg's objects, as hard and as 
durable and as lasting as the stone carvings of the Santa Maria dei 
Miracoli, which Pound so highly cherished. They confer a kind of 
benediction: 
and as for the solidity of the white oxen in all this 
perhaps only Dr Williams (Bill Carlos) 
will understand its importance, 
its benediction. He wd/ have put in the cart. 
[LXXVIII] 
n. THE RESACRALIZATION OF THE LANDSCAPE 
THE SPIRIT OF ROMANCE 
The celestial and earthly process pervades and is substantial; it is on 
high and gives light, it comprehends the light and endures. 
—Confucius30 
Pound, with his monetary history of the West, is the Milton Fried­
man of American poetry. Pound, with his Guide to Kulchur, his sup­
port of Mussolini, and his life-long devotion to the classics, wherever 
he found them, is the supreme poet of culture, both pragmatic and 
imaginative, among America's great Modernists. And so it is with 
some surprise, a pleasant surprise, that Pound ("I detest the coun-
try"31) turns to the "green world" in the Pisan Cantos. Pound, the 
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poet of culture, becomes the poet of nature as well. So much so, in 
fact, that at several points these Cantos resemble the greater Romantic 
lyric of the English Romantics. 
If we adopt the Confucian model of man's development, we see that 
Pound, having looked into his own heart, was now able to turn to the 
larger world beyond, to be part of the *'process." At one with himself, 
he could now be one with the mysteries of the world. One of the 
Confucian passages that he translated at the D.T.C. describes this very 
shift in perspective: 
He who possesses this sincerity does not lull himself to somnolence 
perfecting himself with egocentric aim, but he has a further efficiency in 
perfecting something outside himself. 
Fulfilling himself he attains full manhood, perfecting things outside 
himself he attains knowledge. 
The inborn nature begets this activity naturally, this looking straight 
into oneself and thence acting. These two activities constitute the pro­
cess which unites outer and inner, object and subject, and thence consti­
tutes a harmony with the seasons of earth and heaven.32 
For Pound the goal now becomes the union of inner and outer, and the 
outer is the entire system of the natural world, "the seasons of earth 
and heaven," and not, as it is for Stevens, the single object, the "thing 
itself." 
For Pound the natural landscape offered permanence and continuity. 
He believed that it is nature that ultimately remains (today, of course, 
in our artificial landscape of freeways and state camping grounds, we 
know that nature's permanence is threatened). He believed that the 
beauty of nature could be found everywhere, and that this beauty could 
save him; as he remarks throughout the Pisan Cantos, "the clouds 
near to Pisa/are as good as any in Italy" (LXXVI). But more impor­
tantly, Pound understood man's essential dependence upon the land, 
his origins in the land: "man, earth : two halves of the tally" 
(LXXXII). He called upon the natural world for protection ("o lynx, 
guard my vineyard" [LXXIX]). In the D.T.C. it was nature—the 
green lizard, the butterfly, the wasp building her nest, the ant's 
forefoot—which sustained him, and more, fulfilled him: 
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in about 1/2 a day she has made her adobe 
(la vespa) the tiny mud-flask 
and that day I wrote no further. 
[LXXXHI] 
The quiet miracle of the wasp constructing an object of ' 'culture'' (the 
adobe) in and out of the ' 'natural'' (the mud) eases the need for Pound 
to make his own shelter through the act of writing; the natural and the 
cultural, he realizes as witness to this event, can be, could be, are, not 
separate and distinct, but two aspects of the same reality. 
When man is concerned only with man, Pound wrote in The Spirit of 
Romance, he "forgets the whole and the flowing."33 Never a 
humanist, Pound looked to the green world for centering and balanc­
ing. The world, he knew, was not man's world, but rather man was 
part of the world: 
The ant's a centaur in his dragon world. 
Pull down thy vanity, it is not man 
Made courage, or made order, or made grace, 
Pull down thy vanity, I say pull down. 
Learn of the green world what can be thy place 
In scaled invention or true artistry, 
Pull down thy vanity, 
Paquin pull down! 
The green casque has outdone your elegance. 
[LXXXI] 
But Pound's view of the green world is more profound and more 
magical and more visionary than this. "Wisdom lies next thee, / sim­
ply, past metaphor," he writes of Terra (LXXXII); and "Arum vult 
nemus" (LXXVIII): the grove needs an altar. It is just this altar which 
he discovers (or better, gives) in the Pisan Cantos. What is an altar? 
An icon, a cultural artifact, and culture, Pound believed, must again be 
formed and called upon to serve nature. Among other things (and he 
himself is included), what he offers to the green world, what he makes 
new, is the mythology of Greece and Rome. And this is a lesson 
profoundly important for our time. Since the seventeenth century, the 
emphasis of Western science on "objectivity" has worked to sever 
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man from nature, allowed man to regard nature as dead, as a mere 
thing and a lifeless object, and thus sanctioned the rape of the earth. 
The emphasis on methodology, reason, and logic in the wake of Des­
cartes and Bacon has discredited other forms of awareness, among 
them, the intuitive and the imaginative. 
As Roszak points out, the psychological mode is different in the two 
cases: 
Objectivity involves a breaking off of personal contact between ob­
server and observed; there is an act of psychic contradiction back and 
away from what is studied for the sake of a sharp, undistracted focus. In 
contrast, moral unselfishness means to identify with the other, to reach 
out and embrace and feel with. Far from being a contraction of the self, 
here we have expansion, a profoundly personal activity of the soul. At 
its warmest and more complete, this expansive relationship of self to 
other becomes love, and issues forth gracefully in compassion, sac­
rifice, magnanimity. And these, not any sort of rational calibration or 
intellectual precision, are the secret of peace and joyous community. 
These alone provide a balance to the murdering furies of the political 
34 arena.
In the first case, there is a distancing of the self from the other; the 
relationship is clinical and cold, and the "other" is reduced to the 
status of the object. In the second, the self and the other move toward 
each other; the relationship is ethical and "warm." As Roszak traces 
the curve of Western intellectual history, he observes that with the 
triumph of the attitude of objectivity, there is a progressive "thicken­
ing of the world's substance,"35 ending in the totally desacralized 
world of the twentieth century. "What becomes of a world purged of 
its sacramental capacities?" he asks. "It dies the death of the spirit," 
he answers, and concludes that "beauty cut loose of its sacramental 
base is a decadent pleasure and a vulnerable one. "3  6 For a solution to 
our problem Roszak turns to the English Romantics for a politics of 
eternity, but he could have turned to Pound as well. For Pound too 
believed that we ' 'have lost the radiant world where one thought cuts 
through another with clean edges, a world of moving energies."37 
Kenner accuses Pound of indulging in several of the early Cantos in 
"a kaleidoscope of fancies, visions, glimpses, flickering wonders that 
merge into postwar reality."38 In the Pisan Cantos there are also 
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visions and glimpses and flickering wonders but here it is no in­
dulgence. For Pound, the earth is feminine, the earth is mother, and it 
is also alive with her goddesses. The natural and the mythical merge, 
become interchangeable, identical. The natural and the mythological 
here are different aspects of the same reality; the name of the one calls 
the other. Metaphor collapses to unity, identity; identity resonates with 
meaning and metaphor. The wind is part of the process, the wind is 
Zephyrus, Zephyrus is thus part of the process. Tellus is the divinity of 
earth, nature is another name for divinity. The familiar landscape is pop­
ulated with goddesses transformed, tree nymphs, the hamadryas, who 
were changed into poplar trees while mourning their brother Phaethon: 
the nymph and the tree are one. The earth is both mother and lover, she is 
"XGovia Y8a» MVJTTIQ " and Demeter, the goddess of fruitfulness and 
harvest: 
bel seno (in rimas escarsas, vide sopra) 
2 mountains with the Arno, I suppose, flowing between 
them so kissed the earth after sleeping on concrete 
bel seno AT]UT|TT)Q copulatrix 
thy furrow. 
[LXXVII] 
This passage, and the Pisan Cantos as a whole, is particularly 
interesting because it illustrates how Pound has merged the two paths 
to wholeness—the ascetic and the chivalric—which he had outlined 
many years earlier in The Spirit of Romance. In that book he had 
championed the chivalric path (exemplified by the troubadour who 
seeks wholeness through sex, through union with his opposite, wo­
man) rather than that of the ascetic (exemplified by the monk who, 
Pound had said dryly, achieved wholeness, "at infinite trouble and 
expense," through contemplation).39 Here, in Pisa, through the force 
of a Coleridgean imagination, he keeps the path of the troubadour open 
(Stevens, of course, had never recognized its existence, and Williams 
never really had another) while at the same time following the con­
templative path of the ascetic. The system is complete; in the Pisan 
Cantos Pound practices a kind of ecology of ideas. The metaphor is 
organic; mind works on matter. His consciousness is what he called in 
The Spirit of Romance, ' 'germinal'': 
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Their thoughts [those who possess a ' 'germinal'' consciousness] are in 
them as the thought of the tree is in the seed, or in the grass, or the 
grain, or the blossom. And these minds are the more poetic, and they 
affect mind about them, and transmute it as the seed the earth. And this 
latter sort of mind is close on the vital universe; and the strength of the 
Greek beauty rests in this, that it is ever at the interpretation of this vital 
universe, by its signs of gods and godly attendants and oreads.40 
In the Pisan Cantos the act of contemplation (or better, state of 
contemplation) cannot be separated from the power of woman, the 
feminine; the one (each one) makes the other possible. We remember 
that of the three modes of thought—cognition, meditation, and 
contemplation—that Pound had identified, the last was of the highest 
order, its truth verifiable by experience. "In the first," he wrote in 
Guide to Kulchur, "the mind flits aimlessly about the object, in the 
second it circles about it in a methodical manner, in the third it is 
unified with the object."41 Unified with the object: woman. 
But the earth is for Pound more than his lover, she is his savior. 
Pound loses himself in order to gain his self, a new self: 
man, earth : two halves of the tally 
but I will come out of this knowing no one 
neither they me 
connubium terrae ecpaxa Jiooig euog 
X0ONIO2, mysterium 
fluid X0ONOZ o'erflowed me 
lay in the fluid X0ONOZ 
that lie 
under the air's solidity 
drunk with 'IXQP of X0ONIO2 
fluid X0ONO2 , strong as the undertow 
of the wave receding 
[LXXXII] 
Death by water? yes, but as in Eliot's ' 'The Waste Land,'' the water is a 
primal fluid, it returns one to the source. This is one of the reasons, we 
can suppose, that the sage (as Confucius, and after him, Pound, ob­
served) is associated with water. "The humane man has amity with the 
hills," writes Pound in Canto LXXIII, and he is that humane man. But 
the "sage / delighteth in water," and he is that too. 
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The earth for Pound is magical and alive with power. And in the 
Pisan Cantos he is able, finally, to draw on this power. He becomes a 
shaman; the eucalyptus pip and the texts of Confucius are his allies. 
Know thyself: that was the first step, to recognize and confess his lack 
of compassion for others, to open his heart. The second step was to 
honor and embrace a power larger than his, an inhuman power, the 
other world. The third step is more aptly termed a condition, a state of 
mind. It is repeated throughout the Pisan Cantos: 
"Non combaattere" said Giovanna, 
meaning: don't work so hard. 
[LXXVI] 
Meaning, as Mencius had instructed: "Let not the mind forget its 
work, but let there be no assisting the growth of nature.'' Meaning, the 
ease of mind, which Stevens, we remember, also seeks in his last book 
of poems. It is that ease of mind, the arrest of the Western habit of 
categorizing and dividing, that allows the unexpected to happen, that 
permits multiplication of possibilities. And the unexpected is—what? 
It is itself that inexplicable state of mind (' 'States of mind are inexpli­
cable to us." [LXXVI]) where different worlds, alternative realities, 
interpass and penetrate. Pound has learned how to call up the spirits of 
both realms—the natural and the mythical—when he needs them, and 
this we must take literally, as he did. 
In one of the most lyrical passages in the Pisan Cantos he calls upon 
the lynx not only to protect his vines but to keep Dionysus running in 
his veins.42 As we see in the closing lines of Canto LXXIX, the lynx 
and Aphrodite are two forms of the same power; he can pass from one 
to the other without visible (logical) transition: 
O lynx guard my vineyard 
As the grape swells under vine leaf 
This Goddess was born of sea-foam 
She is lighter than air under Hesperus 
6eiv6 et, Ki39T)Qa 
terrible in resistance 
K6QT) xal Af|Xia xal Mata 
trine as praeludio 
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O puma, sacred to Hermes, Cimbica servant of Helios. 
[LXXIX] 
Aphrodite is only one of the many goddesses he summons. The names 
are for him charms. This he had asserted long before. In The Spirit of 
Romance he had observed that "alchemy and mystical philosophy 
interpenetrate each other, and that feminine names were used as 
charms or equations in alchemy"; and that furthermore, "anyone who 
has in any degree the faculty of vision will know that the so-called 
personifications are real and not artificial."43 
Knowing that such things are real and not just figures of speech— 
this is the spirit of romance. The names and the names behind the 
names flood these Cantos: Persephone and Pallas Athena and Cytherea 
and Maya and Aphrodite and the Heliads and Cassandra. In Canto 
LXXXI the goddess goes unnamed but her existence is no less concrete 
for that: 
Ed ascoltando al leggier mormorio 
there came new subtlety of eyes into my tent, 
whether of spirit or hypostasis, 
but what the blindfold hides 
or at carneval 
nor any pair showed anger 
Saw but the eyes and stance between the eyes, 
colour, diastasis, 
careless or unaware it had not the 
whole tent's room 
nor was place for full Ei&tbg 
interpass, penetrate 
casting but shade beyond the other lights 
sky's clear 
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night's sea 
green of the mountain pool 
shone from the unmasked eyes in half-mask's space. 
[LXXXI] 
The eyes of the goddess(es) enter his tent; no metaphor: "I assert," he 
had said in Guide to Kulchur, "that the Gods exist. "** Invisible, they 
yet cast shadows; translucent, they show him the "clear" and "green" 
landscape of the natural world. 
This point is not Ei6(bg, the full revelation, but in the last of the 
Pisan Cantos there is a final transference. Those eyes become his eyes, 
he sees the magical/natural world with the eyes of that world. Recall 
the first of the Pisan Cantos where Pound speaks of the eye containing 
nature, but only in simile; when that was achieved it would be time to 
go: 
night green of his pupil, as grape flesh and sea wave 
undying luminous and translucent 
Est consummatum, Ite. 
[LXXIV] 
And in the next to the last Canto, in pellucid, simple lines that are 
almost overlooked, Pound can write: 
A fat moon rises lop-sided over the mountain 
The eyes, this time my world, 
But pass and look from mine 
between my lids 
sea, sky, and pool 
alternate 
pool, sky, sea. 
[LXXXIII] 
This is not the empyrean of pure light, the mystic ecstasy which Dante 
felt looking at Beatrice (which Pound took as a model), but it is a union 
with the magical other. This is Pound's point of stillness and peace. 
Now, "in the drenched tent there is quiet / sered eyes are at rest*': 
or 
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as he was standing below the altars 
of the spirits of rain. 
[LXXXIII] 
In the Pisan Cantos Pound succeeds in resacralizing the landscape for 
us as well as himself, and "out of all this beauty," even in Pisa, in 
spite of Pisa, because of Pisa, "something," he believes, "must 
come" (LXXIV). 
III. ETHNO-UTOPIA 
My Paradiso will have no St Dominic or Augustine, but it will be a 
Paradiso just the same, moving toward final coherence. I'm getting at 
the building of the City, that whole tradition. Augustine, he don't 
amount to a great deal. —Pound, 195345 
In the Pisan Cantos the reinvestment (as in "religious vestments") 
of the landscape with a living, sexual dimension, or to put it another 
way, the reunion of the natural with the magical and mythological (the 
super-natural) is analogous to the equally important fusion of the his­
torical with the mythical. As William Irwin Thompson has deftly 
pointed out, myth is the detritus of history.46 Just as the goddesses exist 
and are to be believed, so myth contains truths which are not merely 
metaphorical but real, historical. It was Pound, not Eliot, who under­
stood what the discoveries in the then-new field of anthropology 
meant. Eliot accepted the parables of Western culture (the journey to 
the Perilous Chapel to see the Fisher-King) as convenient metaphor to 
point to the contemporary Western wasteland. But Pound knew, as he 
wrote in the Pisan Cantos, that Homer had been a medic, that that 
ancient journey had been based on rock-real experience. And if that 
were so, then he could conclude that the dreams of Utopian cities and 
civilizations could also have been based on the historical record. 
In the Pisan Cantos Pound resacralizes the landscape, and her god­
desses bring him peace. Only with such a personal equilibrium, Con­
fucius had taught, could a man bring amelioration to the state. And 
for Pound, if those luminous eyes deliver peace, it is the city which 
gives inspiration. If the first represents the feminine principle of accep­
tance and union, the second does not so much represent the masculine 
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principle of action (the hero constructing his civilization's meaning in 
monument), as it incorporates the two. In the Pisan Cantos Pound, 
like Confucius, his master and ally, is a sage, a wise old man. It is his 
mission to reinvent the imaginary city, to dream the city anew, to 
resurrect an ideal. Years before, he had asked in his Guide to Kulchur 
if a modern Eleusis was "possible in the wilds of a man's mind 
only."47 In the Pisan Cantos he answers yes. 
Of the four great American Moderns, Pound was the only poet to 
believe in what we now call ethnopoetics—the coupling of anthropol­
ogy and poetry, the opening up of other, nonwestern cultural 
traditions—both as method and metaphor.48 In the Pisan Cantos 
Pound was fighting not only for his own personal survival, but for the 
survival of the Western world as well. For survival, he knew that the 
industrial West had to turn to cultures which were based on values 
other than that of profit, and ideals other than that of the economy of 
abundance with its concomitant disposable and interchangeable ob­
jects, its scorn of both masterpiece and craft. He turned to Provence 
and to Greece, but more significantly he turned to China, and Africa, 
and even, occasionally, to the American Algonquin. 
Thus, to dwell on Pound as exile, as directing his major effort 
toward breaking the English tradition, represented by the pentameter, 
is to belittle his achievement. Pound was not so much an exile as he 
was a citizen of the world. He had defended himself against that 
charge; as he had written to Harriet Monroe in 1914, "Are you going 
to call people foreigners the minute they care enough about their art to 
travel in order to perfect it. "49 Pound did believe in kulchur, in what he 
called a "vortex," in what his favorite anthropologist, Froebenius, 
called "paideuma," but he was not foolish enough, fortunately he was 
not provincial enough, to confuse this with nationality and the nation-
state. 
In the Pisan Cantos, achieving wholeness, attaining that point 
which I have called the still point, has multiple meanings. It not only 
refers to the personal state of peace which Pound experiences and 
which is, importantly, both psychological and social; these two aspects 
are interrelated by the process of his integrating himself into the human 
("criminal") community, and here the relationship of the self to the 
social unit is an ethical one. But, the still point also refers to the quiet 
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union of Pound with the natural world ("and that day I wrote no 
further" [LXXXIII]), and here the relationship of the self to the other 
is a sacramental one. And the still point also refers to that ideal of 
human civilization which Pound reincarnates for himself, in both his 
heart and his mind, and for us in the living text of the poem. Here the 
relationship of the self to the ideal is a creative one. 
While Pound does not provide us with a blueprint for Utopia, we can 
conclude that for him the perfect society would be a completely inte­
grated "pure" culture which drew on its own traditions for its founda­
tion, as he presumably believed China had. Having lost this, the com­
mercial West (dating from the invention of the institution of banking), 
he believed, had no other choice but to embrace cultural pluralism. 
This presents us with a problem, for the goal and the method are 
contradictory. In the Pisan Cantos, Pound is interested above all in 
opening up and bringing together as many different domains as 
possible—the domain of affection, the domain of the magical, the 
domain of alternative traditions—and yet the ultimate ideal is that of a 
closed and static society. Although this contradiction cannot be re­
solved in the real and historical world (history implies change, change 
in great part comes from the collision of cultures), Pound attempts to 
resolve it through art. 
' 'To build the city of Dioce whose terraces are the colours of stars'' 
(LXXIV), a heavenly city on earth, that is the goal. The city of Dioce 
was Persian but the model Pound appeals to is African: 
4 times was the city rebuilded, Hooo Fasa 
Gassir, Hooo Fasa dell' Italia tradita 
now in the mind indestructible, Gassir, Hooo Fasa, 
With the four giants at the four corners 
and four gates mid-wall Hooo Fasa 
and a terrace the colour of stars. 
[LXXIV] 
The promise of Gassir's city offers a promise to Italy: 
I believe in the resurrection of Italy 
4 times to the song of Gassir 
now in the mind indestructible. 
[LXXIV] 
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Pound is not here resurrecting myth (Gassir and the African city) so as 
to make history possible (the triumph of Italy). Rather he is resurrect­
ing history so as to make the myth of Italy's future possible. The act is 
an imaginative one, a pure one: 
fringe la purezza, 
and that certain images be formed in the mind 
to remain there 
formato locho. 
[LXXIV] 
This is another way of saying that the word must be made perfect 
("cheng ming") , that language (and literature) constitute the building 
blocks of civilization. And as the feminine principle is at the root of 
nature, so it is at the base of the legend of Gassir's lute, for Wagadu is 
woman. It is woman that man must find again, as we see in the 
following account of the legend, which, of course, Pound was familiar 
with: 
Four times Wagadu stood there in all her splendour, four times 
Wagadu disappeared and was lost to human sight: once through vanity, 
once through falsehood, once through greed, and once through dissen­
sion. Four times Wagadu changed her name. First she was called Di­
erra, then Agada, then Ganna, then Silla. Four times she turned her 
face. Once to the north, once to the west, once to the east, and once to 
the south. For Wagadu, whenever men have seen her, has always had 
four gates: one to the north, one to the west, one to the east, and one to 
the south. These are the directions whence the strength of Wagadu 
comes, the strength in which she endures no matter whether she be built 
of stone, wood, or earth, or lives but as a shadow in the mind and 
longing of her children. For really, Wagadu is not of stone, not of 
wood, not of earth. Wagadu is the strength which lives in the hearts of 
men and is sometimes visible because e.yes see her and ears hear the 
clash of swords and ring of shields, and is sometimes invisible because 
the indomitability of men has overtired her, so that she sleeps. Sleep 
came to Wagadu for the first time through vanity, for the second time 
through falsehood, for the third time through greed, and for the fourth 
time through dissension. Should Wagadu ever be found for the fifth 
time, she will live again, so forcefully that vanity, falsehood, greed and 
dissension will never be able to harm her. 
Hooh! Dierra, Agada, Ganna, Silla! Hooh! Fasa!50 
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The promise: if found a fifth time, Wagadu ' 'will never be lost again.'' 
Deliverance: in the Pisan Cantos the song is "now in the mind inde­
structible" (LXXIV). 
What did Pound believe in, Eliot has asked. "I believe," he an­
swered, "the Ta Hio. "51 What Confucius offered him was a "respon­
sible" way of life: Confucius thinks, as Pound put it, "for the whole 
social order," something which both Greek and Christian thought did 
not do.52 Thus for Pound poetry is tied to "the whole social order," to 
politics and to economics and to ethics, and the link is a direct, not an 
indirect, one; as he wrote, for example, to Rene Taupin in 1928, "Je 
viens de donner un noveau version du Ta Hio de Confucius, parce que 
j'y trouve des formulations d'idees qui me paraissent utile pour 
civilizer l'Amerique (tentatif)"53 This belief that the province of 
poetry is "the whole social order" is Pound's great strength, his source 
of optimism, and one of his major contributions. We have him to thank 
for his persistent affirmation throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, a period in Western history preoccupied with its "heap of 
broken images,'' of the possibility of a ' 'new sacred book of the arts,'' 
as Yeats called it. A sacred book which would heal the splits in culture, 
remove, in effect, the banks from the position of power and place the 
artists in the position of authority. 
Pound, all his life, assumed a role of leadership and wrote from a 
position of confidence and authority. His tone is vigorous and bracing 
as well as inspiring. His style embodies that kind of idea which, as he 
describes it, is "intended to 'go into action', or to guide action and 
serve us as rules (and/or) measures of conduct.'' What is the other kind 
of idea? It is that which exists and/or is, Pound says, "discussed in a 
species of vacuum," which is as it were a toy "of the intellect."54 It 
is to this second category of ideas that we could assign Stevens' notion 
of a supreme fiction, and the contrast between his idea of a supreme 
fiction and Pound's hopes and beliefs is a telling one. 
For Stevens, Western culture had broken and could not be made 
new. The only strategy was to hold two opposing and irreconcilable 
ideas in the mind at once. "The final belief," Stevens had written, "is 
to believe in a fiction, which you know to be a fiction, there being 
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nothing else. "55 The strategy was, in other words, solely an individual 
matter and could not, did not, include society, the community. But for 
Pound the "fiction" (whether it was Wagadu or the goddesses or the 
companionship of men) was not a fiction but real. And the "fiction" 
involved not just the healing (the state of wholeness) of the individual 
but the dream of an integrated, healthy social order and an harmonious 
relationship between these two systems (man and society) and that of 
the cosmos as well, where the cosmos is equivalent to the mysteries. 
"Our time," Pound had written, "has overshadowed the mysteries by 
an overemphasis on the individual."56 
The "unwobbling pivot" is not only the metaphor for, but also the 
actual point of, balance of all these systems both together and sepa­
rately. "The master man finds the center and does not waver," Pound 
translated Confucius, and that "axis in the center is the great root of 
the universe. "57 The wisdom of the Pisan Cantos is the wisdom of one 
wise old man, Pound, who himself understands that we must listen to 
the wisdom of the old, internalize the old, and not fall prey to the 
tradition of the new (which is an economics of consumption and waste 
on all levels). "Philosophy is not for young men" (LXXIV), Pound 
wrote early in the Pisan Cantos. This is another way of saying that 
wisdom is reserved for, is the privilege of, the old. And as Simone de 
Beauvoir points out, the important thing to understand is that the status 
of the old is ' 'never won but always granted.' '58 
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WALLACE STEVENS AND THE ROCK 
Not Ideas about Nobility 
but the Thing Itself 
Union of the weakest develops strength 
Not wisdom. Can all men, together, avenge 
One of the leaves that have fallen in autumn? 
But the wise man avenges by building his city in snow. 
But the wise man avenges by building his city in snow. This is how 
Stevens concludes "Like Decorations in a Nigger Cemetery," the 
longest piece in Ideas of Order (1936), his second collection of poems. 
An icy pronouncement, this declaration suggests the shape and strategy 
of the hero that emerges eighteen years later in Stevens' last book of 
poems, The Rock.1 As prophecy, these lines promise more than Ste­
vens could ever deliver or later desired: that the master builder con­
struct a citadel of belief for the modern age. This would have been a 
supreme fiction, an act of defiant will. But what the hero could not do 
for Western culture, Stevens learned in the years between Ideas of 
Order and The Rock, a man could do for himself in a different mood, a 
variant key. It comes to this: the wise man faces mortality, the human 
condition (or what is perhaps the same thing for Stevens, the death of 
belief), on its own ground: alone, old, he makes his home in the 
wasteland, in winter, in the extreme of the unknown. By facing death 
and living within it, not fighting it, the hero, the "impossible possible 
philosophers' man," develops what in old age Stevens understood as 
wisdom. Not power, but an acceptance of the possibility of congruence 
between a man's meditative life and the inhuman meditation of the 
world ("the leaves that have fallen in autumn"). The hero of The 
Rock—and for the abstract-minded Stevens this is the highest 
achievement—is no longer a theoretical construct or more than human. 
He is a man who does not take possession of the world by intellectual 
storm, the act of the mind, but rather lives in harmony with it. 
If the concluding lines of ' 'Like Decorations in a Nigger Cemetery'' 
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point toward what Stevens achieves in his last book of poems, they 
also reveal what he could never accept. Unlike Eliot, Pound, or 
Williams, Stevens was never passionately concerned with the quest for 
community. In the Pisan Cantos, the union of the weakest—the social 
bond forged by imprisonment—does foster wisdom. But for Pound, 
wisdom entails affection and humility, personal virtues, ultimately 
social virtues, which Stevens never believed essential to the hero. Of 
the four Moderns considered here, Stevens was the only one who never 
thought in terms of an ideal society or a Utopia, but only in terms of a 
hero, the hero, the solitary mind. Only the Stevens hero stands alone 
and apart. Stevens posed questions of culture, certainly, but in epis­
temological, not political or social, terms. And it is perhaps as a result 
of this that we find his work, so elegant, so perfect, so deeply satisfy­
ing, yet so often chilly and curiously removed from the problems of 
twentieth-century industrial society. Because Stevens basically ignored 
such questions, in this chapter I look more closely at the individual 
poems. In order to put the achievement of The Rock in perspective, I 
begin by looking at Stevens' earlier versions of the hero and then turn 
to his treatment of death in earlier poems. 
I. CONCEPT ART: ABSTRACTION AS HERO 
The major abstraction is the idea of man 
And major man is its exponent, abler 
In the abstract than in his singular, 
More fecund as principle than particle 
"Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" 
As we have seen in the last lines of ' 'Like Decorations in a Nigger 
Cemetery," at that point in his life Stevens wished to taunt death and 
the "search for a tranquil belief" called for earlier in the poem. This 
contradiction in the poem is contained within its last line. We expect it 
to read: "The wise man builds his city in snow," and in our misread­
ing we uncover the tension between the figure of the hero as youthful 
avenger and Stevens' well-kept, persistent desire for the ascetic wis­
dom of tranquility. This contradiction haunts much of Stevens' work 
until The Rock. 
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We understand, only in retrospect possibly, that his hero was always 
too young, too vigorously grandiose, too abstract, or too barbarous for 
Stevens' basically peaceful purposes. The problem was this. He recog­
nized, as we all know too well (this has become a banality of criticism, 
a truth difficult to revive), that we live in an era of man, not of gods, 
and he believed that we need an image of man in which to locate belief. 
But until The Rock, Stevens refused to accept an image of a man in the 
world as hero. In mixing the proportions between reality and the imag­
ination, Stevens continually erred on the side of the imagination. Over 
and over he repeated the mistake he had cautioned against in ' 'Examina­
tion of the Hero in a Time of War"—that the hero "be not conceived, 
being real." 
His images of the hero were fabrications, projections, extrapola­
tions, abstractions beyond man, preposterous shimmers or muscular 
giants, bare constructions in language that we certainly (to use Ste­
vens' terms) do not recognize, much less realize, respond to, or ac-
cept.2 His art was conceptual; the idea, and the problem it reflected, 
often had more interest than the thing itself; the illustration of the 
definition was often less convincing than the formulation of the defini­
tion. For the irresistible transcendental pull was there. But this is not an 
Emersonian transcendentalism. It is the courage, hubris, and naivete of 
a radical humanism. As Stevens put it in "The Man with the Blue 
Guitar," he desired something "beyond us, yet ourselves." Beyond. 
Yet even in this poem, one of the earliest to deal with the hero, the 
emphasis is on reality, on the hero as a means by which to reach man, a 
hero who could and would have been made of man, if possible: 
I cannot bring a world quite round, 
Although I patch it as I can. 
I sing a hero's head, large eye 
and bearded bronze, but not a man, 
Although I patch him as I can 
And reach through him almost to man. 
After "The Man with the Blue Guitar," however, the hero becomes 
even less man and more god. 
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Stevens revealed his "prejudices" against man in a letter about 
"Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction." "The trouble with humanism," 
he wrote in 1943, "is that man as God remains man, but there is an 
extension of man, the leaner being, in fiction, a possibly more than 
human human, a composite human."3 This is both a nostalgic notion 
of humanism and a desire for something more: the postulate that "man 
is god" is not enough, and that itself was one of our great fictions. In 
his extravagant optimism and equally radical doubt, Stevens wished to 
be the American Mallarme, the creator of something beyond the real. 
But he also wanted the hero to be part of the real, not separate and 
autonomous from it. He wanted the best of these two possible 
worlds—both reality and the imagination—and this, we realize, was 
not possible. He wanted both ' 'an extension of reality," as he put it in a 
slightly earlier letter, and a fiction, not the thing itself.4 
Thus his early images of the hero are equivalent to theoretical propo­
sitions. In "Asides on the Oboe" (the title itself suggests that the hero 
will be off center), he proposed the dewy "impossible possible 
philosophers' man" and in "Chocorua to Its Neighbor," the dreamy 
eminence of dark blue glass, the shadowed mountain with muscular 
shoulders and luminous flesh. And there is also the "large-sculptured, 
platonic person, free from time" in "The Pure Good of Theory," the 
science-fiction meta-men in "The Bouquet," and the "still angelic" 
giant assembled part by part on the horizon: 
Here, then, is an abstraction given head, 
A giant on the horizon, given arms, 
A massive body and long legs, stretched out, 
A definition with an illustration, not 
Too exactly labelled, a large among the smalls 
Of it, a close, parental magnitude, 
At the center on the horizon, concentrum, grave 
And prodigious person, patron of origins. 
"A Primitive Like an Orb" 
Stevens was as fancifully lavish in his period of the imagination as he 
was in the Harmonium period of reality, as we have come to call it. All 
these figures of the hero are constructions of the act of the mind, the 
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will of the imagination, the determination of theory. None of them 
yielded the satisfactions of belief; they only testified to the desire of the 
mind for what was missing, absent. 
Stevens was aware of this, of course. In more than one poem he 
acknowledges that these conceptions of the hero—these heroic 
conceptions—are ephemeral and unstable. In "A Thought Revolved," 
for example, the poet's search for the leader who will reconcile all 
opposites is qualified by an overly determined rhetorical and romantic 
catalogue of attributes: 
The pine, the pillar and the priest, 
The voice, the book, the hidden well, 
The faster's feast and heavy-fruited star, 
The father, the beater of the rigid drums, 
He that at midnight touches the guitar, 
The solitude, the barrier, the Pole 
In Paris, celui qui chante et pleure, 
Winter devising summer in its breast, 
Summer assaulted, thundering, illumed, 
Shelter yet thrower of the summer spear 
With all his attributes no god but man 
Of men whose heaven is in themselves. 
We know that it will not work: to devise summer in the midst of winter 
is a contrivance of the mind, the inbred turning of thought. As Stevens 
further implies in the poem, this language is the product of wish-
fulfillment, longed for by the poet, just as the braceleted, expiring lady 
of the poem's first section yearns to float off to death on the tranquiliz­
ers of Christianity. 
In a much misunderstood poem which appears at the end of Parts of 
a World (1942), "Examination of the Hero in a Time of War," Ste­
vens also calls into doubt the two major ideas (are they figures really?) 
of the hero which he presents: the barbarous hero, like Xenophon, who 
captures the unthinking allegiance of the wartime masses, and the 
meditative hero who abstracts himself from war. "Examination of the 
Hero" (the word "examination" implies a clinical inspection of ap­
propriate qualifications, a rigorous investigation into the symptoms of 
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the hero, who, we read again, we are to "Devise, devise") is best 
understood when read with "The Noble Rider and the Sound of 
Words," an essay also published in 1942. In both pieces, Stevens 
asserts that nobility is a feeling, a force, and cannot be grasped in terms 
of an image or person (how far we are from Eliot's notion of an 
objective correlative). By this, however, Stevens does not mean that 
there cannot be an appropriate embodiment of nobility; he understands 
intellectual history well enough to know that every age has its heroes 
and that they are real heroes for their time only. But given the unthink­
able brutality of the Second World War, Stevens feared it was impos­
sible for a man, a hero, to be adequate to his time. As described in the 
essay, the hero would be potent and vital, possess authority, and repre­
sent an equilibrium between the imagination and reality (we are not 
surprised to learn that at this point in his life, the equilibrium favored 
the imagination). 
If Stevens could do no more than list qualities in "The Noble 
Rider," in "Examination of the Hero" he scrutinizes the masses 
cheering worn-out images of nobility, worshipping the power, not the 
authority, of a brutish emblem of the "hero," which is larger than 
human but less than civilized: 
If the hero is not a person, the emblem 
Of him, even if Xenophon, seems 
To stand taller than a person stands, has 
A wider brow, large and less human 
Eyes and bruted ears: the man-like body 
Of a primitive. 
From this profanity, which turns into a macabre frivolity ("the 
tigers / In trombones roaring for the children"), the uncommon man, 
the scholar and poet, withdraws, preserving his freedom by abstracting 
himself from the unreal world of war heroes into a mental space where, 
as Stevens puts it in "A Thought Revolved," he can walk freely and 
sing the idea of the highest man. To use the terms in "The Noble Rider 
and the Sound of Words," the uncommon man resists the pressure of 
reality with an equal and opposite force of the imagination. 
Although this idea is a monumental and noble one, the meditative 
hero limned in the poem is indulgent. In sections XIV and XV of 
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"Examination," Stevens heralds this hero and, just as in "A Thought 
Revolved," subverts his credibility through outrageous rhetoric, the 
glamorous flourishes which precede him: 
A thousand crystals' chiming voices, 
Like the shiddow-shaddow of lights revolving 
To momentary ones, are blended, 
In hymns, through iridescent changes, 
Of the apprehending of the hero. 
And in the next section, we learn that so overwhelming is the medita­
tive bliss of the poet (and his pastime is a mere domestic one—to study 
"the paper / On the wall, the lemons on the table") that the "highest 
man" ("self of the hero, the solar single, / Man-sun, man-moon, 
man-earth, man-ocean"—this is too much) emerges from it strong 
enough to devise the "man-man." A presumptuous result, too quickly 
achieved. Like Xenophon, this hero does not command our respect. In 
the midst of war, his meditations on wallpaper or the "syllable / a  " 
seem frivolous also. His withdrawal, his abstraction, his preoccupation 
with "the petty gildings on February" seem inexcusable distractions, 
which have taken him too far from the reality of war. 
Stevens is right to say earlier in the poem: 
The hero is a feeling, a man seen 
As if the eye was an emotion, 
As if in seeing we saw our feeling 
In the object seen and saved that mystic 
Against the sight, the penetrating, 
Pure eye. Instead of allegory, 
We have and are the man, capable 
Of his brave quickenings, the human 
Accelerations that seem inhuman. 
Neither Xenophon nor the solipsistic poet (who has "nothing 
higher / Than himself, his se l f . . ."  ) are capable of quickening us to 
bravery. The figures collapse to allegories. The meditation fades. In 
the last section of the poem, Stevens calls in the seasons and nostalgia, 
the reality principle on the one hand and the "truth" of the past on the 
other: 
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Each false thing ends. The bouquet of summer 
Turns blue and on its empty table 
It is stale and the water is discolored. 
True autumn stands then in the doorway. 
After the hero, the familiar 
Man makes the hero artificial. 
But was the summer false? The hero? 
The dazzling hero did exist, Stevens insists, but only for a moment. 
But is the appearance of the hero like the moment "of flickering 
mobility," which astute critics of Stevens read as the way he recon­
ciles the imagination and reality, thereby creating a poetry of being?5 I 
do not think so. First, it is not the reality of experience which is 
questioned (that is given), but the possibility of belief. Belief entails 
continuity, and Stevens' belief is not sustained and neither is ours. For 
even if we assume that the meditative hero of ' 'Examination,'' the blue 
Chocorua, or the horizontal giant work for a moment—as long as their 
language lives while we read their poems—they do not give us what 
Stevens required of poetry in an age of disbelief: the ' 'satisfactions of 
belief."6 
I would argue further that these heroic images of the hero do not in 
fact work, even for a moment; they are theoretical constructions, not 
moments of perception. No, the summer was not false, but the analogy 
between the eternal return of the seasons and the life of the hero is 
false. Stevens' questions are both plaintive and shrill: "But was the 
summer false? The hero?" We have not yet encountered in the poem 
the dazzling hero of whom he speaks, and the poem's last lines, which 
aim to conflate the hero with summer, are overdressed, in bad taste: 
Summer, jangling the savagest diamonds and 
Dressed in its azure-doubled crimsons, 
May truly bear its heroic fortunes 
For the large, the solitary figure. 
Why do these fabrications of the hero not work? Because, ironically, 
Stevens believed too much in the radical ability of man's imagination 
to create full-blown a set of myths by which to live. Stevens under­
stood that the hero had to be transparent (we find this image throughout 
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his work), but he did not grasp the real reasons why. For him the hero 
had to be beyond reality, more than man, and yet reflect reality, act as 
a glass through which reality could be more clearly and accurately 
seen. 
An age does not perceive its own myths as "myth," as beyond 
reality, but as a part of reality; they are perceived not as fiction but as 
actuality. As Eliot put it, "Understanding involves an area more exten­
sive than that of which one can be conscious; one cannot be outside and 
inside at the same time. "7 The Greek gods were not painted fragments 
of the imagination or mere mythology to the Greeks, but part of the 
living structure of their world. In every age there is a fiction which fits, 
a fiction which we believe not as fiction but as truth. Thus Stevens was 
asking the impossible when he required that we consent to his fictions 
of the hero as both fiction and reality. Here I am not suggesting that we 
should not act with courage of mind, as if something were possible 
when we know full well it is not. But Stevens' images of the hero do 
not allow us to suspend even a fraction of that disbelief. Until The 
Rock, his poetry of the hero fails, although his poetics do not. But it is 
not only a question of poetic failure. It is also a symptom of the 
twentieth-century obsession with, and over-evaluation of, doubt. What 
Stevens did not understand is that to succeed the hero had to be trans­
parent not because the idea of him is abstract or because he reflects 
reality, but because he must be indistinguishable from reality, part of 
it. This demands a passion, perhaps a blind passion, which Stevens did 
not possess. 
Myths think themselves out through men and without men's knowl­
edge, although we strive to see our historical position as clearly as we 
can. And similarly, the ultimate realization of the Stevens hero thought 
itself out through Stevens' poems without his conscious knowledge. 
Michel Benamou has read the body of Stevens' work in terms of the 
Jungian model of individuation, arguing that the world of reality in 
Harmonium corresponds to the personality's domination by the forces 
of the unconscious (the feminine principle, the earth), that the world of 
imagination in Parts of a World corresponds to the personality's domi­
nation by the forces of the conscious (the masculine hero, the intellect, 
the virile hero), and, finally, that the union of the two in later poems 
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corresponds to the mature self.8 This third stage is characterized 
neither by a lavish attachment to the world of reality, nor by the 
ascetic, heroic, masculine act of the mind, but instead by a mode of 
being that tempers the two impulses, which, I would argue, are only 
facets of the same inclination: a tenacity of mind. I agree with Helen 
Vendler's suggestion that in his earlier poems, Stevens seems to have 
"felt obliged to pretend an instinct for the fertility of the earth, when 
his instinct was for its austerities and dilapidations."9 In Harmonium 
Stevens seems to will himself to embrace the ' 'green vine angering for 
life," to resolve against his nature to lead a nomadic life. The poems of 
Harmonium do not so much represent the forces of the unconscious as 
they do Stevens' intense discipline; they are another form of the rigor­
ous act of the mind. 
Toward the end of his life and in his later poems, the "normality of 
the normal" and "pure being" replace, displace, the act of the mind. 
The pure good of theory is challenged. As Stevens explained in a letter 
in early 1953: 
I wanted to stay in bed and make for myself a week-end world far more 
extraordinary than the one that most people make for themselves. But 
the habitual, customary, has become, at my age, such a pleasure in itself 
that it is coming to be that that pleasure is at least as great as any. It is a 
large part of the normality of the normal. And, I suppose, that project­
ing this idea to its ultimate extension, the time will arrive when just to 
be will take in everything without the least doing since even the least 
doing is irrelevant to pure being.10 
Just to be will yield everything, "take in everything"; "doing is 
irrelevant." By 1954 the Stevens hero is older and wiser. He no longer 
takes up arms against reality and no longer is figured as beyond reality. 
This hero is foreshadowed in ' 'The House Was Quiet and the World 
Was Calm,'' in which the mind and the text of the world become one: 
The quiet was part of the meaning, part of the mind: 
The access of perfection to the page. 
And the world was calm. The truth in a calm world, 
In which there is no other meaning, itself 
Is calm, itself is summer and night, itself 
Is the reader leaning late and reading there. 
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But the text still mediates the world. In "Credences of Summer,"11 
however, the "old man" stands at the center (which is not the center, 
but a center which has been posited in the mind's eye) and sees not 
ideas about the thing, but the thing itself. Or more accurately, the old 
man is the thing itself: 
It is the old man standing on the tower, 
Who reads no book. His ruddy ancientness 
Absorbs the ruddy summer and is appeased, 
By an understanding that fulfills his age, 
By a feeling capable of nothing more. 
The text is no longer necessary. He reads no book. Interpretation and 
mediation are irrelevant to pure being. His nature ("his ruddy ancient­
ness") corresponds to the nature of the world ("the ruddy summer"), 
or at least one of the seasons. Satisfactions are complete: his age is 
fulfilled. The old man is an eloquent image of man made in the image 
of Stevens himself; we respond to it deeply, as we never could to the 
meta-men or the abstruse impossible possible philosophers' man (here 
the language of contradiction stops us, we must consider the image as 
if it were an idea, logically). In The Rock the Stevens hero is part of 
reality and its rhythms. A wise old man, the hero of American 
Modernism, he is no longer a representation of something else, the 
imperfect exemplar of an abstraction. Nor does he live, as does the old 
man in "Credences of Summer," in a warm world, in "green's green 
apogee." In "Credences of Summer," the image of the old man is 
"fixed" by an act of the mind: 
Fix it in an eternal foliage 
And fill the foliage with arrested peace, 
Joy of such permanence, right ignorance 
Of such change possible. 
In The Rock, the old man builds his city in snow. 
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST DEATH: "SUNDAY MORNING" 
AND "THE OWL IN THE SARCOPHAGUS" 
In a world without heaven to follow, the stops 
Would be endings, more poignant than partings, profounder, 
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And that would be saying farewell, repeating farewell, 
Just to be there and just to behold. 
"Waving Adieu, Adieu, Adieu" 
Stevens had always struggled "to suppress the merely personal."12 
To use Gertrude Stein's distinction, he struggled to speak the voice of 
the Human Mind, not Human Nature. That would be a voice articu­
lated in the act of writing, not talking, a voice capable of objectivity, of 
living in the present and seeing things as entities, not identities, of 
leaving events and memories and such emotions as fear and disap­
pointment behind, of being concerned with the weather, not per­
sonalities, of accepting death, the death of an age, the death of others, 
the death of the self. "Human nature," explains Stein, "can not say 
yes, how can human nature say yes, human nature does what it does 
but it cannot say yes."1 3 But the Human Mind can, it can say yes. 
But saying yes was for Stevens no easy achievement. If the death of 
the gods (and with them they took belief) was for him the cultural crisis 
of his age, it was also a profoundly personal problem: in it, he felt 
keenly the shadow of his own mortality.14 Stevens had always known 
that death could not be ignored or obliterated and that we cannot take 
refuge in memory.15 But it is not until The Rock that he confronts the 
fact that his own memories are an illusion, for they are no longer a part 
of a felt reality. Gertrude Stein put this realization in the following 
brisk way: "What is the use of being a little boy if you are to grow up 
to be a man. "16 And in his thoughtful slower way, Stevens opens "The 
Rock" with: 
It is an illusion that we were ever alive, 
Lived in the houses of mothers, arranged ourselves 
By our own motions in a freedom of air. 
The World, as he writes in "St. Armorer's Church from the Outside," 
is "always beginning, over and over." Thus the continuity of the self 
was perhaps itself a myth, the last one that Stevens discarded. With it 
he discarded his former selves, but not his nature, and in their place he 
found satisfactions of being. As Harold Bloom has pointed out, by 
the end of "The Rock" "the self cites its own tranquility as means of 
proof, at the rock, where by opposition the mind II would say the self) 
and the external realm are brought together."17 
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Death preoccupied Stevens his entire poetic life. As early as the 
gaudy Harmonium we find Stevens writing about the death of the body 
and sex (of course he had never really believed in the body) in the most 
graphic of terms: 
Our bloom is gone. We are the fruit thereof. 
Two golden gourds distended on our vines, 
Into the autumn weather, splashed with frost, 
Distorted by hale fatness, turned grotesque. 
These lines are from "Le Monocle de Mon Oncle," written when he 
was thirty-nine and published as the eleventh poem in his Collected 
Poems, and Stevens never got any younger. But it not so much the 
death of the body as the death of the mind that he feared. Time is the 
inescapable enemy, not just because death is irrevocable, but because 
insistent reminders of it are everywhere—in the familiar sounds of 
evening, in one's heartbeat, in the rapid walk of a person going down 
the street: 
It is time that beats in the breast and it is time 
That batters against the mind, silent and proud, 
The mind that knows it is destroyed by time. 
"The Pure Good of Theory" 
How did a man so obsessed with death face it in his seventies and write 
the poems of The Rock? If we can answer this question, we may also 
better understand how Stevens reached (or discovered) the balance 
between the imagination and reality which he had called for in ' 'The 
Noble Rider and the Sound of Words." 
To see just how far Stevens has come in The Rock, and particularly 
in "To an Old Philosopher in Rome," I begin by taking a rather 
lengthy detour through two of his earlier poems which deal with death: 
first, "Sunday Morning," which I call the argument for reality, and 
secondly, "The Owl in the Sarcophagus," the argument for the imagi­
nation. Both arguments fail. 
Although "Sunday Morning" is not in the familiar meditative mode 
of Stevens' poetry, its form and purpose are similar; it is a drama, to 
adopt Louis Martz's excellent definition, between a projected part of 
the self and the whole self (or mind, whose aim is to find what will 
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suffice.)18 Basically "Sunday Morning" is a dialogue between a 
brooding woman (a Jamesian character enfolded in the indolent 
luxuries of fine lingerie and a lazy morning) and the more articulate 
mind which suggests answers to her objections and questions. The 
poem is well known and has been much and ably discussed, so I will 
only summarize here. The situation is this: her agreeable musings in 
the midst of "bounty" are interrupted by thoughts of sacrifice and 
death, an expected text of a traditional American Sunday morning. 
And the problem is this: where on earth will she find "Things to be 
cherished like the thought of heaven." 
Three attempts are made to answer this question. First, in section 
IV, it is argued that the natural world is in fact more permanent than 
the world of religious imagination. The cyclical view of natural history 
is contrasted with the Christian linear view of religious history. Her 
memories and anticipation of the seasons, the myth of the eternal 
return, the myth of continuity through change—these are stronger and 
more durable, it is argued, than any vague promises of a final heaven: 
There is not any haunt of prophecy, 
Nor any chimera of the grave, 
Neither the golden underground, nor isle 
Melodious, where spirits gat them home, 
Nor visionary south, nor cloudy palm 
Remote on heaven's hill, that has endured 
As April's green endures; or will endure 
Like her remembrance of awakened birds, 
Of her desire for June and evening, tipped 
By the consummation of the swallow's wings. 
But she objects that the contentment nature provides her is not enough. 
She wants more, desiring not relative permanence but permanence 
absolute—"some imperishable bliss." And so in sections V and VI 
another argument is advanced, a more subtle and sophisticated varia­
tion of the first. 
Death is personified as female, as mother. Stevens' text is that Death 
taketh away but first, she giveth; Death is "the mother of beauty," 
beauty the source of all fulfillment, indeed consummation. This 
strained conclusion is reached by identifying death with change, an 
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awkward equation which results in the awkward line: "Is there no 
change of death in paradise?" The logical result of this identity is not 
only that death emerges as the Prime Mover, but heaven is rendered 
static and motionless, as the tomb containing the urn whose lovers 
never kiss. The conclusion is that our mortal earth is the true paradise. 
This reasoning also is not persuasive. The woman, presumably, is 
beautiful and alone. Lovers who never embrace are not satisfactory. 
Thus Stevens turns to another argument, escalating the tone. A shrill, 
sexy vision of wild young men, chanting their worship of mortality, is 
offered: 
Supple and turbulent, a ring of men 
shall chant in orgy on a summer morn 
their boisterous devotion to the sun, 
Not as a god, but as a god might be 
Naked among them, like a savage source. 
This religious rite of "heavenly fellowship," it is implied, is possible 
if the mortal world is acceptable as paradise—an argument which cer­
tainly seems calculated to stir at least the interest, if not the desire, of 
this languid woman. In fact all three arguments seem pointedly aimed 
at quelling her complaining and querulous tone. But none of them 
works. At each stage the level of rhetoric has to be heightened, in­
creased from sweet persuasions to romantic sophistry and finally to 
wild imaginings. 
But in the last section of the poem Stevens returns us to quieter 
language, acknowledging that we live not in paradise but in "island 
solitude, unsponsored, free / Of that wide water, inescapable." Man is 
alone, and the haunting idea of death returns, echoing the poem's first 
section. In "Sunday Morning" Stevens does not so much confront 
death as he illustrates an unsuccessful attempt to reason it away (or 
evaporate it by metaphor) by concentrating on the essence of life and 
living—change. The panacea "Death is the mother of beauty" creates 
an illusion for only a moment. In fact there are, we see, not two voices 
in the poem but three: that of the discontented woman, the devil's 
advocate for reality, and the more mature, resigned mind who speaks 
the poem's last section with tones invoking a lost American landscape: 
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Deer walk upon our mountains, and the quail 
Whistle about us their spontaneous cries; 
Sweet berries ripen in the wilderness; 
And, in the isolation of the sky, 
At evening, casual flocks of pigeons make 
Ambiguous undulations as they sink, 
Downward to darkness, on extended wings. 
For a moment the urban (or suburban) Sunday morning is displaced by 
the broad evening spaces of the American frontier, which, in reality, 
had closed years before. But given the argumentative structure of the 
poem, it is clear that this ending is not a resolution but a further appeal 
on the basis of the comforting, seductive mood of elegy. 
If "Sunday Morning" presents the argument for reality, "The Owl 
in the Sarcophagus," a much later poem collected in The Auroras of 
Autumn (1950), presents the argument for the imagination. Written 
following the death of one of his closest friends, it is unlike any other 
Stevens poem. In no other piece does Stevens explore the domain of 
allegory, unfortunately perhaps, because this long poem is splendid. 
Above all a man of affirmation (Stevens once said that he stopped 
reading Shaw because "he had nothing affirmative in him and, also, 
because his noes were indiscriminate"19), Stevens offers a consoling, 
elegant dream, a sleepy and sublime "mythology of modern death," 
no Bosch-like visions, no Dantean hell, no grim reaper, in short, no 
suffering. The allegorical figures are a mirror of Stevens' will: 
The children of a desire that is the will, 
Even of death, the beings of the mind 
In the light-bound space of the mind, the floreate flare. 
Not a poem which hymns the idea of the hero, "The Owl" presents 
what the hero might imagine, and thus is rare in the Stevens canon. 
Stevens sets up the allegory within familiar conventions. A man 
visits the land of the dead and there meets the forms of his own thought 
and "dark desire." These "beings of the mind" resemble, of course, 
the forms of reality; the difference between them is musical and re­
leases melancholy reverberations of remembrance and return to the 
Other: 
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And, if of substance, a likeness of the earth, 
That by resemblance twanged him through and through, 
Releasing an abysmal melody, 
A meeting, an emerging in the light, 
A dazzle of remembrance and of sight. 
High sleep is a giant, characterized by the luminous revolvings of the 
earth, the hypnosis of a "fulfilling air," the involutions of meaning, 
the white of sheets, and the "ultimate intellect." Less expected and 
more opaque is the description of his brother Peace, who proclaims a 
state of peace, his authority shining in the sparkling accretions of his 
robes adorned with ancient, indecipherable texts: 
Its brightness burned the way good solace seethes. 
This was peace after death, the brother of sleep, 
The inhuman brother so much like, so near, 
Yet vested in a foreign absolute, 
Adorned with cryptic stones and sliding shines, 
An immaculate personage in nothingness, 
With the whole spirit sparkling in its cloth, 
Generations of the imagination piled 
In the manner of its stitchings, of its thread, 
In the weaving round the wonder of its need, 
And by the first flowers upon it, an alphabet 
By which to spell out holy doom and end, 
A bee for the remembering of happiness. 
Yet is the third figure who speaks most deeply to Stevens: "she that 
says good-by losing in self / The sense of self." Strong, desirable, and 
graceful, speaking not with language but the slight "backward gestures 
of her hand," she is not an allegorical figure (she has no name) but a 
"self" who has passed beyond self-consciousness. Possessing sure 
and inner knowledge, she speaks for those who "cannot say good-by 
themselves." Unlike her two brothers who represent life after death, 
she incarnates the moment on the edge of death, the passage between 
life and death. She exists in the syllable (there is no grammar here, no 
language that can represent this) separating the two domains: 
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She was a self that knew, an inner thing, 
Subtler than look's declaiming, although she moved 
With sad splendor, beyond artifice, 
Impassioned by the knowledge that she had, 
There on the edge of oblivion. 
But just as the last section of "Sunday Morning" calls into question 
all that went before, so the last three lines of "The Owl" confess the 
limits of the imagination. The regal rhetoric of thought, the sublime but 
much-too-comforting mythology, yield to a simpler tone. The mind 
which invented these figures harbors a childlike desire for the "pure 
perfections of parental space": 
It is a child that sings itself to sleep, 
The mind, among the creatures that it makes, 
The people, those by which it lives and dies. 
The story is a bedtime tale, a fantasy which has no real authority. The 
myth is a fiction which is not subject to final belief. The allegory falls 
under the pressure of time.20 
Stevens had warned against the problems of allegory in ' 'Effects of 
Analogy." In that essay, what troubles him about Bunyan's Pilgrim's 
Progress is exactly what troubles us in "The Owl in the Sar­
cophagus." As we read Bunyan's story, Stevens maintains, "we are 
distracted by the double sense of the analogy and we are rather less 
engaged by the symbols than we are by what is symbolized. "21 And as 
we read the Stevens poem we are only too aware that it is just what the 
final stanza announces it is—a self-conscious mythology. The imagi­
nation, to use Stevens' own measure, does not adhere to reality. And if 
we take a look at the structure of the poem, we see that as an act of the 
mind as Stevens would define it, it falls flat. For Stevens bases his 
notion of the act of the mind on the principle of the transformation of 
reality. But in this poem, although each of the three figures is in itself a 
splendid example of the power of the imagination, the organization as 
a whole is so bald as to preclude the desired effect of analogy; in the 
words of "Effects of Analogy," the parts "do not combine, inter-act, 
so that one influences the other and produces an effect similar in kind 
to the prismatic formations that occur about us in nature in the case of 
reflections and refractions."22 
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The poem is organized in orderly outline fashion. It is, to transpose a 
phrase from a Stevens poem, merely posed.23 In section I Stevens 
introduces his three allegorical characters; in section II he introduces 
his human character; in sections III-V he tidily describes each allegori­
cal figure in turn; and in section VI he offers a summary and conclu­
sion. Imagination, in other words, collapses in this poem to framework 
fantasy. This is not the successful, transformative act of the mind we 
find in such short poems as * 'On the Road Home'' and ' 'The Candle a 
Saint" or in a larger open-ended poem such as "The Man with the 
Blue Guitar." The argument for the imagination, we find, is no more 
successful in dealing with the problem of death than is the argument for 
reality in "Sunday Morning." 
III. IT MUST BE HUMAN 
Perhaps there are times of inherent excellence, 
As when the cock crows on the left and all 
Is well, incalculable balances, 
At which a kind of Swiss perfection comes 
And a familiar music of the machine 
Sets up its Schwarmerei, not balances 
That we achieve but balances that happen, 
As a man and woman meet and love forthwith. 
Perhaps there are moments of awakening, 
Extreme, fortuitous, personal, in which 
We more than awaken, sit on the edge of sleep, 
As on an elevation, and behold 
The academies like structures in a mist. 
"Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" 
In 1954, the year of the publication of his Collected Poems, Stevens 
wrote that he had ' 'thought of adding other sections to the NOTES and 
one in particular: It Must Be Human. "24 The Rock might be called that 
section, for, as many have pointed out, it is the most personal and 
perfect group of poems which Stevens ever wrote. Poems of a wise old 
man, they have, as Harold Bloom has written, "an uncanny intensity 
and originality that surpass nearly all his previous work at middle 
length or shorter."25 As Joseph Riddel has said, they are "sharply 
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etched in Stevens' personal style, stoic and tough in the face of age's 
pressing questions, yet tender and knowing."26 Stevens wrote in 
"Man and Winter," an earlier poem, that the "mind is the great poem 
of winter.'' In The Rock it is rather the poem which is the great mind of 
winter. Best illustrated by the perfections of "To an Old Philosopher in 
Rome," this meditative mind unites the self with the world. In San­
tayana, sheltered in the Roman convent of the Blue Nuns, we have a 
man, not a phantasm, as hero. In this poem, there are no questions 
asked, as there were in "Sunday Morning." There are no stunning acts 
of the imagination, as in "The Owl in the Sarcophagus." Nor is there a 
last-minute stanza which qualifies the hypothesis of the poem. The 
tone is consistently that of serene calm, deep assurance, an eloquent 
poise. 
What is the meditative mode for Stevens? The act of the mind? The 
act of the imagination? Speaking generally, it would seem reasonable 
to call all of Stevens' poems meditative, for it was Stevens' tempera­
ment to revolve an idea in his mind, to pursue it, muse on it. But Martz 
cautions, and rightfully so, that we must distinguish between imagina­
tion and meditation. "Meditation," he says, "is the essential exercise 
which, constantly practiced, brings the imagination into play." As I 
pointed out earlier, Martz defines meditation as "a deliberate act of 
choice," "a calculated effort of the mind," "a constructive power of 
deliberate choice," " 'an attentive thought repeated or voluntarily 
maintained in the mind, to arouse the will to holy and wholesome 
affections and resolutions.'" It is, he says, best represented by 
"tightly argued, tightly ordered meditations on a theme."27 
If we reverse (altering slightly) Martz's distinctions between medita­
tion and imagination, defining the imagination as the heroic act of will 
and meditation as a state of mind, an ease of mind, an easing of mind, 
a mode of being which is sought after for its own sake, we can more 
clearly grasp the meditative mode of the last poems. As we recall, in 
"Examination of the Hero in a Time of War" Stevens describes the 
"highest self" this way: 
These are the works and pastimes 
Of the highest self: he studies the paper 
On the wall, the lemons on the table. 
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This is his day. With nothing lost, 
He arrives at the man-man as he wanted. 
This is his night and meditation. 
At that point in his life, the meditative mode was inappropriate and in­
adequate, but in his seventies this grace of mind is the result and gift of 
a long life of the mind. "Sunday Morning" and "The Owl in the 
Sarcophagus" are self-conscious feints against death. "To an Old 
Philosopher in Rome," on the other hand, portrays Santayana, one of 
the great general thinkers, near death. Santayana is one of the whole 
men: "To be ruled by thought, in reality to govern ourselves by the 
truth or to be able to feel that we were being governed by the truth," 
writes Stevens in his late essay "The Whole Man: Perspectives, Hori­
zons," "would be a great satisfaction. .  . ."28 
While Stevens was a student at Harvard, he met Santayana, but 
although he knew the philosopher personally, their relationship was 
never intimate. Stevens deeply admired Santayana as a man "of 
dynamic mind. .  . and something of a scholar and very much of an 
original force."29 Stevens was probably attracted to him because the 
quality of their thinking was so similar: Santayana was a mirror for 
Stevens. Their minds both radiate more light than heat, tend toward 
balance rather than passion, and affirm the virtue of detachment rather 
than testify to the tragic. Santayana's idiosyncratic combination of 
naturalism and platonism finds its analogues in Stevens' notions of 
reality and the imagination. Both believed, in the words of Santayana, 
that poetry "adds a pure value to existence, the value of a liberal 
imaginative exercise. "30 And both insisted that the world will be saved 
by those who believe that the real and the ideal, reality and the imagi­
nation, must be kept in vital and dynamic interconnection. 
Santayana, feeling that people and possessions were likely to be 
distractions, living out the last eleven years of his life in a convent cell 
with only a bed and books, must have seemed to Stevens an ideal alter 
ego. In his essay "Imagination as Value," Stevens writes that San­
tayana is one of the few men in whose lives "the function of the 
imagination has had a function similar to its function in any deliberate 
work of art";31 that function is aesthetic. 
4
 'To an Old Philosopher in Rome'' opens with a metaphor of trans­
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formation which informs the entire poem. The beginning prepositional 
phrase is characteristically problematical: 
On the threshold of heaven, the figures in the street 
Become the figures of heaven, the majestic movement 
Of men growing small in the distances of space, 
Singing, with smaller and still smaller sound, 
Unintelligible absolution and an end— 
"On the threshold of heaven" modifies two different nouns—the "Old 
Philosopher" of the poem's title and the "figures in the street" of the 
first line.32 Both perspectives are possible and taken together constitute 
a paradigm of the mode of being portrayed in the poem. By both 
participating in and yet remaining detached from experience, San­
tayana becomes a figure of heaven. He could be said to transcend 
himself, or in the words of "The Owl in the Sarcophagus," to lose "in 
self / The sense of self.'' Here the most complete knowledge is possi­
ble: the ' 'Extremes of the known in the presence of the extreme / Of 
the unknown." 
The transformation of reality into something sweeter and more real 
occurs "easily," effortlessly. In the contact-boundary situation of 
death the simplest experiences of the senses are intensified and charged 
with aesthetic values. Harsh mutterings become "murmuring," the 
antiseptic smell of medicine, a fragrance. The concrete is invested with 
the spiritual, reality undergoes transubstantiation, and we pass from 
the real to the visionary with no sense of change. On the chair is a 
"portent," the nuns are a "moving transparence." Santayana sees the 
way Stevens imagined that the meta-men could see: 
The infinite of the actual perceived 
A freedom revealed, a realization touched, 
The real made more acute by an unreal. 
This transformation is possible not solely by virtue of being at the 
edge of death, "in snow." Dignity is also required. The extreme of the 
unknown must be approached with control, with the self composed, 
with a composition of the self. And if so, Stevens suggests, more than 
a transformation of the real into the imagined is possible. The two 
worlds—the real world and its heightened, imagined counterpart, a 
fiction—fuse: 
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The threshold, Rome, and that more merciful Rome 
Beyond, the two alike in the make of the mind. 
It is as if in a human dignity 
Two parallels become one, a perspective, of which 
Men are part both in the inch and in the mile. 
Just as two parallel lines can never meet in uncurved space, so these 
two Romes could never have met in an ordinary situation. But here 
they fuse, creating a perspective from which Santayana can both see 
and be seen. This is the same point we discover in another poem in The 
Rock, "The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain," the threshold 
from which one 
Would discover, at last, the view toward which they had edged, 
Where he could lie and, gazing down at the sea, 
Recognize his unique and solitary home. 
That home is the earth, the rock, the normality of the normal. 
In the process of discovering that perspective toward which one had 
moved cautiously, perhaps throughout a lifetime, the figure of the self, 
' 'losing in self / The sense of self,'' paradoxically grows more dis­
tinct. The poem's structure parallels this process, progressively focus­
ing our attention on the figure of Santayana. The poem has three parts: 
in the first (stanzas 1-6), Santayana does not appear; in the second 
(stanzas 7-11), Stevens points him out; and in the third (stanzas 12­
16), Santayana dominates the field. The final lesson of the master is 
the belief that the whole of life can be the formation of a gestalt in 
time, the coherent course of a particular. As Santayana wrote in his 
preface to Realms of Being, "Our distinction and glory, as well as our 
sorrow, will have lain in being something in particular, and in knowing 
what that is."3 3 
In the second section of the poem Stevens asks Santayana to be the 
man who can speak for all mankind—a moving and courageous re­
quest, for Stevens is demanding it of himself also: 
So that we feel, in this illumined large, 
The veritable small, so that each of us 
Beholds himself in you, and hears his voice 
In yours, master and commiserable man. 
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Years before Stevens had said bluntly that the chief defect of 
humanism was that it concerned human beings.34 Now, accepting a 
man as both "master" and "commiserable" who in creating a "total 
edifice" composed a self, and who "says good-by by losing in self/ 
The sense of self," Stevens writes that "It is poverty's speech which 
seeks us out most." If Pound's achievement, given his proud temper­
ament, in the Pisan Cantos is humility, Stevens' achievement in The 
Rock is to move beyond the act of the mind into the integrated realm of 
being. 
This realm of being has its own mode of meditation. Stevens de­
scribes Santayana as "half-asleep," both "dozing in the depths of 
wakefulness" and "intent," not "intent" in the sense of strenuous 
concentration but rather in the sense of absorption, fascination, inter­
est. In "To an Old Philosopher in Rome" it is not speculation on a 
fiction that gives happiness and peace, but absorption in the particular, 
the smell of medicine, "the particles of nether-do." This is the poet's 
condition of ' 'vague receptivity'' which Stevens describes in his late 
essay "A Collect of Philosophy."35 It is the "vivid sleep" of "The 
Rock,'' and the ' 'ease of the mind that was like being alone in a boat at 
sea" in "Prologues to What Is Possible." What is possible are "not 
balances / That we achieve but balances that happen," as he called 
such moments in "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction." 
Thus these poems of The Rock record Stevens' movement beyond 
the disciplined, deliberate act of the mind into a condition of receptiv­
ity to experience. As he wrote in a letter in 1950 about the privacy 
which Hartford offered him: "It seems easier to think here. Perhaps 
this is balanced by the possibility that one has less to think about or, 
rather, less occasion to think. Yet that does not seem possible. Then, 
too, it is not always easy to tell the difference between thinking and 
looking out of the window."36 This is an admission of immense pro­
portions. This mode of being suspends doubt. Introspection and percep­
tion here merge for Stevens. The old Stevens problem of the subject-
object split, the old problem of clearing away everything that comes 
between the perceiving mind and the world as perceived, has disap­
peared along with the problem of belief. In "To an Old Philosopher in 
Rome" the categories of subject and object cannot really be said to 
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exist. Instead we find an easy interpenetration between the outside and 
the inside. The sound of the bells drifts in. 
And now we understand exactly what Stevens means by the world as 
meditation. In the beautiful poem of that title, Penelope, waiting for 
Ulysses, composes a self—she does not postulate a supreme 
fiction—with which to meet and be in the world. With Penelope it is 
not an act of the mind that sustains her, but a confidence in her own 
strength and an acceptance of the "inhuman meditation of the world," 
the round of time and the seasons. She waits, patiently. Her "barbar­
ous energy'' and her receptivity to the particulars of experience—to 
daybreak and spring—allow her to receive the rising sun as she would 
Ulysses, as if it were Ulysses. As in "To an Old Philosopher in 
Rome" where the city of Rome and heaven become one, where the 
whole shape of Rome is repeated in the shape of the bed, in "The 
World as Meditation" her meditation parallels the "inhuman medita­
tion." The two come together: 
The two kept beating together. It was only day. 
It was Ulysses and it was not. Yet they had met, 
Friend and dear friend and a planet's encouragement. 
The barbarous strength within her would never fail. 
And with it, the "inhuman meditation" becomes "a planet's encour­
agement." Penelope's "barbarous strength" is not like the strength of 
mind which Nietzsche possessed. Of Nietzsche, Stevens had written, 
' 'In his mind one does not see the world more clearly . .  . a strong mind 
distorts the world. "37 In their strength neither Penelope nor Santayana 
distort the world; they are in rhythm with it. 
If in the second part of "To an Old Philosopher in Rome" Stevens 
asks Santayana to speak "Profound poetry of the poor and of the 
dead," in the third section the figure of the philosopher becomes that 
orator "with accurate tongue / And without eloquence": 
And you—it is you that speak it, without speech, 
The loftiest syllables among loftiest things, 
The one invulnerable man among 
Crude captains, the naked majesty, if you like, 
Of bird-nest arches and of rain-stained vaults. 
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It is not simple speech which Santayana offers but the very elements of 
language—its syllables. "We say ourselves in syllables that rise," 
Stevens wrote in "The Creations of Sound," "from the floor, rising in 
speech we do not speak." The absolution Santayana grants is "unintel­
ligible." The message is not the text he had composed but the man 
himself. These are "the immaculate syllables" Stevens spoke of in 
"The Men That Are Falling": "That he spoke only by doing what he 
did." 
Stevens, we remember, once said that the simplest personification of 
the angel of reality would be the good man. If earlier in "To an Old 
Philosopher in Rome" the figure of Santayana is "impatient for the 
grandeur" that he needs in "so much misery," now the desire to 
escape is replaced by a total commitment to the real: "The life of the 
city never lets go, nor do you / Ever want it to." Santayana is both 
alone and not alone. He is at one with the city just as Penelope is at one 
with the weather. Like the man in "An Ordinary Evening in New 
Haven," "Life fixed him," always watching: 
This sat beside his bed, with its guitar, 
To keep him from forgetting, without a word, 
A note or two disclosing who it was. 
A temporary stay against death has been granted: 
It is a kind of total grandeur at the end, 
With every visible thing enlarged and yet 
No more than a bed, a chair and moving nuns. 
The immensest theatre, the pillared porch, 
The book and candle in your ambered room, 
Total grandeur of a total edifice, 
Chosen by an inquisitor of structures 
For himself. He stops upon his threshold, 
As if the design of all his words takes form 
And frame from thinking and is realized. 
The "total edifice" which stands as shelter is the self that he has 
composed through the act of writing. As Stevens says of himself in 
"The Planet on the Table" (and it applies to Santayana): 
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His self and the sun were one 
And his poems, although makings of his self, 
Were no less makings of the sun. 
The flow and fear of time, the movement of the opening stanza, are 
stopped; Santayana lives completely within the present, "the normality 
of the normal." The poem's ending has the quality of apocalypse, of a 
monumental, visionary, and yet simple human poise. Stevens drama­
tizes what he had hoped for years before in ' 'The Man with the Blue 
Guitar": 
A tune beyond us as we are, 
Yet nothing changed by the blue guitar; 
Ourselves in the tune as if in space, 
Yet nothing changed, except the place 
Of things as they are and only the place 
As you play them, on the blue guitar, 
Placed, so, beyond the compass of change, 
Perceived in a final atmosphere; 
For a moment final, in the way 
The thinking of art seems final when 
The thinking of god is smoky dew. 
But there is one important difference. In this much earlier poem all 
Stevens could hope for was that this "tune" would last for a "mo­
ment." And as we know, much of Stevens' poetry is a poetry of 
evanescence and epiphany. But in "To an Old Philosopher in Rome" 
the still point is not a single heightened moment. It is a quiet state of 
being, it is a point of perspective on one's entire life. And this applies 
to the opening poem of The Rock, "An Old Man Asleep," just as it 
does to Stevens' final collection of poems as a whole. The mood is one 
of elegy and farewells in keeping with Stevens' "wintry tempera-
ment,"38 as Helen Vendler has so aptly called it. But it is predomi­
nately that of quiet confidence, of Stevens' acceptance of what his life 
has been (the poems he has written—these, not memories—are the 
testaments to his life) and what his life could be now. 
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To review. In "To an Old Philosopher in Rome," we read how a 
man—Stevens—might live out the end of his life with nobility. The 
wise man, building his city in snow, must confront death rather than 
reason it away or lull himself to sleep with a "modern mythology." 
Reality must be bared to its essentials, the luxury of peignoirs and 
green freedom of cockatoos rejected for the poverty of ' 'No more than 
a bed, a chair and moving nuns." There must be a "dignity" won 
through "a solitude of the self," as we read in "Things of August": 
When was it that the particles became 
The whole man, that tempers and beliefs became 
Temper and belief and that differences lost 
Difference and were one? It had to be 
In the presence of a solitude of the self, 
An expanse and the abstraction of an expanse, 
A zone of time without the ticking of clocks, 
A color that moves us with forgetfulness. 
Where was it that we heard the voice of union? 
And finally, the dominating act of mind must yield to a mode of 
meditation, which is a mode of being, characterized by receptivity to 
experience. 
"Poetry," says Stevens in Adagia, "is health." Of all his collec­
tions, The Rock is the only one which offers the satisfactions of health. 
For the problem of belief no longer concerned him with the same 
intensity. In his last poems we see Stevens content to meet the normal, 
the everyday, every day, as Penelope does in "The World as Medita­
tion." As he said in a letter in 1949: 
. .  . what one ought to find is normal life, insight into the commonplace, 
reconciliation with every-day reality. The things that it makes me happy 
to do are things of this sort. . .  . At the moment what I have in mind is a 
group of things which mean a good deal more than they sound like 
meaning: for instance, airing the house in the morning; the colors of 
sunlight on the side of the house; people in their familiar aspects. All 
this is difficult for me. It is possible that pages of insight and or reconcil­
iation, etc. are merely pages of description. The trouble is that poetry is 
so largely a matter of transformation. To describe a cup of tea without 
changing it and without concerning oneself with some extreme aspect of 
it is not at all the easy thing that it seems to be." 
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The Rock moves closer and closer to the bone of the "normal life." 
Beginning with "An Old Man Asleep" (who notonly can possess two 
worlds but does), moving unself-consciously to the myth before the 
myth began (the father, the rock at "the spirit's base" in "The Irish 
Cliffs of Moher"), and from there to the sad emptiness of "The Plain 
Sense of Things" and "Long and Sluggish Lines,"40 The Rock ends 
with an unpretentious poem entitled "Not Ideas about the Thing but 
the Thing Itself." And Stevens means it. 
The old man half asleep in the winter of The Rock wakes up in early 
March to the "scrawny cry" of the earliest bird. Like Penelope, he 
believes in the "inhuman meditation of the world," that the "choris­
ter" would be followed by the "choir" of spring and that this was and 
would be enough. It is no longer a question of satisfying the mind. The 
triumph is that the cry is not "a sound in his mind," not willed into 
being by his dreaming imagination (' 'the vast ventriloquism / Of 
sleep's faded papier-mache"), but outside. The cry is reality, a song of 
fixed accord which will be heard every day, and each day will be 
"like / A new knowledge of reality." 
This is what he wants—a quiet normal life, as he calls it in the title 
of one of his last poems—for "transcendent forms" have no more 
vitality for him, "but his actual candle blazed with artifice." This is 
what Stevens means in the long poem "The Rock." The fictive cover­
ing of reality is not enough, the poem as icon is not enough: 
It is not enough to cover the rock with leaves. 
We must be cured of it by a cure of the ground 
Or a cure of ourselves, that is equal to a cure 
Of the ground, a cure beyond forgetfulness. 
And yet the leaves, if they broke into bud, 
If they broke into bloom, if they bore fruit, 
And if we ate the incipient colorings 
Of their fresh culls might be a cure of the ground. 
The world, Stevens knew and had known for a long time, was made by 
man in the image of man. But Stevens learned that it is not enough to 
recognize that fact. Man must live in the world, he must love the 
world, he must eat its fruit: "They bloom as a man loves, as he lives in 
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love / They bear their fruit so that the year is known." In ' 'The Rock" 
reality is linked with singleness and grayness, and the imagination is 
linked with the potency of the diverse. In "Note on Moonlight" Ste­
vens reverses similar terms: the "one moonlight" (the imagination, the 
sense of the poet) and "the various universe" (the rock, reality). But 
what is important in both these poems is not so much these distinctions 
between two aspects of the world, but the conclusion that the world is 
the source of tranquility and that the satisfactions of tranquility are at 
last so easily arrived at: 
The one moonlight, the various universe, intended 
So much just to be seen—a purpose, empty 
Perhaps, absurd perhaps, but at least a purpose, 
Certain and ever more fresh. Ah! Certain, for sure... 
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Stevens reflects too easily the negative stereotype of old age. 

WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS AND PATERSON V 
Tradition and the Individual Talent 
By it they mean that when I have suffered... I too shall run for cover; 
that I too shall seek refuge in fantasy. And mind you, I do not say that I 
will not. To decorate my age. —I Wanted to Write a Poem1 
In the opening of the fifth book of Paterson it could be Stevens 
speaking, it could be Eliot. This Williams must have known when he 
began with an unmistakable reference to the rock of Stevens, the 
March of Stevens, and the birds of Stevens' last piece in his Collected 
Poems, which speak not prophecy but are the thing itself. And just a 
few pages later in Paterson V we hear the voice of Eliot's Four 
Quartets intoning ' 'What but indirection / will get to the end of the 
sphere?" Certainly it is surprising that Williams should take this as his 
text, but it is even more surprising that in the last part of Paterson V he 
should expand the text into Eliotic testimony of religious experience and 
triumph over time and death: 
The (self) direction has been changed 
the serpent 
its tail in its mouth 
' 'the river has returned to its beginnings'' 
and backward 
(and forward) 
it tortures itself within me 
until time has been washed finally under: 
and ' 'I knew all (or enough) 
it became me . " 
[I, iii] 
Eliot and Stevens—these are the two poets in the American Modern 
tradition one would least expect Williams to honor. Yet honor them he 
does and, in fact, he could be said to join their ranks. For in the seven 
years between the publication of the fourth and fifth books of Pater­
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son, between 1951 and 1958, Williams and his poetry underwent a 
profound change. 
In 1951 Williams suffered his first stroke and was forced to retire. 
Three years later he published The Desert Music and Other Poems, a 
transition volume marked on the one hand by energy, confidence, and 
curiosity in the "local" and on the other by an almost desperate confu­
sion in the face of an exhausted and weak old age. Of these two 
extremes, marked by "The Desert Music" and "For Eleanor and Bill 
Monahan," "The Desert Music" came first. 
' 'I must gather together the stray ends of what I have been think­
ing," Williams wrote to Louis Martz after his stroke, "and make my 
full statement as to their meaning or quit."2 "The Desert Music," a 
long poem about his brief trip across the Mexican border in 1950, does 
just this. Written in the manner of the first four books of Paterson, it 
deals with essentially the same problem but accomplishes what they 
never could—it glorifies the city. In Mexico Williams finds the poetic 
line to celebrate this city of paper flowers and dried peppers, poverty 
and laughing young girls. Talking and walking, drinking and carrying 
on, here Williams is in the city, a real part of it, not, as he often is in 
the first four books of Paterson, a silent observer whose near-
allegorical mission is literally to conceive its inhabitants. "Desert 
Music" is not a poem of reminiscence, of an agony of descent, or of 
memory, as some have read it, but a poem of action and characteristic 
Williams shoulder-to-shoulder contact with a living culture, the local, 
the real.3 
Why was this possible in Juarez and El Paso and not in Paterson, 
New Jersey? All these cities are stamped by poverty. But in the south 
Williams discovers a culture which is full of color, music, and a people 
who are alive, vital, and vibrant. The reason: these people are the 
descendants, the survivors, of the Aztec culture which Williams rap­
turously idealized and which, he had more than once mused, could 
have been "the pure American addition to world culture."4 Latins, 
Spanish Indians, Mexicans, displaced white Americans—what is most 
important is that these people have not divorced the soul from the 
body. As we see even in "Desert Music," Williams believed that it is 
from the association of the body and the soul—even a perverse 
association—that a healing and glorifying poetry of the city is born. 
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The scene, for example, is a tourist-trap dump of a bar. The form of 
beauty is "flagrant" (as it often is in Paterson), an un-American (yet 
more truly American) version of the female, lower class, with whom 
Williams is so obsessed in the first four books of Paterson. An old 
whore in a sequined G-string does bumps and grinds to the incongru­
ous song of soul and love. But nonetheless, almost unaccountably, the 
body is linked to the soul, and from this "worn-out trouper from / the 
States" (from "slime") comes "so sweet a tune":5 
Andromeda of those rocks 
the virgin of her mind . those unearthly 
greens and reds 
in her mockery of virtue 
she becomes unaccountably virtuous 
though she in no 
way pretends it 
What in the form of an old whore in 
a cheap Mexican joint in Juarez, her bare 
can waggling crazily can be 
so refreshing to me, raise to my ear 
so sweet a tune, built of such slime? 
This is the music of poetry, "a protecting music." "I am a poet!" 
Williams writes triumphantly, "/ / am. I am." 
* 'The Desert Music'' is Williams' strongest affirmation of both his 
power as a poet and the power of poetry as a "music of survival." 
Sadly, it is also his last muscular, masculine poem and as such would 
appear the appropriate sequel to Paterson IV, a better Paterson V than 
the poem itself. For Williams, the poem had always been the locus of 
the body and mind (or the imagination, as Williams often calls it), and 
this is achieved, with vigor, in "Desert Music." The triumph is all the 
more moving because Williams was struggling against physical odds; 
the constant fear is that the mind will be weakened also. Moreover, 
necessarily the relationship between the body and the mind (and it was 
always an intimate connection for Williams) must change, and thus we 
may not be surprised to see that after "Desert Music," Williams' 
notion of what a poem is also changes; the mind now lives first and 
foremost in words, not the body. 
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As we read in the poignant "To Daphne and Virginia," 
Be patient that I address you in a poem, 
there is no other 
fit medium. 
The mind 
lives there. It is uncertain, 
can trick us and leave us 
agonized. But for resources 
what can equal it? 
There is nothing. We 
should be lost 
without its wings to 
fly off upon. 
If Williams' notion of poetry changes with age and physical infirmity, 
we might also observe that so do his poetic mode and his poetic line 
(the physical ease of his triadic line has been explicitly linked to his 
difficulties in reading after his strokes by Jerome Mazzaro in his splen­
did study of the late poems of Williams).6 The fertile profusion of 
rhythms, the open form, the voices of everyday speech of "Desert 
Music"—all contract to the meditative religious chant of the not-so 
variable foot in "For Eleanor and Bill Monahan." In this strange poem 
Williams confesses to an anguish, weakness, loss of potency, and 
confusion about his sexual identity (something, it must be said, which 
he had rarely if ever felt before or admitted). In an almost self-pitying 
meditative address to the Virgin Mary he declares her (in, however, 
true Williams irreverent fashion) both "young and fit to be loved." 
But the lament is that he is not fit to do it. Not only is he "half man and 
half / woman," but worse, he does not have the will: 
But I 
am an old man. I 
have had enough. 
This must be understood as one of the most intimate of Williams' 
confessions. Pound he had charged with the sin of having developed 
"androgynetically from the past itself mind to mind." The sign of 
Pound's sin, Williams believed, was his refusal of the form of the 
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present and his hope for a return of "political, social and economic 
autocracy. "7 This is, we could infer, what Williams feared for himself 
and for that reason he appealed for help from the Virgin Mary: 
The female principle of the world 
is my appeal 
in my extremity 
to which I have come. 
O clemens! O pia! O dolcis! 
Maria. 
In Journey to Love, published a scant year later, it would seem that 
this appeal had once and for all been answered. The extremes of mood 
of the previous volume have disappeared, and in their place we find a 
calm persistence and pervading tone of reminiscence. Overshadowed 
by the world of memory, the world of particulars shrinks to an occa­
sional window sparrow, a bus station drunk, or a look in his son's 
eyes. But by and large, "the hollows of the eyes," as he says in 
"Shadows," "are unpeopled." All no longer depends on the cele­
brated red wheelbarrow and its white chickens for, as he puts it in the 
major, and by far the longest, poem of the book, "Asphodel, That 
Greeny Flower," which he had orginally conceived as the sequel to 
Paterson IV and later rejected: 
Approaching death, 
as we think, the death of love, 
no distinction 
any more suffices to differentiate 
the particulars 
of place and condition 
with which we have been long 
familiar. 
The outlines are blurred, he says; they cannot help him know what he 
must know about his own death if it is to be "real." It is, in other 
words, not place, not particulars, which can give him either peace or 
meaning. Although too simple a formulation, we might say that his 
creed has become in a very real sense no longer the famous tenet "no 
ideas but in things" but the opposite—"no things but in ideas." 
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In this volume of poems, as its title suggests, it is a tender love 
which gives his world meaning. It is love associated with light and 
imagination, a trinity with which the Virgin Mary of "To Eleanor and 
Bill Monahan" could be said to have answered him. From this trinity 
of love, the memory of the asphodel takes on a significance which it is 
too frail to bear: 
Light, the imagination 
and love, 
in our age, 
by natural law, 
which we worship 
maintain 
all of a piece 
their dominance. 
The rhythms of "Asphodel" are leisurely and rambling. Here the 
feminine principle is no longer associated with sexual urges and strong 
rhythms of accumulation and release, but rather with the principle of 
duration, a long and lasting marriage. Significantly, in this poem the 
issue of sex, long a central preoccupation in Williams' work, is not 
even a mere question. Journey to Love in fact is the first—and only— 
book in which it does not even appear. Perhaps for Williams sex had to 
die before the other could fully develop—first sex, then love. We 
know that this is the line of succession upon which he entered his 
marriage. Perhaps this is what he means when he writes: 
You understand 
I had to meet you 
after the event 
and still have to meet you. 
Love 
to which you too shall bow 
along with me— 
But this delicate balance of love, light, and the imagination with its 
too sweet interplay between love and the memory of the emblematic 
flower did not sustain Williams for long. Nor, I might add, does it hold 
our attention as poetry. We read it with more interest as an autobio­
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graphical piece than we do for its lyrical delicacy or psychological truth. 
Although as readers we want to admire what we take to be Williams' 
candor and wish not to be harsh with an old man's bedlocked confes­
sions, nevertheless to be honest we must question the quality of the 
poem in terms of both its artistic achievement and its moral dimension, 
for the two are explicitly connected in the poem. Certainly the poem 
has moments of lyric fineness and compression, but for the most part it 
is strung together on the loose and unconvincing principle of the Au­
tobiography: one incident yields to another; Williams writes to keep 
on writing. Just as we do not learn in his Autobiography what the 
"hidden core" of his life is (and we suspect that perhaps he did not 
know either), in "Asphodel" we do not see how his absolution is won. 
He opens the poem asking for forgiveness from his wife (the symbol of 
their love, the asphodel, he writes in a touching phrase, has a "moral 
order"); he presents himself alternately as anguished and self-
vaunting, and he closes the poem asserting that she has indeed forgiven 
him: 
You have forgiven me 
making me new again. 
We want to agree, with some relief, but it is difficult to see the poetic 
means by which this forgiveness is gotten. I do not wish to beat an old 
man's poem to death, but "Asphodel" raises a serious poetic problem. 
The long poem was not Williams' strength, nor was, it must be admit­
ted, prose. To achieve a basic transformation of feeling is perhaps a 
dramatic art which he did not possess. This point I will come back to 
later. 
Nothing if not a consistently restless and courageous man, who 
perhaps overextended himself, Williams could not rest with the unchal­
lenging sweetness of "Asphodel." In 1958 Paterson V was published. 
Acclaimed a masterpiece—and that it surely is—Book V does, as few 
tire of pointing out, affirm-the-triumph-of-the-imagination-over-death-
and-old-age. But, Paterson K, as this paean might lead one to expect, is 
not just a variation on the theme of' 'Asphodel.'' This is his most complex 
meditative poem, and as a poem "du Vieux Sage" it differs radically 
from all others he had written. How does V depart from the first four books 
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of Paterson? Does V fulfill or disappoint our expectations of Williams? 
How can we understand the change which occurred between the first four 
books and the fifth? And how does the kind of peace which Williams 
makes for himself compare with what Pound finds in the Pisan Cantos, 
Eliot finds in the Four Quartets, and Stevens finds in The Rock? These 
are questions that are considered in this chapter. 
I. TENOCHTITLAN AS THE AMERICAN UTOPIA 
One is at liberty to guess what the pure American addition to world 
culture might have been if it had gone forward singly. But that is 
merely an academicism. Perhaps Tenochtitlan which Cortez destroyed 
held the key. That also is beside the point, except that Tenochtitlan with 
its curious brilliance may still legitimately be kept alive in thought not 
as something which could have been preserved but as something which 
was actual and was destroyed.—"The American Background"8 
A self-appointed creator of American culture, Williams understood 
his mission when he conceived Paterson in its four books as that of 
making the American city real, of bringing into being an articulate 
whole. As he put it in the preface: 
To make a start 
out of particulars 
and make them general, rolling 
up the sum.... 
By 1958 however, he had shifted from the provincial in the American 
grain to the Western universal in European art. If before his object 
was to make the American city real, in Book V his object is to make 
art real. Accordingly, in Book V the overlying allegorical structure— 
the poet as city—is flatly dropped. Williams is no longer a heavily 
populated Paterson wanting to give voice to his thoughts, the people. 
Rather he is a private person who has little to do with the noise of the 
city and all to do with the quiet of a museum. In Book V the tone is no 
longer predominantly that of aggressive pursuit of the city's geog­
raphy, its workers, books, and Sunday afternoons. Instead it is medita­
tive, reminiscent, and largely lyrical. The flat and jagged edge of prose 
has almost entirely disappeared, and with it has disappeared the con­
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cern with American history. The American Indian is replaced by the 
huntsman and unicorn of medieval legend. The lower class, scarred, 
"cheap" black woman ("Beautiful Thing") is displaced by the aristo­
cratic maiden of the French tapestries. Tradition, in short, supersedes, 
or at least surrounds, individual (local) talent. 
What does this radical shift of priorities mean? It means for 
Williams failure in the attempt to make the local universal. It means 
failure in the attempt to realize in the American city a sustaining 
culture. It means, to use one of the dominant metaphors of the first four 
books, divorce from the city. Moreover it means an acceptance of the 
long-familiar and long-rejected position of Pound and Eliot—that the 
tradition of other cultures can give sustenance where our own waste­
land cannot. Here the objection may be raised that Book V is to be 
understood simply as Williams' metacommentary on the art of writing 
in reference to the first four books of Paterson.9 But this hypothesis 
too easily avoids the troublesome problem of the subject matter and 
origin of the very two examples of art which he focuses on—the 
fifteenth-century French tapestries housed at New York City's Clois­
ters and Peter Breughel's Nativity. This is what Williams chose, not, 
as one might have expected from his American background, native 
American sources for his myths, or twentieth-century American pain­
ters and photographers (a Charles Sheeler or an Alfred Stieglitz, for 
example) for his art. In Book V it is as though he had never written his 
brilliant, precocious, and passionate book In the American Grain. It is 
as though he could no longer write a "Desert Music." 
This being understood, the fruitful approach, in other words, is not 
to struggle with reconciling the unexpected ground of Book V with the 
rest of Williams' work, but to come to terms with the very significant 
differences which exist. And the suspicion inevitably occurs. Was 
Williams running off to the peripheries, as he had accused Pound and 
Eliot of doing? Would it be fair to characterize him as a "subtle 
conformist," as he himself had once characterized Eliot?10 Would it be 
accurate to say that in Book V Williams chooses caviar, not bread; that 
he reveals a taste for the exquisite which he had more than once 
associated with Pound?11 It seems fair to say he does. 
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The basic opposition set up in the whole of Paterson thus can be 
defined as the conflict between culture (American) and art, or alterna­
tively put, the city and the museum. The two, it is clear, cannot be 
reconciled; neither can contain meaningfully or for long the other. Just 
why this is so has much to do with Williams' concept of the city and 
his notion of culture. Consider Paterson itself. The first four books are 
built on the almost mystical and twin belief that man is defined by the 
city which he has built and lives in, and that the city itself is a living 
organism defined not only by its parts (its people) but also by its 
relationship to its surrounding landscape as well. Like the twentieth-
century visionary architect Paolo Soleri, Williams sees the city as more 
than a machinelike sum of its parts. There is an interpenetration be­
tween the city and water and land, an identification between city and a 
new kind of man. More importantly, the city is a work of art, a moral 
entity. 
Thus Williams chooses a passage from Santayana as the epigraph to 
Book III, ' 'The Library'': 
Cities, for Oliver, were not a part of nature. He could hardly feel, he 
could hardly admit even when it was pointed out to him, that cities are a 
second body for the human mind, a second organism, more rational, 
permanent and decorative than the animal organism of flesh and bone: a 
work of natural yet moral art, where the soul sets up her trophies of 
action and instruments of pleasure. 
A fitting introduction to Book III, perfect because it could not be 
integrated into the main text, only contrasted to it. For Book HI turns 
on the contradiction between city and museum. Instead of "library" 
read "museum," a museum of books which the poet decimates by an 
all powerful blast of the imagination, which he destroys by fire, wind, 
and flood. "The Library is desolation, it has a smell of its own / 
stagnation and death": it is a prison of "Dead men's dreams" which 
threatens to absorb the artist, to black out his consciousness, to possess 
and oppress him in the past. For the books are hollow. Like the Puri­
tans Williams describes in In the American Grain, they are shells only, 
they lack life. As he writes in familiar metaphor as late as 1954 in his 
preface to his Selected Essays, "Masterpieces are only beautiful in a 
tragic sense, like a starfish lying stretched dead on the beach in the 
sun."1 2 
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The reason for this, he explains in "An Approach to the Poem," is 
that the work of art lives only in the period in which it is created. It has 
a finite historical life. The "monumental poems of the past," he says, 
mark 
the record of certain accumulations of human achievements; summa­
tions of all that is distinguished in man, the most distinguished, as far as 
we know, that those various ages produced. But those times came to an 
end leaving those works of art, those poems in their perfection, like 
complex shells upon a shore. Men lived in those poems as surely as fish 
lived in the shells we find among the fossils of the past. But they are not 
there now.13 
Before Book V, Williams (unlike Eliot and Pound, for whom the 
literary tradition exists in space, not time) held to an historical view of 
art. In this context, then, it is clear that the library, the museum, acts to 
keep the poet from the city. And it is the city which for Williams is the 
object of the poem. As he writes in Book III: 
The province of the poem is the world. 
When the sun rises, it rises in the poem 
And when it sets darkness comes down 
And the poem is dark 
In Book III what saves the poet from the museum and draws him back 
into the world? It is the form of the world, the sexual world, in the 
shape of the black woman, "Beautiful Thing." 
But Williams was unable to make the city the province of Book V, 
the only book he left untitled, but which we might dedicate to the care 
and preservation of the museum. Paterson, that swill hole of democ­
racy, was beyond saving. It could never be transformed into a 
Tenochtitlan, Williams' early vision of what the ideal American city 
had once been but could never be again. Williams' extraordinary essay 
on "The Destruction of Tenochtitlan"14 (which is written in a prose so 
charged with emotion as to be poetry) and his 1934 essay entitled "The 
American Background" together form the clearest—even luminous— 
statement he ever made about the city (culture). Tenochtitlan is a 
Utopian city, whose people were infinitely gracious, whose ruler daily 
shared his food (his "natural wealth") with the people, and whose 
beauty was to be found in its markets of "onions, leeks, watercresses, 
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nasturtium, sorrel, artichokes and golden thistle" and "artifices" 
woven into architecture and clothing, not winnowed out as art and put 
away in a museum. It was a city whose tribe remained in touch with the 
primal ground and whose leader, Montezuma, was a poet, an American 
cacique who "was the very person of their ornate dreams, so delicate, 
so prismatically colorful, so full of tinkling sounds and rhythms, so 
tireless of invention." 
Montezuma is the personification of the New World, not Prufrock, 
says Williams in his Prologue to Kora in Hell. Because Montezuma's 
Tenochtitlan, unlike the industrial Paterson, understood, and under­
stood consummately, that culture is not a thing, but an act, not this or 
that isolated product of the artist but the entire process of adjusting to 
local conditions, of creating a community, a city, the process in fact of 
the first four books of Paterson, where emphasis is on the poet walk­
ing, talking, on art in the making as a way of life. "The burning need 
of a culture," says Williams in "The American Background," 
is not a choice to be made or not made, voluntarily, any more than it can 
be satisfied by loans. It has to be where it arises, or everything related to 
the life there ceases. It isn't a thing: it's an act. If it stands still, it is 
dead. It is the realization of the qualities of a place in relation to the life 
which occupies it; embracing everything involved, climate, geographic 
position, relative size, history, other cultures—as well as the character 
of its sands, flowers, minerals and the condition of knowledge within its 
borders. It is the act of lifting these things into an ordered and utilized 
whole which is culture. It isn't something left over afterward. That is 
the record only. The act is the thing.15 
The implication is this: in a perfectly realized culture such as that of 
Tenochtitlan, art is so flawlessly integrated in the city that it disappears 
as a separate entity. Here the "pure" and the "real" (or the virgin and 
the whore, the two elements which Williams so desires to unite in 
Book V) merge. But just as Tenochtitlan collapsed "to be reenkindled, 
never, Never, at least, save in spirit"16 when it was conquered by the 
Cortez-rude, acquisitive people from Europe, so Paterson scarcely had 
a chance to develop a culture of its own. The "local" was exploited by 
such federal money-makers as Hamilton and sabotaged by the imposi­
tion of a culture purchased from without. And as cities in the United 
States grew and museums were built by robber barons to assuage their 
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guilt, Williams argues, the spirit of local community progressively 
disintegrated. Williams believed, in other words, that in the United 
States there was historically a pernicious relationship between the rise 
of the city and the founding of its traditional complement, the museum, 
which in this case housed an imported, not an indigenous culture. And 
the corrupting nexus between the city and the museum was wealth. 
Thus if Williams' purpose in Paterson was to make the local univer­
sal, to roll up the particulars into a whole, this is one reason why he 
ultimately failed. Historically he saw that the cards were stacked 
against him. For his poetics do not include the romantic belief of 
beholding the world in a grain of sand. The intervening term in his 
often-repeated tenet "The local is the universal"17 is culture, an 
indigenous culture, and the process is an historical one: Local yields 
CULTURE yields universal. But an authentic, articulate culture could 
not be raised from the grounds of Paterson, polluted as they were by 
the industry-saturated Passaic. The city could not be made real. 
So in Paterson V Williams came as close as he ever did to joining 
other Moderns in building a personal system—call it a mythology—to 
replace what had been lost in the course of the Nietzschean nineteenth 
century and the industrially polluted twentieth century. If he did not 
create a full-blown Yeatsian system, he did propose a kind of Utopia to 
replace his lost Atlantis, the lost city of Tenochtitlan. What was mis­
sing in Paterson was the splendid element of social harmony and 
beauty found in Tenochtitlan or even in the vital music of Juarez, 
Tenochtitlan corrupted. What was missing was the union between the 
pure and the real, a union impossible either to find or create in one-
dimensional mid-century America. What was missing, in short, was 
the visionary, for certainly there was more than an abundance of the 
"real." And the visionary was to be found, Williams concluded, only 
in art—in, for example, Breughel's painting of the nativity. 
But Williams had his own sacred tenet. It was not an Eliotic union of 
the Christian Father, Son, and Holy Ghost he wished. Nor the Pound­
ian process based upon the teachings of Confucius and resulting in the 
building of the city of Dioce "now in the mind indestructible." Nor 
simple Stevensian contact with the real, something he had had all his 
life. For Williams it was first the union of virgin and whore: 
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the Virgin and the Whore, which 
most endures? the world 
of the imagination most endures : 
[V, i] 
As we saw in "Asphodel," it is survival and permanence, not the 
New,18 that are the values by which Williams swears in Paterson V. 
But they inhere no longer in the "local" marriage, but rather in the 
world of the imagination, or more precisely, the realm of the imagi­
nary. It is neither the virgin nor the whore "which / most endures," 
both being defined in terms of time, either by what has not happened 
to them or by what has happened to them. It is not the creation of one 
out of the other, the making of a virgin from a whore, which could be 
said to describe the process of "Desert Music." It is instead a fusion of 
the two into one by the force of the imagination. Williams, in other 
words, abandons the historical world of Paterson for the timeless world 
of the imagination, which exists outside of it: the museum. Accord­
ingly, his Utopia is not a social construct but a personal image: the 
unicorn. 
The union of opposites, the figure from mythology, the alchemical 
image of the uroboros—this is a strategy completely new to Williams, 
a class of images totally new to his poetry. If we understand his 
lifelong poetics as originating from the dictum "no ideas but in 
things" and read the late poem "Asphodel, That Greeny Flower" as a 
reversal of this, we see exactly how unprecedented this final stage of 
his development is. Neither "thing" nor "idea," the unicorn belongs 
to the realm of the imaginary. Granted, Williams had to locate another 
solution when he found that in Paterson the city could not be made 
real. Granted, there is a dialectical logic to the change between the first 
four books and the fifth. If in the first four he wanted to make what was 
living a sustaining fiction, in the fifth he he wants to give a fiction life. 
If in Book HI he destroys the library as the prison house of language, 
in Book V he exalts the living museum. But why did Williams move 
beyond or reject the "solution," the peace and contentment, he dis­
covered in "Asphodel"? The central images of whore, virgin, and 
unicorn suggest an answer. 
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II. SEXUAL POETICS 
No man in my country has seen a woman naked and painted her as if he 
knew anything except that she was naked. No woman in my country is 
naked except at night. —Contact, IV19 
Of all the major American poets since Whitman, Williams is without 
question the most sexual of our major poets, consistently so, with 
abundant evidence ranging from the cover design of the 1920 Kora in 
Hell, which pictures an ovum surrounded by sperm, to the poet Pater­
son some thirty-odd years later treading the female ground of the park 
to "kindle" his mind. Williams' poetics—blunt as they are—he him­
self frames as a sexual poetics. When in his seventies he looked back at 
his beginnings, he specificially linked his desires for a non-English 
poetry, a local, American poetry, to sex: 
I came to look at poetry from a local viewpoint; I had to find out for 
myself; I'd had no instruction beyond high school literature. When I 
was inclined to write poems, I was very definitely an American kid, 
confident of himself and also independent. From the beginning I felt I 
was not English. If poetry had to be written, I had to do it my own way. 
It all happened very quickly. Somehow poetry and the female sex were 
allied in my mind. The beauty of girls seemed the same to me as the 
beauty of a poem. I knew nothing at all about the sexual approach but I 
had to do something about it. I did it in the only terms I knew, through 
poetry.20 
He was, he disclosed in his 1951 Autobiography with the candor and 
openness he had always displayed toward the matter of sex, "ex­
tremely sexual" in his desires. And in that year, which also saw the 
publication of the fourth book of Paterson, he used the present tense: 
"I am extremely sexual in my desires: I carry them everywhere and at 
all times." "I think that from that arises the drive which empowers us 
all. "21 Williams' particular version of sexual psychology was codified 
as early as the 1910s, elaborated in In the American Grain in 1925 and 
A Voyage to Pagany in 1928, and displayed allegorically in Paterson 
I-1V. 
In a 1917 issue of the Egoist Williams advanced his idiosyncratic 
version of the Lockean proposition that sense experience is the basis 
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for our knowledge of the world. The male and the female have radi­
cally different sense experiences, he states, arguing that the female is 
naturally in touch with the earth, the ground, the concrete, fact, and 
that the male, having no direct link of his own with the earth, is 
naturally given to stargazing and daydreaming. The male, he therefore 
concludes, is driven by a kind of earth-envy to pursue the female and 
thereby possess the earth. "Man's only positive connexion with the 
earth is in the fleeting sex function," he wrote, warning that "either 
sex must hold to his own psychology or relinquish its sense of real-
ity."22 
This tragedy, of course, is exactly what Williams believed befell the 
Puritans, both sexes, and, through them, America. For the Puritans 
repressed, suppressed, oppressed the right to touch. Touch: the word 
and theme resound throughout In the American Grain. "It is this to be 
moral: to be positive, to be peculiar, to be sure, generous, brave—TO 
MARRY, to touch—to give,"23 proclaims Williams. It is this contact 
with the ground, the land, the female body of America which the 
Indian possessed and through which, Williams asserts, the soul grows, 
the spirit of an individual and a place (whether a city or an entire 
country) develops. Given this, he argues that the liberation of the 
Indian residual in every American, the release of passion in every 
American woman, "might be the opening of wonders, of freedom to 
'save the nation.'"24 He offers Daniel Boone, that "great volup-
tuary,"25 as an example of one of the few Americans who discovered 
America by undergoing the twin processes of discovering its land and 
the Indian within himself. Boone, says Williams, allowed himself to 
be driven by the sexual desires which characterize all men. "Because 
of a descent to the ground of his desires," writes Williams, "was 
Boone's life important and does it still remain loaded with power— 
power to strengthen every form of energy that would be voluptuous, 
passionate, possessive in that place which he opened" (italics mine).26 
But most Americans unfortunately followed the example of 
Washington and the penny-thrifty Franklin, thus neutralizing their na­
tive energy with an equal and opposite force of restraint. As a result the 
country as a whole suffered from a lack of touch. And from lack of 
touch followed a lack of closeness, a lack of generosity, a fear of 
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embrace, a brittleness of national soul. "From lack of touch, lack of 
belief,"27 Williams succinctly sums it up. For what is moral, he be­
lieved, grew out of contact with the ground. The two major themes of 
In the American Grain—America's historical repression of "touch" 
and its need for a culture of its own—are thus causally related. It is 
through a sexual approach to the concrete, Williams implies, that an 
authentic culture is created. Moreover it is through a sexual approach 
to the text, to writing, that a language is born. This is perhaps seen 
most clearly in A Voyage to Pagany where Williams describes Evans 
who "made a wife of his writing, his writing—that desire to free 
himself from his besetting reactions by transcending them—thus driv­
ing off his torments and going often to sleep thereafter."28 
Not surprisingly, it is this twin process which Williams chose as the 
rather crude allegorical structure for Paterson I-IV. Paterson, male, 
doctor and writer, personifies the city. The park, female, personifies the 
ground, both the land and the body. And the predictable problem is to 
bring the two together in a satisfying manner. The problem is to give 
real voice to the thoughts (the people) of Paterson: 
Who because they 
neither know their sources nor the sills of their 
disappointments walk outside their bodies aimlessly 
for the most part, 
locked and forgot in their desires—unaroused. 
[I, i] 
To arouse the people, that is the problem. But as the poem progresses 
nothing could seem less probable. Book I: "The Delineaments of the 
Giants" pictures Paterson youth as sexually immature: 
—unfledged desire, irresponsible, green, 
colder to the hand than stone, 
unready—challenging our waking: 
[I, n] 
Book II: "Sunday in the Park" is an anti-Seurat scene of flagrant 
desire and frustration. "Frank vulgarity" is the best that can be ex­
pected from the working classes, what with some men too fat and 
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flaccid to move even a minor muscle and others unaroused and worse, 
unaware of the impulse of desire itself. By Book IV: ' 'The Run to the 
Sea," the decay of healthy sexual relationships has spread to the upper 
classes. In the lesbian scenes ironically titled "An Idyl," Williams 
exposes sex as not just abortive or unrealized, but as unnatural. And it 
is either this, he implies, or nothing at all. For in the city, in the 
financial district, the people are completely stripped, "unsexed": 
At the 
sanitary lunch hour packed woman to 
woman (or man to woman, what's the difference?) 
the flesh of their faces gone 
to fat or gristle, without recognizable 
outline, fixed in rigors, adipose or sclerosis 
expressionless, facing one another, a mould 
for all faces (canned fish) this 
[IV, i] 
Yet throughout the first four books of Paterson Williams does pre­
sent a model of a healthy sexual being who falters only once or twice, 
and that is Paterson (Williams) himself. There is no need to detail this 
since each and'every page could stand as document. Paterson? "His 
mind drinks of desire." Let it suffice to point out that Paterson's 
explicitly sexual sensibility is revealed in his countless images of flow­
ers and tongues of bees, pubic groves of trees, and pearl grey towers. 
In his sensitivity to the land (female) upon which he "instructs" his 
thoughts, focusing his mind on the concrete, on for example the recur­
rent, rhythmic, flaming flight of grasshoppers from which he again 
realizes that there is "no flesh but the caress!" In the letters from "C" 
which expose his sexual (if not sexist) approach to the text, or it could 
be said, his textual approach to sex. And finally in the scenes in which 
Williams dramatizes Paterson's actual physical involvement with 
women—in Paterson's insisting, in fact shouting, that the black girl he 
calls "Beautiful Thing" take off her clothes ("let me purify myself," 
he says), or in Book IV, Paterson's effort, though unsuccessful, to 
seduce the very young and somewhat virginal nurse Phyllis in his 
office. 
With his sexual orientation to the world, Paterson is entirely unlike 
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the personae Stevens and Eliot chose for themselves in their pro­
foundly personal late poems. 
Sing me a song to make death tolerable, a song 
of a man and a woman: the riddle of a man 
and a woman, 
says Williams in Book III. Such a song, sexual and stronger than any 
in Book V, appears in Book I. It is Williams' version of the still point: 
We sit and talk, 
quietly, with long lapses of silence 
and I am aware of the stream 
that has no language, coursing 
beneath the quiet heaven of 
your eyes 
which has no speech; to 
go to bed with you, to pass beyond 
the moments of meeting, while the 
currents float still in mid-air, to 
fall— 
with you from the brink, before 
the crash— 
to seize the moment. 
We sit and talk, sensing a little 
the rushing impact of the giant's 
violent torrent rolling over us, a 
few moments. 
If I should demand it, as 
it has been demanded of others 
and given too swiftly, and you should 
consent. If you would consent 
We sit and talk and the 
silence speaks of the giants 
who have died in the past and have 
returned to those scenes unsatisfied 
and who is not unsatisfied, the 
silent, Singac the rock-shoulder 
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emerging from the rocks—and the giants 
live again in your silence and 
unacknowledged desire— 
And the air lying over the water 
lifts the ripples, brother 
to brother, touching as the mind touches.... 
[I, ii] 
If Eliot could reach this peak of ineffable experience, a point where all 
time is stopped, only through the rhythms of abstract language, 
Williams can reach it only through the body, through sex, through the 
union of male with female. Suspended beyond the world, beyond the 
need for language and the desire for speech, Williams discovers in this 
silence that the giants of the past live again. 
At first this might appear a contradiction of Williams' much talked 
about mission in Paterson to invent the exact language to evoke the 
people, an American idiom to find the rhythm of Paterson life. And it 
would be if Williams' search were interpreted, as it often is, on the 
level of poetic technique—the variable foot et al.—and on that level 
only. But Williams was not so narrow a man. In Paterson he wanted 
also to dramatize the need for touch, for as we've seen it was from this 
that a culture could be created. The touch of the mind must be sensual: 
And the air lying over the water 
lifts the ripples, brother 
to brother, touching as the mind touches.... 
The process is this: from the sexual (sensual, local) to the cultural, to 
the universal. 
III. THE WOMAN IN THE MIND INDESTRUCTIBLE 
Old men cut from touch. 
"The Old Men"29 
If the Williams of Paterson I-IV, a man in his mid-sixties, were to 
be described, one would characterize him as a lusty old man. If one of 
the questions he asked himself was 
Doctor, do you believe in 
"the people," the Democracy? Do 
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you still believe—in this 
swill-hole of corrupt cities? 
Do you, Doctor? Now? 
[Ill, i] 
the answer he gave throughout those four books was, on balance, yes. 
Yes, he could embrace, desired to embrace, women, even though, in 
fact because, they did not embody classical (European) beauty. Their 
beauty was in defiance of authority, a quality Williams had singled out 
in "The American Background" as being quintessentially American.30 
And yes, because at the end of Book IV Williams in spite of it all could 
still head inland, toward other centers of culture. Yes, in short, be­
cause Williams in Paterson I-IV had a sexual hold on life. 
But if we were to ask this same question of the Williams of Paterson 
V, we would have to answer no, he does not still believe in that 
swill-hole, now he wants to "avoid / the irreverent." Whereas in 
Book II he had enjoined himself to "Be reconciled, poet, with your 
world, it is / the only truth!," now he insists upon embracing other 
less tangible worlds, other centuries. And if we were to characterize 
him now it would be as the wise old man reminiscent of the elder Eliot, 
Pound, and Stevens, a calm figure who seeks to preserve and hand on 
tradition. Before Willimas had instructed young writers to "write 
carelessly so that nothing that is not green will survive." Now he sees 
himself as imparting courage, answers, and his own tradition in order 
to get the young 
to foreshorten 
their errors in the use of words which 
he had found so difficult, the errors 
he had made in the use of the 
poetic line 
[V, iii] 
Why this change? Because the link between the body and the mind, 
sex and the text, had been snapped. And with the loss of touch, 
Williams lost his American background. He says as much in / Wanted 
to Write a Poem, published the very year Paterson V was published: 
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. .  . Paterson V must be written, is being written... . Why must it be 
written? Paterson IV ends with the protagonist breaking through the 
bushes, identifying himself with the land, with America. He finally will 
die but it can't be categorically stated that death ends anything. When 
you're through with sex, with ambition, what can an old man create? 
Art, of course, a piece of art that will go beyond him into the lives of 
young people, the people who haven't had time to create. The old man 
meets the young people and lives on.31 
"When you're through with sex, with ambition, what must an old man 
create?" We must not be hesitant to take this literally, for Williams 
was a very literal-minded man. Accordingly, the opening lines of 
Paterson V do not so much express a breakthrough for the poet, as they 
rather frame this very problem: 





from its crag 
—the angle of a forehead 
or far less 
makes him remember when he thought 
he had forgot 
—remember 
confidently 
only a moment, only for a fleeting moment— 
with a smile of recognitions 
[V, i] 
For some readers Williams is now triumphant, "less bound by his 
locality and his immediate present"; he now is free "from time and 
place. " 3  2 But when had Williams ever desired this? I read the passage 
this way: in old age, his old age, writes Williams, the mind attempts to 
rebel from the body, the rock which represents the poem. And it is a 
rebellion nearly successful because the body is almost completely pas­
sive, but fortunately a physical sign will occasionally restore himself 
William Carlos Williams and Paterson V 155 
to himself. The very problem, in other words, is that his mind is no 
longer stirred by actual contact, by touch, by sex, but only by experi­
ence once removed—memory. The problem is a collapse of his world. 
The flesh of the female, the one indispensable element in his way of 
being in and with the world, has been removed. 
How to define himself? How to adjust? A curious kind of narcissism 
confronts him: 
—shall we speak of love 
seen only in a mirror 
—no replica? 
reflecting only her impalpable spirit? 
which is she whom I see 
and not touch her flesh? 
[V, iii] 
The mood is that of melancholy, elegy. As he unsentimentally charac­
terizes himself, 
Paterson has grown older 
the dog of his thoughts 
has shrunk 
to no more than "a passionate letter" 
to a woman, a woman he had neglected 
to put to bed in the past 
[V, iii] 
Much less neglect to put to bed, worse, he does not even manage to ask 
the name of his "Solitary Reaper," his "To the One of Fictive 
Music," the plain woman he sees in the streets. What does he want of 
himself? "Paterson, / keep your pecker up / whatever the detail!" 
What does he wish? He includes the long letter from G. S. telling in 
rushing, drunk-high prose about the whore in all-white, the virgin, 
bride, but this is no longer a part of his life. He translates a poem of 
Sappho's but "a delicate fire" no longer runs through his veins. 
What he desires is desire itself. What he wants is a vision. "The 
dream / is in pursuit!" he says, and although he is here referring to the 
making of an artist, the lines sum up his need as well. He needs a new 
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goal—and he defines it as the element of splendor. Or, to read the 
situation somewhat differently, he needs to be pursued. No longer able 
to possess, no longer active as he was in Paterson I-IV, now he wants 
to be possessed. But he has retired from the world of people. In the 
world of the first four books his dreams were the people themselves. 
Now he asserts: 
Dreams possess me 
and the dance 
of my thoughts 
involve animals 
the blameless beasts. 
[V, ii] 
And in the third and final section of Book V he observes in the calm 
tone of the third person that ' 'Though he is approaching / death he is 
possessed by many poems." To be possessed by dreams, by art, that is 
his desire. Desire, we might say, is in Book V (dis)placed in art. The 
calm he experiences, we might say, is not so much a finding of a 
balance he had never had, but a way of achieving a dynamic equilib­
rium he had once had with the world and lost. Since neither of his two 
models of perfection—that of Tenochtitlan on the social level, or that 
of the still point on the sexual level—are possible, he creates a sub­
stitute: the imaginary. 
Williams thus moves from the "hot" society of Paterson I-IV 
where meaningful human exchange is defined for him in sexual terms 
(if not for the other characters)33 to the "cold" society of Paterson V, 
inhabited by himself, a few letter writers, a few works of art, and a 
few, only a few, memories (Williams is not given to much nostalgia 
here), and initially empty of the Woman he must create in order to 
create a role for himself. 
In Book V he finds himself turning to tradition for models, or at least 
inspiration, because, following Pound's economic theories, in times 
past, there was local control of purchasing power. As he puts it, 
shorthand, in Book IV, "Difference between squalor of spreading 
slums / splendor of renaissance cities." The Renaissance? It stretches 
for him from at least the twelfth century (the century he attributes to the 
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fifteenth-century Cloister tapestries in which he imagines the people 
"All together, working together") to the seventeenth, to Brueghel's 
three wise men who "had eyes for visions / in those days." And so did 
Brueghel, who knew what Williams found himself just learning, or just 
needing: 
Peter Brueghel the artist saw it 
from the two sides the 
imagination must be served— 
and he served 
dispassionately 
[V, iii] 
Until Book V, if I may simplify, Williams had been concerned with 
one side only, the real. Now confronted with death (which on one level 
was very certainly the death of desire) Williams needed a living fic­
tion. The triumph of his imagination was this: not to invest a few past 
masterpieces with life by showing just how concrete they were,34 but to 
work with traditional image clusters in a way unknown to him before 
and create from them a new language of the self within which he could 
survive. If before his was an unmediated vision, now he found it 
necessary to devise a system, or at the very least, assert a belief to 
stand between himself and both the world he could no longer touch and 
approaching death. Interpreted this way, the development of his poetic 
career is seen to be the very reverse of that of Wallace Stevens, who 
spent a lifetime imagining reality and only at the very end made the 
American breakthrough to perceiving the blunt edge of the thing itself. 
Like Stevens' concept of the imagination, Williams' "system" is not 
so much a strategy for putting himself in contact with the world of 
particulars—it does not act at all as a pipeline to the concrete—as it is a 
way of allowing the imagination to exert an equal pressure on the now 
intolerable force of reality, intolerable because it was either too much 
with him in the shape of death, or intolerable because it was not 
enough with him in the shape of sex. The imaginary is a way, we could 
say, of countervailing the all-too-sharp reality principle. 
The three central images—virgin/whore, unicorn, and the 
uroboros—are distinctly related: the first two form an idiosyncratic 
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religious symbol from which, we could say, the uroboros, a figure of 
wholeness, can be generated. Williams' desire, announced in the first 
section of Book V, is to build a "secret world" so that he can "get to 
the end of the sphere." In the third and final section he asserts that he 
has done just that: 
The (self) direction has been changed 
the serpent 
its tail in its mouth 
' 'the river has returned to its beginnings'' 
and backward 
(and forward) 
it tortures itself within me 
until time has been washed finally under: 
and "I knew all (or enough) 
it became me . " 
[V, iii] 
In Book IV Williams presented us with a modern-day industrial 
equivalent of the virgin/whore in the uneducated, unscrupulous, teas­
ing Phyllis, who, it is clear, is qualified to be taken for a virgin and 
damned a whore, but for precisely the wrong reasons. As a counterpart 
to Phyllis, in Book V he postulates an ideal synthesis of the virgin/ 
whore—that of mistress/wife—through a characteristic Williams mix­
ture of the traditions of Christianity, courtly love, and Toulouse-Laut-
rec. Book V is dedicated to Toulouse-Lautrec because, as Williams 
observed in Book III, 
Toulouse Lautrec witnessed 
it: Limbs relaxed 
—all religions 
have excluded it— 
at ease, the tendons 
untensed 
[III, i] 
Williams' "religion," however, does include it—the sexual. For 
Williams, the virgin/whore unites both the innocent and the seductive 
in a sacred union. The virtuous woman gives herself like a gift, un-
hesitantly, to her lover, as does the ideal whore. And the ideal whore is 
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a virgin, and the ideal virgin, Mary, mother and whore of the Holy 
Ghost. This virgin/whore is a purely imaginary construct. Since sex is 
no longer an affair of the body, it must exist in the mind: 
—every married man carries in his head 
the beloved and sacred image 
of a virgin 
whom he has whored 
[V, iii] 
In this vision Williams identifies himself with the unicorn, legen­
dary touchstone of virgins and long established symbol of Christ, a 
fabulous, solitary, ferocious, gentle, beautiful, melancholy, magical 
creature.35 We can assume that Williams chose the unicorn—which 
legend tells us appears freely only to wise men and is tamed only by 
virgins—as symbol for himself and the artist, as well as the symbol of 
what he himself pursued, because the unicorn, "la licorne," is both 
"dame" and "demoiselle," both whore and virgin, virginal in its 
whiteness and power of purification and whorelike in its possession of 
the horn. In French tradition the unicorn, although androgynous, is 
thus considered essentially feminine, an incarnation of the multivalent 
nature of woman. But Williams diverges from this tradition by casting 
the unicorn as male, thereby merging three in one in a new-found 
trinity, itself an image of wholeness, a virile analogue to the uroboros. 
In the unicorn, Williams thus finds an image for what was only a 
hypothesis in Book III ("Say I am the locus / where two women 
meet") and fulfills a dream of Book IV: 
To bring himself in, 
hold together wives in one wife and 
at the same time scatter it, 
the one in all of them 
Weakness, 
weakness dogs him, fulfillment only 
a dream or in a dream. 
[IV, iii] 
Thus from out of his long-held theory of the sexual origin of the text 
(whether it be a poem or a person, a city or a culture), in Paterson V 
Williams turns to the corollary that art is both male and female and 
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constructs an imaginary set to mediate between a diminished life and a 
coming death. From this point, theoretically he can re-member, re­
turn, re-awaken. Now his world can come round again: "The (self) 
direction has been changed." Although trapped, penned-up, and 
penned-in, he can face the "aging body," for he lives in a safe and 
secret world of symbols which "rolls back into the past": 
Through this hole 
at the bottom of the cavern 
of death, the imagination 
escapes intact. 
[V, i] 
In the fifth book of Pater son then, the poem becomes for Williams a 
personal instrument in a way that it had never been before. As late as 
1950 he had defined the poem as having a social function. As he said 
then, "The poem to me (until I go broke) is an attempt, an experiment, 
a failing experiment, toward assertion with broken means but an asser­
tion, always, of a new and total culture, the lifting of an environment 
to expression. Thus it is social, the poem is a social instrument— 
accepted or not accepted seems to be of no material importance."36 
But in Paterson V the poem becomes first and foremost a means of 
personal salvation, not a vehicle for raising an American culture. 
In Book HI Williams had prophesied Book V: 
The descent beckons 
as the ascent beckoned 
Memory is a kind 
of accomplishment 
a sort of renewal 
even 
an initiation, since the spaces it opens are new 
places 
[HI, iii] 
New spaces, new places—this is just what Williams makes in Book V. 
But the form this memory takes is not so much the memories of his 
own past—for these are few and fleeting as he himself admits. Nor I 
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would suggest, is it the larger field of the unconscious, although the 
unicorn and uroboros are indeed what we have come to call archetypal 
symbols. Rather this "memory" is that of Western consciousness 
objectified in European art from which Williams borrows a goal (the 
inclusion of the element of "splendor," I have called it) and adopts, 
adapts a set of images for his own use. As I suggested earlier, this 
strategy sounds curiously like what Williams had accused Pound and 
Eliot of in Book I—of running off 
toward the peripheries— 
to other centers, direct— 
for clarity (if 
they found it) 
loveliness and 
authority in the world— 
[I, hi] 
And it is. But Williams' understanding of what Pound and Eliot were 
doing was meager. If we compare the Williams of Paterson V with the 
Pound of the Pisan Cantos, the Eliot of the Four Quartets, and the 
Stevens of The Rock, we understand just how much his poem suffers in 
comparison. 
As we have seen, the impulse of the long, meditative poem among 
these American poets is to find what will suffice in old age, or, as in 
the case of Eliot, what can be projected for an old age. And as a form it 
is impressive, primarily because its successes are hard won over a long 
period of poetic practice, but also because the emphasis is on process 
and becoming. Process: this by now has become a commonplace of 
criticism, but we must not let familiarity harden us to what should 
remain fresh. The meditative poem has a hidden dramatic form, and 
for this reason, insights can be revealed which are persuasive, 
moments can "occur" which are similar to Joycean epiphanies. 
In Paterson V this is missing. For if Williams intended to adopt the 
meditative mode of the Stevens of The Rock and the Eliot of the Four 
Quartets, as indeed his allusions suggest and his age required, it is 
clear that he either did not understand it or his long life in poetry had 
not prepared him for an entirely new way of writing. Certainly the 
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meditative mode was new to him. Earlier he had most often structured 
his poems in simple terms of anecdote ("This Is Just To Say," for 
example), portraiture ("Sympathetic Portrait of a Child"), the image 
("Spouts") and/or combinations of the three, which tended to result in 
a fleshing out of the narrative line, upon which Pater son I-IV, how­
ever much it may look on the page like a modern collage, is bedrock 
built. Nor did "Asphodel, That Greeny Flower" provide him with 
experience in the strategy of the meditative poem (no matter how much 
we wish to be genuinely, not sentimentally, moved by it), being as it is 
a rather flaccid amble down an associational memory lane: 
And so 
with fear in my heart 
I drag it out 
And keep on talking 
for I dare not stop. 
But Paterson V falls into none of these categories. Williams drops the 
structural methods of the narrative and association and substitutes— 
what? What is the process by which he would win the discovery of the 
uroboros, symbol of integrations, wholeness? Although the reader can 
point to an Eliotic question in section one of Paterson V and an Eliotic 
assertion in section three, it is much more difficult to locate an underly­
ing dramatic or rhetorical logic which allows Williams to make this 
affirmation. The truth is this—that Williams does not so much experi­
ence as assert. His purpose was dramatic, but he could not escape the 
tyranny of the object. In Paterson V he continued his old habit of 
description: he chose a brilliantly defined object—the tapestry which 
weaves the narrative of the unicorn—for his symbol, not something 
ineffable, irreducible to an object, such as Eliot's notion of the still 
point. 
In / Wanted to Write a Poem Williams said that those people who 
had accused him of writing antipoetry had prophesied that "when I 
have suffered . .  . I too shall run for cover; that I too shall seek refuge 
in fantasy. And mind you, I do not say that I will not. To decorate my 
age."37 It would not be too outrageous to suggest that this is indeed 
just what he does in Paterson V—that he decorates a substitute world 
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with unicorns and flowers and a grim reaper and serpents gripping their 
tales in their mouths as though they were so many paintings to be hung 
on the wall of the text. There is something, in other words, curiously 
unconvincing about Paterson V, and Louis Martz's definition of the 
goal (not the procedure) of meditative poetry helps us understand what 
it is. For Martz the meditative poet "seeks himself in himself in order 
to discover or to construct a firm position from which he can include 
the universe. " 3  8 Williams, cut off from his lifelong concept of himself, 
divorced from the ground (the sexual) and thus divorced from his 
native culture (the American grain), sought himself outside himself, 
never reaching a still point from which he could include the universe. 
This was his failure, but his courage was also in this: the infirmities of 
age demanded that he do what he had not done before, and confronting 
those weaknesses, he invented something new. 
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EPILOGUE 
The Sense of an Ending 
One of the central concerns of this book is the nature of wisdom. This 
is a question that deeply interests me, in part because wisdom is so 
little valued in today's technological society. Generally speaking, wis­
dom is confused with authoritarianism and dismissed as specious, 
rather than identified with the persuasiveness of right ideas, that is, 
authority (it is difficult even to rescue the word "authority" from 
contempt). In the Introduction I refer to Gregory Bateson's definition 
of wisdom as he conceives it in Steps Toward an Ecology of Mind. 
There he writes of wisdom as the understanding of ' 'the larger interac­
tive system—that system which if disturbed, is likely to generate ex­
ponential curves of change." For Bateson wisdom is an understanding 
of the pattern which connects a system. The metaphors he uses are 
derived from both ecology and information theory; in terms of a cul­
tural system, he believes, wisdom is crucial to health and social stabil­
ity (not stagnation). In some of the societies Bateson has studied, such 
an understanding of the pattern which connects a system—its 
interdependencies—is built into cultural practices unconsciously. But 
as any intelligent critic of contemporary industrial society knows, this 
is not the case in our culture. We are introducing change into our 
culture—and those of others—so rapidly that it cannot be absorbed; 
explosive curves of change are being generated which threaten to de­
stroy the system itself. Given this crisis, what is necessary for our 
culture is a conscious, not unconscious, perspective on the whole 
which is actively learned. Although in the text I quoted above Bateson 
is speaking primarily about a cultural system, we can apply his ideas to 
the idea of an individual life as well. The problem can then be reformu­
lated: What is the connection between the crisis in our culture and old 
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age? What is the relationship between action and a certain quality of 
thoughtfulness? 
For me, wisdom is intuitively connected with age, hence this book. 
Why? Is there a necessary, although not sufficient, connection between 
wisdom and age? (I recognize, of course, that we can speak of a young 
man as wise and that by this, we generally mean he is balanced in his 
judgments; the wisdom of Stevens' Penelope, as I have shown, differs 
from this. When we refer to a man in his late seventies as youthful, I 
suspect we mean that he is still active in the conventional sense, while 
the wise old man is characterized by a certain stasis, a lack of overt 
movement. In our culture there is no question that we tend to value the 
former over the latter, as we value action over reflectiveness.) In the 
poems considered here, age does bring perspective, a vision of the 
whole which is possible only from a summit. The problematics of 
perspective—of the relationship between action and quietism, experi­
ence and meaning—pervades, as we have seen, much of the Four 
Quartets: Eliot was not sure whether he was indeed old or not. On the 
other hand, we find this constituting perspective transparently articu­
lated in Stevens' last poems—a global view of his life before him, his 
poems a planet on his table. The old man must be poised in a tower, as 
Yeats also knew, nowhere else. 
If this is so, the perspective is not to be identified with action. For 
action requires partisanship, an embodiment of a point of view within 
the system rather than a perspective on the whole of the system, even 
when one understands that others may have competing, equally valid 
claims (believing that a system is sustained by countervailing powers is 
not wise). Perhaps this is one reason why Stevens finally relinquished 
his hold on the idea of a supreme fiction. Action and wisdom are 
basically antithetical, although we surely can speak of a wise action or 
a wisdom that is not passive. If they are antithetical, we see how the 
wisdom of the aged plays its traditional role in a time which requires it 
more urgently than ever before: the image of the wise old man relieves 
the pressure to action, and, for the time being, it is my guess that the 
less we "do" in terms of introducing change into our system, the 
better. 
But, as I have shown, the model of a wise relationship to the world 
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is much more subtle than a self-conscious halt to action. The medita­
tive mode, as it is exemplified by both Stevens' Penelope and San­
tayana, represents an easy interpenetration between mind and world 
which is achieved by surrendering a large measure of self-
consciousness; the unity between mind and nature in Stevens' "World 
as Meditation" represents a system functioning harmoniously of its 
own accord. 
How is such a perspective achieved? Again, I refer to Bateson, 
whose recent Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity, published when he 
was seventy-five, further develops his theory of the ecological evolu­
tion of mind. The last sentence of his book poses a question which he 
originally addressed to the Regents of the University of California: 
"As teachers, " he asks, "are we wise?" To convey what he means by 
wisdom, Bateson evokes the image of the still point. "The still point is 
the setting of the turning world,"1 he writes in a discussion of the 
differences between "feedback" and "calibration," two modes of 
attaining a connection one desires with the world. To illustrate the two 
processes, Bateson uses the examples of shooting a rifle and firing a 
shotgun, respectively. In the former, he notes, the marksman does not 
carry forward what he has learned from one shot to the next, whereas 
in the latter the opposite is true: success is based on learning from past 
experience. "The rifleman simply goes round his cybernetic circuit a 
number of separate times; the man with a shotgun must accumulate his 
skill, packing his successive experiences, like Chinese boxes, each 
within the context of information derived from all previous relevant 
experiences."2 
This we can relate to the kind of learning achieved within the life 
span of an artist. Working with a problem over a long period of 
time—a particular form, a certain theme—an artist embodies the very 
process of calibration (this is not to be confused with simple experience 
or short-term problem solving; tackling one problem and then another 
and then another is not the same as persisting in a single-minded effort 
over a long period of time). In just this way, the achievement of these 
poets—all extraordinarily gifted men—has been the result of a long life 
in poetry, the fruit of the exacting demands of shaping language to fit 
their needs and visions. Working with a material, meeting its resis­
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tances with one's own ideas, this is a learning process, a form of what 
Bateson calls calibration. It is also what we call mastering a discipline, 
combining rigor with imagination, and as such it does not come about 
spontaneously, magically, automatically. Whereas in these poems the 
model of correct thought—what I have called the meditative mode— 
presupposes a relaxing of the mind, an ecological balance between 
mind and world that is appropriate to the age of the poets and the 
requirements of our age, this possibility was prepared only by an active 
shaping of language, the raw material. This learning must be won, it is 
not merely granted. There is no contradiction here. One of the themes 
dramatized in these poems is that of creative readiness for the unex­
pected moment, a receptivity to experience, which has been prepared 
by a long process of learning about the relationship between the self 
and the world, the mind and the world. Without this, the condition of 
receptivity to experience could be too easily mistaken for passivity. 
Moreover, certainly the poems themselves are products of thought, 
forms which have been made. Indeed the implied tension between the 
two poles—the condition of receptivity to experience and the active 
shaping of words—may be disturbing, for in some cases the tension is 
so great that the "next" poem, the possibility or even the necessity of 
the act of writing, threatens to collapse under the strain. Both Eliot and 
Stevens, I sense, moved toward not writing. Eliot, as we know, did 
indeed stop writing poetry. And for Stevens simply to be seems at 
times to be enough. As he wrote in 1950 in a moving letter, which I 
quoted earlier, "It is not always easy to tell the difference between 
thinking and looking out of the window." To write or not to write. As 
critics, we find the very question shocking. Why should it disturb us 
so? Stevens gives us an image of stillness, not stagnation. Perhaps the 
production of meaning itself is no longer necessary. To again quote 
Bateson: "To be still is the essence of calibration. The still point is the 
setting of the turning world." 
To be still and yet moving: a symbol of wisdom. In all four of these 
poets, this paradox—the impetus of movement finding its source in 
stillness—is reflected in yet another way which is in itself an astonish­
ing achievement. Their wisdom is revealed in their ability to incorpo­
rate change into the body of their poetry. In confronting the limit to 
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what the self can achieve—death (I except Eliot)—they understood 
wisdom to be a reaching beyond one's strength. And in the process 
they found new strengths. Their poetry suggests that over time one's 
art can be a self-correcting system, as I put it earlier. The act of writing 
is, as Wallace Stevens wrote so enigmatically and eloquently in "The 
Rock", 
. .  . a cure of ourselves, that is equal to a cure 
Of the ground, a cure beyond forgetfulness. 
For each poet, what had to be given up and what embraced are 
different, conditioned by private obsessions. It is as if they intuitively 
understood that they had work which could only be finished by an act 
of balancing. In the Four Quartets Eliot did what he could to reach 
beyond the impersonality of the poet—one of his preoccupations—to 
present himself, the personal. Stevens had to silence the incessant 
meta-poetry of the mind, abandon the dream of the supreme fiction, 
and accept the thing itself; he desired "reconciliation with every-day 
reality." "The trouble is that poetry," he wrote, "is so largely a 
matter of transformation. To describe a cup of tea without changing it 
and without concerning oneself with some extreme aspect of it is not at 
all the easy thing that it seems to be."3 In the Pisan Cantos Pound 
moved beyond the elite sphere of ' 'literary'' history and into the world 
of outcast men, and magnificently united the two. And Williams made 
the most ambitious effort of the four. For Williams the natural object 
had always been both necessary and sufficient, but in the whole of 
Paterson he abandoned imagism for allegory and abstraction, and in 
the fifth book he exchanged the industrial ground of the United States 
for the European tradition of art. He was wise to do this, although the 
radical difference between the two histories was too great for him to 
bridge. 
The integration of the "new" or the "other" in these poems lends 
support to a developmental theory of psychology. Again, it is not the 
case that the poems and poets verify the theory or vice versa. Nor do I 
subscribe by temperament to the mystical metaphors we find in Jun­
gian psychology or Neumann's work. Furthermore, I think it is wise to 
heed Nisbet's warning that we be suspicious of organic metaphors 
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which imply growth and progress, when in fact there may be only 
change. But Nisbet's insight is particularly useful only when it is 
applied to the development of society. Certainly we need to question 
the myth of progress and trace the intellectual roots of this mistaken 
analysis, but what is curious is that for centuries we should have 
obsessively applied the metaphor of growth to society—a nonorganic 
construct—and denied it to individuals. This is a perversity in our 
thinking, which perhaps the system has exacted from us for its own 
growth: industrial society required economic man who, when old, 
could be discarded because he was no longer useful. But it is not 
accurate to think about the development of a society and the develop­
ment of an individual in the same terms. To do so is to make an error in 
what Bateson calls logical types (Eliot understood this). 
And yet the resistance on the part of the intellectual community to 
developmental psychology is tenacious. Why is this so? I suggest the 
hostility masks a fear of growing old. We reject the very possibility of 
development for it requires that we accept change and ultimately death. 
The psychological mechanism at work is familar: one denies value to 
that which one fears, thus keeping it at arm's length. But this is 
complicated. What we deny to others, we also partially accord to 
ourselves, not realizing that this involves us in a contradiction, a blind­
ness to our own future. Our everyday experience of our own lives tells 
us that we grow wiser as we grow older. Most of us have a sense of 
personal growth, most of us would not wish to repeat our lives, most of 
us believe that we do accumulate experience. Yet we tend not to 
perceive this in others. Nor do we associate it with old age. Others are 
old, we are not. This fear of old age may be so deep that it is coeval 
with consciousness itself, rooted in awareness of our own mortality, 
which we steadfastly deny. As Simone de Beauvoir has written: 
"Whatever the context may be, the biological facts remain. For every 
individual age brings with it a dreaded decline. . . . Old age in others 
also causes an instant repulsion. This primitive reaction remains alive 
even when custom represses it; and in this we see the origin of a 
conflict that we shall find exemplified again and again."4 Thus the 
wisdom of these four poets inheres in their having recognized, and 
accepted, the "other," what was always the stranger to their work, the 
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ghost, the image of themselves as old, mutability. They asserted a 
connection between age and wisdom. To quote Herbert Blau: "All is 
still at the still point of the turning wheel. The circular movement 
activates all the dark and light forces of human nature. Mutability and 
mortality."5 
Although the terms are different, this pattern of integrating different 
parts of the self to achieve balance, wisdom, is essentially the same as 
the Jungian model of individuation. We may object to the Jungian 
concept of the development of the self as the harmonization of the male 
and female principles (although it seems to me that these metaphors are 
also important for our culture), but basically the pattern of the two 
models is that of incorporating meaningful difference—terms which 
are related structurally to one another—into one's life. 
This must be refined further, however, and in doing so, we expose 
one of the inadequacies of the Jungian model. The basic question is: 
Where does this element of "difference" come from? It is surely a 
mistake to think that the quality "wisdom" resides within the person, 
anymore than we are correct in saying that "such-and-such is cold" (it 
is cold only in relationship to something else). This insight reveals one 
of the fundamental difficulties in the Jungian model of individuation: 
the phenomenon of growth is presented as if it were automatically 
generated from within the psyche. It is not an accident that Jung uses 
the image of the philosophical tree to represent psychic growth, a 
metaphor that is misleading because it overemphasizes the automatic, 
programmed character of growth. And within the world of Jungian 
theory the role of art is to reveal the process which is working through 
it; art does not present the mind with new elements and problems to be 
dealt with. It is the degree of passivity that Jung's model implies that is 
inappropriate to a model of human growth and development. 
In this regard, Erik Erikson's model of the unfolding stages of 
psychosocial development is superior, for it correctly emphasizes the 
give and take, the trial and error, which take place between the indi­
vidual and society. (Parenthetically I should add that both theories are 
normative, which the intellectual community also objects to, and 
strenuously. This response too must be analyzed. We are under­
standably uncomfortable when we measure ourselves against stages of 
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growth and find ourselves lacking. Yet the resistance to models of 
authority is too shrill, I believe. But this I must leave aside.) Although 
Erikson's model stresses socializing roles (the role of the adolescent, 
the parent, the worker, and so on), I find his model more useful than 
Jung's in accounting for the development of what we call wisdom 
because it does deal with the notion of learning (calibration, as Bateson 
calls it) as a systematic exchange between organism and environment, 
which we could define as the materials of one's art, as well as one's 
social world. Difference, in other words, does not so much come from 
within (although one must meet it with both rigor and imagination, if 
one is to learn anything or achieve anything of value), as it does from 
without. For Bateson—and I think he is right—this is a definition of 
creative thought: "Creative thought must always contain a random 
component. The exploratory processes—the endless trial and error of 
mental progress—can achieve the new only by embarking upon path­
ways randomly presented, some of which when tried are somehow 
selected for something like survival."6 
As the above suggests, I do not agree with the cynical Yeats who 
asserted darkly that wisdom is a property of the dead. Nor by wisdom 
do I mean the maxims which we find in "The Wisdom of Solomon," 
or the Ta Hio of Confucius, although they are by no means irrelevant. 
Indeed some of the sayings, like the following from "The Wisdom of 
Solomon," are just now being "proved" by social gerontologists 
statistically: "If you have not gathered wisdom in your youth, / How 
will you find it when you are old?" Instead, I mean something much 
more abstract both in terms of the lives and art of these individual poets 
and the role their poetry plays in the larger domain of cultural history. 
In closing this book, I take pleasure in referring to Hannah Arendt's 
splendid book The Human Condition, which I have had occasion to 
return to recently. In that model of lucid thought, Arendt traces our 
alienation in the modern world to the historical development of West­
ern culture, which has reversed the hierarchical order between the vita 
contemplativa and the vita activa. Worse, the contemplative life— 
once the supreme value in human life—has been rendered valueless. 
This, she argues, is a perversion, for the contemplative life represents 
the highest, perhaps the purest, activity of which we are capable. 
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The late poems of these poets embody that which is lacking in our 
culture. The pursuit of the eternal—which is indeed what Pound, Eliot, 
and Williams, and even Stevens were devoted to—cannot be submitted 
to the coarse test of pragmatism. Contemplation, Arendt insists, is not 
the same as thought and reasoning. Contemplation is absolute quiet. 
Contemplation has as its goal beholding the truth. Wisdom has its 
source in solitude, although to be in solitude is to be with one's self, a 
partner. The still point. "Every movement," she writes, "the 
movements of body and soul as well as of speech and reasoning, must 
cease before truth. Truth, be it the ancient truth of Being or the Chris­
tian truth of the Living God, can reveal itself only in complete human 
stillness."7 And these meditative poems testify to the nobility of the 
life of the mind as the quintessential human activity. 
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